【正文】 oduction Within the past two years investors have been plagued by numerous instances of fraud and scandal in corporate America. Financial scandals reduce investors39。 finally multiple events from the same firm may bias the independence of the variables, management turnovers and longterm returns. As shown in panel A of Table I, we have a total of 291 unique firms with their first offense included in the dataset, relatively evenly spread out across the decade. These incidents are not clustered around a few years. To record the management turnover information of these 291 firms, Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives (Register) is used. The position of top management (Chairman, CEO and President), financial management (CFO, Treasurer and Controller) and board during the fiveyear event window (2, 2) is documented. Also documented are their auditing firms, auditing firm turnover, and number of employees.We separately code the turnover for two subperiods (2, 0), and (1, 2). SEC investigation usually goes through the following process: After initial review, if a case warrants further scrutiny, the agency initiates an informal investigation and invites related persons to cooperate by providing documents and testimony. If the informal investigation reveals strong evidence of violating the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the SEC tends to pursue a formal investigation. Therefore, the investigation period can take place much earlier than the official AAER release date and firms frequently fire their alleged management team during the investigation period. One also has to be cautious in interpreting the management turnover of AAER firms since the gap between accounting fraud and SEC enforcement disclosure can be lengthy. The average gap between the year the fraud was mitted and the AAER release is years while the average length of the alleged fraud period is years. Thus we feel it is important to document the management turnover two years prior to the AAER event year. Likewise, two subsequent years will allow a long enough period for firms to make decisions on whether to keep their existing management team.翻譯：會計(jì)欺詐和管理層的人員流動率文摘會計(jì)欺詐和丑聞的影響已成為最近幾年的公共政策議論的中心話題。2002年7月30日,布什總統(tǒng)簽署了《薩班斯奧克斯利法案》。薩班斯奧克斯利法案的通過,是兩個(gè)重大事件的直接后果中列出以下兩段:2001年10月,宣布安然這個(gè)能源巨頭,它的盈利被夸大了12億美元。2002年6月25日,MCI世通、第二大長途公司在美國,披露在前五個(gè)季度一個(gè)38億美元的會計(jì)錯(cuò)誤，這成為了歷史上最大的會計(jì)欺詐案件。這些實(shí)例也表明,高級軍官最終負(fù)責(zé)公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的完整性。他們不認(rèn)為系統(tǒng)性證據(jù)異常高的營業(yè)額在高級經(jīng)理和董事。Mian(2001)研究的選擇和更換首席財(cái)務(wù)官和發(fā)現(xiàn),一般情況下,在首席財(cái)務(wù)官失誤是紀(jì)律,他們是往往有一種操作資產(chǎn)收益率下降,消極的超額回報(bào),CEO流動率高得離譜。本文的其余部分組織如下:在第二部分,我們描述數(shù)據(jù)的選擇和顯示單變量之間的比較AAER公司和對照樣品。a .示例AAER的數(shù)據(jù)庫被用來提取所有樣本公司在1990 2000年期間。我們分別對兩subperiods營業(yè)額的代碼(2，0),(1，2)。17。如果非正式的調(diào)查揭示了強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù),違反了1934年證券交易法案,美國證券交易委員會傾向于追求一項(xiàng)正式調(diào)查。作為一個(gè)表中所示，我們總共有291個(gè)不同的公司和他們的第一次進(jìn)攻包含在數(shù)據(jù)集、相對均勻鋪滿十年的。所有的公司包括在SEC會計(jì)和審計(jì)執(zhí)行版本(AAER)1990 2000年期間,構(gòu)成了人口研究。金融集團(tuán)金融營業(yè)額,包括首席財(cái)務(wù)官、司庫和控制器,更具代表性比CFO營業(yè)額,主要是因?yàn)镃FO可能不一定是負(fù)責(zé)會計(jì)欺詐。他們的發(fā)現(xiàn)而感到驚訝,因?yàn)闀?jì)欺詐信號低公司的價(jià)值以及大型欺詐可能會不利于股東的利益。只有在會計(jì)欺詐檢測SEC是否有嚴(yán)重的影響該公司。薩利文。很好地隱藏在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表,安然已經(jīng)數(shù)十億美元的債務(wù)，是由于欺詐會計(jì)、非法貸款和伙伴關(guān)系。它創(chuàng)建了一個(gè)重大的,新的視野和管理制度,對公共會計(jì)行業(yè),強(qiáng)加了很多重要的改革公司治理和信息披露要求,而且戲劇性的增加刑事處罰,因?yàn)椤鞍最I(lǐng)犯罪。我們使用數(shù)據(jù)來自1990 2000年期間SEC會計(jì)和審計(jì)執(zhí)行版本(AAER)。 management position.On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the SarbanesOxley Act. This is considered to be one of the most sweeping revisions of the federal securities laws in the past 60 years. It creates a significant, new oversight and regulatory regime over the public accounting industry, imposes many important reforms in corporate governance and disclosure requirements, and dramatically increases criminal penalties for white collar crime. One of the most substantive reforms in the act is that . and foreign reporting panies have to provide CEO and CFO certifications with their SEC filings that contain financial statements. Academia has been debating how effective the act is at preventing executives from mitting accounting fraud. Opponents argue that the act will not have the desired effect because existing market mechanisms are already in place to regulate executive behavior. If the accounting fraud is likely to cause management turnover, one can argue that market mechanism is already playing a critical role in disciplining errant management. Thus the disciplining effects of the SarbanesOxley Act could be less than desired.The passing of the SarbanesOxley Act was a direct consequence of two major incidents outlined in the following two paragraphs:In October 2001, Enron, the energy giant, announced that its earnings were overstated by $ billion. Less than two weeks later it fired Andrew Fastow, its Chief Financial Officer, claiming that he allegedly arranged deceptive and failing hidden in the financial statements, Enron was already billions of dollars in debt as a result of fraudulent accounting, illegal loans, and partnerships. Early in December of 2001, it was forced to file for bankruptcy. Top management turnover in that year signaled the instability of