【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 998). The cleared land would be sold to private developers at a reduced cost, while residentsdisplaced through ―slum clearance‖ would be rehoused in new public housing announced its plans at an October 1946 luncheon whose guests included the publishersof the city‘s major newspapers, the presidents of the city‘s largest banks, and top real estateexecutives (Neil, 1952). During the following months, Milton Mumford, Holman Pettibone, and other members ofMHPC‘s inner circle worked with Republican Governor Dwight Green and Democratic MayorMartin Kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998). These efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Actand the Relocation Act, in July 1947. The bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban renewal unveiled by MHPC less than a ‘s efforts received a boost with the election of Martin Kennelly as mayor in had been governed since the early 1930s by a powerful Democratic Party machine. Bythe end of World War II, however, a series of scandals implicating current mayor Edward Kellyproduced growing support for reform (Biles, 1984。 O‘Malley, 1980). 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設計外文文獻 及譯文 6 In the national electionsof 1946, half of the Chicago area‘s congressional seats were won by Republicans (O‘Malley,1980). To preempt the growing reform wave, leaders of the city‘s Democratic organization choseKennelly as the party‘s nominee for mayor. A successful business executive with no previous ties to the machine, Kennelly was appealing to reformers. However, as the machine‘s candidate formayor with no political base of his own, he had little political leverage to assert his independencefrom the party organization (Biles, 1995).Kennelly was well known in business circles, serving as vicepresident of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, chairman of the Red Cross fund drive, a trustee of DePaulUniversity, and a member of the Federal Reserve Bank‘s industrial advisory mittee (Biles,1995). After assuming office in April 1947, he quickly made urban renewal a priority, appointing a 15member Committee for Housing Action to develop proposals for housing and slum clearance. The mittee, chaired by Holman Pettibone and including fellow MHPC board membersFerd Kramer and Milton Mumford, played a key role in the passage of the state‘s 1947 urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998). In July 1948, Governor Green announced Chicago‘s first urbanrenewal project to be carried out under the new law (Chicago Tribune, 1948). Groundbreakingfor the construction of new public housing units followed several years later. While progress on urban redevelopment during the early postwar years was heartening tocivic leaders and other proponents of urban renewal, problems soon began to surface. Landassembly, slum clearance, and public housing construction were all taking much longer thanoriginally expected, in some cases placing the pletion of projects in jeopardy. The crux of theproblem, most civic leaders agreed, was the fragmentation of the city‘s administrative powers,which posed a barrier to quick, decisive action. Urban renewal policy was administered by severaldifferent agencies, with responsibilities for slum clearance, redevelopment, public housing, andother activities divided among the early 1950s, this structure had was increasingly difficult to achieve, creating ―many points at which success [could]be blocked。 but none at which it [could] be assured‖ (MHPC, 1956a, p. 3). A second and related problem was posed by the weakness of the executive branch of citygovernment. Formally speaking, Chicago was a councilgoverned city. City council held thepower of approval over mayoral appointments, it prescribed the duties and powers of most city officers, and it could create new city departments and agencies at will. It also exercised 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設計外文文獻 及譯文 7 variousadministrative powers, including preparation of the city budget, awarding of city contracts, andapproval of zoning variances. For urban renewal projects, council approval was required fordesignation of project areas, site plans, the terms of sale of cityowned land to developers,rezonings, and street closings (Chicago City Council, 1953). A council majority could blockvirtually any action by the mayor (Banfield, 1961。 Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1954). As a prehensive program for urban redevelopment, urban renewal policy required a citywide perspective on the part of local government officials. However, aldermen were frequentlyindifferent to planning and development issues that did not directly concern their situations where their wards were affected, the needs of ward constituents typically came first. If anurban renewal or public housing project was opposed by a substantial number of ward residents,the alderman representing that district was likely to oppose it as well (Meyerson amp。 Banfield,1955). Without strong executive leadership, an uncooperative alderman or bloc of aldermencould derail plans for new the past, the office of the mayor was strengthened informally through the fusion of politicaland administrative power (Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1972). Previous mayors such asEdward Kelly had dominated city council by forming alliances with party leaders or by servingjointly as mayor and machine boss. Mayor Kennelly, however, distanced himself from machineleaders and made no effort to bring city council under his control. As he put it early in his term,―Chicago is a councilgoverned city . . . . I don‘t think it‘s a function of the mayor to boss thealdermen‖ (quoted in Simpson, 2020, p. 107). With control over urban renewal policy lodged, bydefault, in city council, coor