【正文】
ach firm sets its own price assuming the other firm’s outputs are fixed. Cournot equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium. The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Dominant Strategy ?―I’m doing the best I can no matter what you do. You’re doing the best you can no matter what I do.‖ ? Nash Equilibrium ?―I’m doing the best I can given what you are doing. You’re doing the best you can given what I am doing.‖ ? Dominant strategy is a special case of Nash equilibrium The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Two cereal panies face a market in which two new types of cereal can be successfully introduced, provided each type is introduced by only one firm ? Product Choice Problem ? Market for one producer of crispy cereal ? Market for one producer of sweet cereal ? Each firm only has the resources to introduce one cereal ? Noncooperative Product Choice Problem Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 ? If Firm 1 hears Firm 2 is introducing a new sweet cereal, its best action is to make crispy ? Bottom left corner is Nash equilibrium ? What is other Nash Equilibrium? Beach Location Game ? Scenario ?Two petitors, Y and C, selling soft drinks ?Beach is 200 yards long ?Sunbathers are spread evenly along the beach ?Price Y = Price C ?Customer will buy from the closest vendor Beach Location Game ? Where will the petitors locate (., where is the Nash equilibrium)? ? Will want to all locate in center of beach ?Similar to groups of gas stations, car dealerships, etc. Ocean 0 B Beach A 200 yards C The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Maximin Strategies Scenario ?Two firms pete selling file encryption software ?They both use the same encryption standard (files encrypted by one software can be read by the other advantage to consumers) ?Firm 1 has a much larger market share than Firm 2 ?Both are considering investing in a new encryption standard Maximin Strategy Firm 1 Don’t invest Invest Firm 2 0, 0 10, 10 20, 10 100, 0 Don’t invest Invest 。 ? 土地使用權(quán)從土地所用權(quán)中分離出來 , 并依此為基礎(chǔ)形成農(nóng)業(yè) ( 或土地 ) 雙層經(jīng)營體制( 全稱為以家庭承包經(jīng)營為基礎(chǔ) , 統(tǒng)分結(jié)合的雙層經(jīng)營體制 ) 。 ? 土地政策是農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展的核心政策之一,制定合理的土地政策也是農(nóng)業(yè)可持續(xù)的發(fā)展的重要前提。 ? 國內(nèi)支持 :中國黃箱政策的微量允許水平為 % 。以 19861990年為基期,從 1995年起,發(fā)達(dá)國家在 6年內(nèi)削減 20%的綜合支持量( AMS),發(fā)展中國家 10年內(nèi)削減 13%;對(duì)具體農(nóng)產(chǎn)品(或所有農(nóng)產(chǎn)品)的支持,發(fā)達(dá)國家的 AMS只要不超過生產(chǎn)總值的 5%,發(fā)展中國家不超過 10%(中國為 %),無須削減。我省常用的耕整機(jī)、插秧機(jī)、播種機(jī)、收割機(jī)等,補(bǔ)貼標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為銷售價(jià)的 30%,農(nóng)戶購買時(shí)直接扣除。國際上農(nóng)業(yè)財(cái)政支持大部分用于直接補(bǔ)貼農(nóng)業(yè)。 中國的農(nóng)業(yè)支持政策 ? 世界上存在一種普遍趨勢即窮國歧視農(nóng)業(yè),而富國資助農(nóng)民。2020/9/15 中國農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策及未來發(fā)展趨勢 中國農(nóng)業(yè)的現(xiàn)狀 ? 農(nóng)民:文化素質(zhì)相對(duì)較低,年輕勞動(dòng)力外出務(wù)工; ? 耕地:土地集體所有,家庭承包經(jīng)營,平均分配,人均耕地很少,土地細(xì)碎化; ? 農(nóng)民組織化程度較低,以單家獨(dú)戶生產(chǎn)為主; ?