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service and the providing it, we may consider this a typical “reform”. 比如,某個地方當局一項為老人和殘疾人提供“家庭幫助”(家庭照顧)的計劃按照準市場的原則進行了重新修改,將購買服務(wù)的當局和提供服務(wù)的成員分離開來,我們可將此視為一項典型的“改革”。 When, however, we discover that the contract drawn up for the service is 700 pages long and that the actual service provided seems to have changed very little in either quality or quantity, then doubt sets in 來臨、開始、到來. 然而,如果我們發(fā)現(xiàn),為這項服務(wù)而起草的合同文件厚達700頁,而實際提供的服務(wù)在數(shù)量上和質(zhì)量上只有非常小的改變時,質(zhì)疑就開始產(chǎn)生了。We wonder if more trust between the parties concerned might not be a more efficient option, enabling a much shorter contract (or no contract at all) and radically reduced monitoring costs. 我們會想,在相關(guān)方之間建立更多的信任也許會是更好的選擇,這樣,合同文件就會簡短得多(甚至可能根本不需要合同),并且會大大減少監(jiān)督費用。Furthermore, even if a particular reform clearly “succeeds” in respect of one or two of the objectives mentioned above (savings, say, and improvement in quality) it is unlikely that it will succeed in all. 此外,即便一項特定的改革確實在上面提到的一個或兩個目標方面(節(jié)余、宣示和質(zhì)量改進)獲得了“成功”,它也不可能完全獲得成功。Indeed, we shall argue later that certain tradeoffs 權(quán)衡、取舍、交易、妥協(xié) and dilemmas are exceedingly mon in administrative change, so that the achievement of one or two particular ends might well be “paid for” by a lowered performance in other respects: “rule over specialized decision makers in a bureaucracy is maintained by selective crackdowns 鎮(zhèn)壓、制裁、強制取締、懲罰 on one goal at a time, steering the equilibrium—without ever acknowledging that tightening up on one criterion implies slackening off 放慢、松勁 on another”. 實際上,我們在后面會說明,行政改革中導致的權(quán)衡和兩難困境很常見,因此,某一項或兩項目標的實現(xiàn)很可能會被其他方面較差的表現(xiàn)“抵消”:“官僚體制中專門的決策者遵循的規(guī)則是,一次針對一個目標采取措施,從而控制平衡——但他們沒有認識到,緊縮某一項指標意味著放松另一項指標”。For example, if we subject public servants to more effective political supervision and control, can we simultaneously gift 賦予、給予、向……贈送 them greater freedom and flexibility to manage? 例如,如果我們對公務(wù)員實施更有效的政治監(jiān)督和控制,我們能否同時賦予他們更多的自由和管理的靈活性?The optimists will say yes, by laying do