【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 of the firm. 管理者的職能是監(jiān)督要素的契約的執(zhí)行以及確保企業(yè)的生命力。For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous associations of a manager with success and failure are information about his talents. 對于管理者市場而言，管理者之前的成敗代表著管理者的才能。The manager of a firm, like the coach of any team, may not suffer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current performance of his team, but the success or failure of the team impacts his future wages, and this gives the manager a stake in the success of the ，就像團隊里的教練，其現(xiàn)在的工資并不受他的團隊現(xiàn)在的表現(xiàn)影響，但是他的團隊的成敗將影響他的未來工資，這就給予了管理者關心團隊成功的激勵。The firm39。s security holders provide important but indirect assistance to the managerial labor market in its task of valuing the firm39。s management. 企業(yè)證券的持有者提供了一個重要但是非直接的幫助在勞動力市場評價企業(yè)的管理者。A security holder wants to purchase securities with confidence that the prices paid reflect the risks he is taking and that the securities will be priced in the future to allow him to reap the rewards (or punishments) of his risk （或者懲罰）。Thus, although an individual security holder may not have a strong interest in directly overseeing the management of a particular firm, he has a strong interest in the existence of a capital market which efficiently prices the firm39。s securities. 因此，盡管一個證券的持有者并沒有興趣直接關心某一特定企業(yè)的管理者，但是他對能夠反應企業(yè)價值的資本市場十分感興趣。The signals provided by an efficient capital market about the values of a firm39。s securities are likely to be important for the managerial labor market39。s revaluations of the firm39。s management. 有效市場關于企業(yè)證劵價值的信號對于管理者市場關于企業(yè)管理者的評價十分重要。We e now to the central question. 我們現(xiàn)在碰到了核心問題。To what extent can the signals provided by the managerial labor market and the capital market, perhaps along with other marketinduced mechanisms, discipline managers?管理者勞動市場和資本市場提供的信號，也許伴隨其他價格機制，多大程度上約束管理者。 We first discuss, still in general terms, the types of discipline imposed by managerial labor markets, both within and outside of the firm. 我們首先在一般意義上討論，管理者勞動市場對企業(yè)內(nèi)和企業(yè)外施加的約束的類型。We then analyze specific conditions under which this discipline is sufficient to resolve potential incentive problems that might be associated with the separation of security ownership and ，上述約束對解決企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離帶來的激勵問題十分有作用。The Viability of Separation of Security Ownership and Control of the Firm: General Comments 企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離的生命力。一般評論The outside managerial labor market exerts many direct pressures on the firm to sort and pensate managers according to performance. 外部的管理者勞動力市場對企業(yè)施加了許多壓力以促使企業(yè)根據(jù)管理者的表現(xiàn)給予選擇和補償。One form of pressure es from the fact that an ongoing firm is always in the market for new 。 Potential new managers are concerned with the mechanics by which their performance will be judged, and they seek information about the responsiveness of the system in rewarding ，以及搜尋其表現(xiàn)的報酬的系統(tǒng)反應的信息。Moreover, given a petitive managerial labor market, when the firm39。s reward system is not responsive to performance the firm loses managers, and the best are the first to ，給定一個競爭的管理者勞動力市場，當企業(yè)的報酬并不是管理者表現(xiàn)的反應，企業(yè)將會失去管理者，最好的管理者會首先離去。 There is also much internal monitoring of managers by managers 。 Part of the talent of a manager is his ability to elicit and measure the productivity of lower managers, so there is a natural process of monitoring from higher to lower levels of ，因此這里有一個自上而下的管理者監(jiān)督機制。 Less well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top. 然而，這一自上而下的監(jiān)督機制并沒有受到好評。Lower managers perceive that they can gain by stepping over shirking or less petent managers above them. 下級的管理者意識到緊跟著弱懦和沒有能力的管理者會受到更好的收益。Moreover, in the team or nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is concerned with the performance of managers above and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of theirs. 進一步，在一個組織或者企業(yè)中，每個管理者都關注他的上級和下級管理者的表現(xiàn)，因為他的邊際生產(chǎn)率與這些管理者的表現(xiàn)是正相關的。Finally, although higher managers are affected more than lower managers, all managers realize that the managerial labor market uses the performance of the firm to determine each manager39。s outside opportunity wage. 最后，盡管頂層的管理者相對下面的管理者更受企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的影響，但是所有管理者都意識到管理者勞動市場是根據(jù)企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)來決定每一個管理者外部可選擇機會的工資。In short, each manager has a stake in the performance of the managers above and below him and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of monitoring in both ，每一個管理者都與上下級管理者有著利益關系，結(jié)果，都會有一些對上下級管理者的監(jiān)督。All managers below the very top level have an interest in seeing that the top managers choose policies for the firm which provide the most positive signals to the managerial labor ，這種政策向管理勞動力市場提供最為確切的信號。But by what mechanism can top management be disciplined?但是最高層管理者如何受到約束呢？ Since the body designated for this function is the board of directors, we can ask how it might be constructed to do its job. 因為董事會的建立正是為了實現(xiàn)這個功能，我們會問董事會如何構(gòu)建以實現(xiàn)這個職能。A board dominated by security holders does not seem optimal or endowed with good survival properties. 證券持有人支配的董事會并不是最優(yōu)的或者具有強生命力的性質(zhì)。Diffuse ownership of securities is beneficial in terms of an optimal allocation of risk bearing, but its consequence is that the firm39。s security holders are generally too diversified across the securities of many firms to take much direct interest in a particular ，但是結(jié)果導致證券持有者過于分散持有企業(yè)的證券以至于并不關心特定企業(yè)。 If there is petition among the top managers themselves (all want to be the boss of bosses), then perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors. 如果企業(yè)高層管理者之間存在競爭（都想成為老板們的老板），他們也許是最好的控制董事會的人選。They are most directly in the line of fire from lower managers when the markets for securities and managerial labor give poor signals about the performance of the firm. 當證券市場和管理勞動力市場發(fā)出企業(yè)表現(xiàn)不好時，高層管理者最容易受到下面管理者的批評。Because of their power over the firm39。s decisions, their market determined opportunity wages are also likely to be most affected by market signals about the performance of the ，他們的市場決定的機會工資最受企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的市場信號的影響。 If they are also in petition for the top places in the firm, they may be the most informed and responsive critics of the firm39。s performance. 如果他們都競爭企業(yè)的最高位置，他們應該是最為熟悉企業(yè)業(yè)績的人，也是企業(yè)業(yè)績最好的評價者。Having gained control of the board,