博弈論資料-英文(25個(gè)文件)syllabus-博弈論(存儲(chǔ)版)
【正文】 tensive Games: Basics Extensive games with perfect information Notation(s) and terminology Nash equilibrium R OR Sections , , Backward Induction and SubgamePerfect equilibrium The OneDeviation Property Extensive games with perfect but inplete information Perfect Bayesian equilibrium R OR Section , up to p. 233 Repeated Games: basics General setup and payoff aggregation criteria Automata Nash Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. R OR Sections Perfect folk theorems for infinitely repeated games Perfect folk theorems for finitely repeated games R OR Sections 8. Extensive Games: details General Extensive games: imperfect information. Relationship between normal and extensive form. Mixed and Behavioral strategies. Kuhn’s Theorem. Perfect and Imperfect Recall R OR Chapter 11 Sequential rationality and offequilibrium beliefs TremblingHand Perfect equilibrium Consistent Assessments and Sequential Equilibrium R OR Sections , O KREPS, D. and WILSON, R. (1982): “Sequential equilibria,” Econometrica, 50, 863894。 and L means that relevant lecture notes will be distributed in class. Lecture notes shall be considered required readings. 1. Introduction The main issues Structure of the Course Games as Multiperson Decision Problems R OR Chapter 1 O MY Sections Zerosum games Minmax theory The Minmax theorem and LP R OR Section L 2. Normal— Form A
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