【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 of the firm. 管理者的職能是監(jiān)督要素的契約的執(zhí)行以及確保企業(yè)的生命力。For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous associations of a manager with success and failure are information about his talents. 對(duì)于管理者市場(chǎng)而言，管理者之前的成敗代表著管理者的才能。The manager of a firm, like the coach of any team, may not suffer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current performance of his team, but the success or failure of the team impacts his future wages, and this gives the manager a stake in the success of the ，就像團(tuán)隊(duì)里的教練，其現(xiàn)在的工資并不受他的團(tuán)隊(duì)現(xiàn)在的表現(xiàn)影響，但是他的團(tuán)隊(duì)的成敗將影響他的未來(lái)工資，這就給予了管理者關(guān)心團(tuán)隊(duì)成功的激勵(lì)。The firm39。s security holders provide important but indirect assistance to the managerial labor market in its task of valuing the firm39。s management. 企業(yè)證券的持有者提供了一個(gè)重要但是非直接的幫助在勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)評(píng)價(jià)企業(yè)的管理者。A security holder wants to purchase securities with confidence that the prices paid reflect the risks he is taking and that the securities will be priced in the future to allow him to reap the rewards (or punishments) of his risk （或者懲罰）。Thus, although an individual security holder may not have a strong interest in directly overseeing the management of a particular firm, he has a strong interest in the existence of a capital market which efficiently prices the firm39。s securities. 因此，盡管一個(gè)證券的持有者并沒(méi)有興趣直接關(guān)心某一特定企業(yè)的管理者，但是他對(duì)能夠反應(yīng)企業(yè)價(jià)值的資本市場(chǎng)十分感興趣。The signals provided by an efficient capital market about the values of a firm39。s securities are likely to be important for the managerial labor market39。s revaluations of the firm39。s management. 有效市場(chǎng)關(guān)于企業(yè)證劵價(jià)值的信號(hào)對(duì)于管理者市場(chǎng)關(guān)于企業(yè)管理者的評(píng)價(jià)十分重要。We e now to the central question. 我們現(xiàn)在碰到了核心問(wèn)題。To what extent can the signals provided by the managerial labor market and the capital market, perhaps along with other marketinduced mechanisms, discipline managers?管理者勞動(dòng)市場(chǎng)和資本市場(chǎng)提供的信號(hào)，也許伴隨其他價(jià)格機(jī)制，多大程度上約束管理者。 We first discuss, still in general terms, the types of discipline imposed by managerial labor markets, both within and outside of the firm. 我們首先在一般意義上討論，管理者勞動(dòng)市場(chǎng)對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)和企業(yè)外施加的約束的類型。We then analyze specific conditions under which this discipline is sufficient to resolve potential incentive problems that might be associated with the separation of security ownership and ，上述約束對(duì)解決企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離帶來(lái)的激勵(lì)問(wèn)題十分有作用。The Viability of Separation of Security Ownership and Control of the Firm: General Comments 企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離的生命力。一般評(píng)論The outside managerial labor market exerts many direct pressures on the firm to sort and pensate managers according to performance. 外部的管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)對(duì)企業(yè)施加了許多壓力以促使企業(yè)根據(jù)管理者的表現(xiàn)給予選擇和補(bǔ)償。One form of pressure es from the fact that an ongoing firm is always in the market for new 。 Potential new managers are concerned with the mechanics by which their performance will be judged, and they seek information about the responsiveness of the system in rewarding ，以及搜尋其表現(xiàn)的報(bào)酬的系統(tǒng)反應(yīng)的信息。Moreover, given a petitive managerial labor market, when the firm39。s reward system is not responsive to performance the firm loses managers, and the best are the first to ，給定一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)，當(dāng)企業(yè)的報(bào)酬并不是管理者表現(xiàn)的反應(yīng)，企業(yè)將會(huì)失去管理者，最好的管理者會(huì)首先離去。 There is also much internal monitoring of managers by managers 。 Part of the talent of a manager is his ability to elicit and measure the productivity of lower managers, so there is a natural process of monitoring from higher to lower levels of ，因此這里有一個(gè)自上而下的管理者監(jiān)督機(jī)制。 Less well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top. 然而，這一自上而下的監(jiān)督機(jī)制并沒(méi)有受到好評(píng)。Lower managers perceive that they can gain by stepping over shirking or less petent managers above them. 下級(jí)的管理者意識(shí)到緊跟著弱懦和沒(méi)有能力的管理者會(huì)受到更好的收益。Moreover, in the team or nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is concerned with the performance of managers above and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of theirs. 進(jìn)一步，在一個(gè)組織或者企業(yè)中，每個(gè)管理者都關(guān)注他的上級(jí)和下級(jí)管理者的表現(xiàn)，因?yàn)樗倪呺H生產(chǎn)率與這些管理者的表現(xiàn)是正相關(guān)的。Finally, although higher managers are affected more than lower managers, all managers realize that the managerial labor market uses the performance of the firm to determine each manager39。s outside opportunity wage. 最后，盡管頂層的管理者相對(duì)下面的管理者更受企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的影響，但是所有管理者都意識(shí)到管理者勞動(dòng)市場(chǎng)是根據(jù)企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)來(lái)決定每一個(gè)管理者外部可選擇機(jī)會(huì)的工資。In short, each manager has a stake in the performance of the managers above and below him and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of monitoring in both ，每一個(gè)管理者都與上下級(jí)管理者有著利益關(guān)系，結(jié)果，都會(huì)有一些對(duì)上下級(jí)管理者的監(jiān)督。All managers below the very top level have an interest in seeing that the top managers choose policies for the firm which provide the most positive signals to the managerial labor ，這種政策向管理勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)提供最為確切的信號(hào)。But by what mechanism can top management be disciplined?但是最高層管理者如何受到約束呢？ Since the body designated for this function is the board of directors, we can ask how it might be constructed to do its job. 因?yàn)槎聲?huì)的建立正是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)功能，我們會(huì)問(wèn)董事會(huì)如何構(gòu)建以實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)職能。A board dominated by security holders does not seem optimal or endowed with good survival properties. 證券持有人支配的董事會(huì)并不是最優(yōu)的或者具有強(qiáng)生命力的性質(zhì)。Diffuse ownership of securities is beneficial in terms of an optimal allocation of risk bearing, but its consequence is that the firm39。s security holders are generally too diversified across the securities of many firms to take much direct interest in a particular ，但是結(jié)果導(dǎo)致證券持有者過(guò)于分散持有企業(yè)的證券以至于并不關(guān)心特定企業(yè)。 If there is petition among the top managers themselves (all want to be the boss of bosses), then perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors. 如果企業(yè)高層管理者之間存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)（都想成為老板們的老板），他們也許是最好的控制董事會(huì)的人選。They are most directly in the line of fire from lower managers when the markets for securities and managerial labor give poor signals about the performance of the firm. 當(dāng)證券市場(chǎng)和管理勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)發(fā)出企業(yè)表現(xiàn)不好時(shí)，高層管理者最容易受到下面管理者的批評(píng)。Because of their power over the firm39。s decisions, their market determined opportunity wages are also likely to be most affected by market signals about the performance of the ，他們的市場(chǎng)決定的機(jī)會(huì)工資最受企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的市場(chǎng)信號(hào)的影響。 If they are also in petition for the top places in the firm, they may be the most informed and responsive critics of the firm39。s performance. 如果他們都競(jìng)爭(zhēng)企業(yè)的最高位置，他們應(yīng)該是最為熟悉企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的人，也是企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)最好的評(píng)價(jià)者。Having gained control of the board,