【正文】 Martin et al.,2020。BRC,1999。NYSE,2020。Klein,2020a). The examination of the association between internal governance structures and the practice of earnings management in Australian firms is motivated by several factors. With The Exception of Peasnell et al.(2020),which uses data,existing research is predominantly US based. Therefore,we explore whether the internal governanceearnings management relationship holds in an institutional environmen where corporate governance is less regulated and choice of governance mechanisms is voluntary(VonNessen,2020). In Australia,at the time of the present study(2020),listed panies were not required to have an audit mittee or an internal audit function. Furthermore,corporate regulators favour principlesbased approach to governance rather than a rulesbased approach(ASX,2020). Although a similar approach exists in the UK,Peasnelletal.(2020)examine only the relationships between earnings management and the proportion of outside directors on the board and the existence of an audit mittee. We extend this research by exploring the effect of additional audit mittee variables such as size and frequency of meetings as well as the independence of members. We also extend board independence to examine whether the separation of the chief executive and board chair roles is associated with earnings management. A further contribution is the inclusion of internal audit as a governance mechanism that is likely to be associated with a reduction in the level of earnings management. While there has been increasing emphasis on the role played in governance by internal audit,no prior earnings management studies have included this variable. Australia is an ideal setting to examine this issue as evidence suggests that many listed panies in Australia do not have an internal audit function. Goodwin and Kent(2020)report that the use of internal audit is associated with the size of the pany and its mitment to strong corporate governance and risk management. Our principal tests,using absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management,suggest that a lower level of earnings management is associated with the presence of nonexecutive directors on the board. We also find a negative association between earnings management and audit mittees prising a majority of non executives,but no relationship between earnings management and mittees prised solely of nonexecutives. Our results do not support a relationship between earnings management and the use of internal auditor the choice of a Big 5 auditor. Additional testing,using small positive changes in earnings as an indication of earnings management,suggests that audit mittees are associated with this measure of earnings results have important practical implications because of the heightened interest in corporate governance matters from governments,regulators and standard setters. The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides the theoretical background for the study and develops the 3 outlines the research method used to test the hypotheses. It also discusses the measurement of earnings management through the estimation of discretionary 4 reports the present study39。s internal governance structures constraint in earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms,including the board of directors ,the audit mittee,the internal audit function andthe choice of external auditor. Based on a broad crosssectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms,for the financial year ending in 200,a majority of nonexecutive directors on the board and on the audit mittee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management,as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of audit are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis,using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management,also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit mittee. Key words:Audit Committee。 以可控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)作為盈余管理的替代指標(biāo)是 有據(jù)可查的，但是結(jié)果表明可控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)并不能很好的代替盈余管理。所有這些 在 模型一 中 都不 被 支持，其中審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性是通過委員會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事的比例進(jìn)行衡量的。雖然兩個(gè)系數(shù)與假設(shè)一致為負(fù)但并不十分顯著，因此我們認(rèn)為假設(shè) 3和假設(shè) 4 不成立。公司的債務(wù)契約限制通常會(huì)對(duì)盈余管理行為產(chǎn)生影響，當(dāng)公司面臨較高的違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)，容易通過盈余管理行為來避免財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)，而資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率通常作為債務(wù)契約中重要的限制性指標(biāo)。為了測(cè)試內(nèi)部審計(jì)職能的假設(shè)，當(dāng)公司有自己的內(nèi)部審計(jì)職能時(shí)虛擬變量取 1，否則取 0。 公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)變量 在本文的模型中，董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性是通過兩個(gè)虛擬變量衡量的。 企業(yè)盈利分為兩個(gè)部分：一部分是已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的現(xiàn)金流入的盈利，即經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金凈流量 (Cash From operations， CFO)，另一部分則是沒有實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流入的盈利，由于這部分是按權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制原則確認(rèn)的，但沒實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流入，故稱之為總體應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn) (Total Accruals, TA)。為了驗(yàn)證我們的假設(shè)，本文運(yùn)用兩次回歸模型，一次用于計(jì)算可控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)，第二次用于檢驗(yàn)盈余管理與內(nèi)部治理間的關(guān)系。 因此，提出以下假設(shè)： 3 :H 盈 余 管 理 與 內(nèi) 部 審 計(jì) 存 在 負(fù) 相 關(guān) 外部審計(jì) 一個(gè)公司的審計(jì)人員的選擇是公司內(nèi) 部治理機(jī)制的一部分，可能與盈余管理相聯(lián)系。 內(nèi)部審計(jì)委員會(huì)可以提高公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，控制公司治理的進(jìn)程和有效性，為公司提供了一個(gè)保證和咨詢服務(wù)。為了有效地監(jiān)督管理財(cái)務(wù)權(quán)限，審計(jì)委員會(huì)將審閱財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，同時(shí)促進(jìn)董事會(huì)、內(nèi)部審計(jì)委員會(huì)與外部進(jìn)行信息的交流。 在澳大利亞，政府的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革計(jì)劃公司法（審計(jì)改革和公司信息披露）（澳大利亞聯(lián)邦， 2020 年）提出了世界 500 強(qiáng)上市公司強(qiáng)制配置審計(jì)委員會(huì)的法案。基于這些發(fā)現(xiàn)， Peasnell 和 Chtourou等（ 2020）預(yù)測(cè)，董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性可能與盈余管理負(fù)相關(guān)。 董事會(huì) 法瑪和詹森（ 1983 年）認(rèn)為 董事會(huì)是 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中最重 要的控制機(jī)制，因?yàn)樗莾?nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的核心。 不過，盈余管理，被定義為扭曲一個(gè)公司真正的財(cái)務(wù)執(zhí)行情況，它可能掩蓋地下交易削弱公司檢測(cè)機(jī)制 （場(chǎng)埃塔爾， 2020）出版的 研究和實(shí)證測(cè)試了各種盈余管理發(fā)生的動(dòng)機(jī)，大致包括代理成本、信息不對(duì)稱和外部因素影響非締約方。進(jìn)一步測(cè)試，使用收入 的 變化代表盈余管理的變化，表明審計(jì)委員會(huì)與收益管理措施相關(guān)。我們通過額外研究 檢驗(yàn) 審計(jì)委員會(huì)規(guī)模、開會(huì)頻率及獨(dú)立審計(jì)人員人數(shù) 對(duì)盈余管理的影響 。不過，相對(duì)較新的研究領(lǐng)域是公司治理與盈余管理。 內(nèi)部審計(jì)職能和審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的 選擇 與盈 余管理沒有顯著的相關(guān)性 。 我們進(jìn)一步分析還發(fā)現(xiàn)，利用 收入的增加作為盈余管理的替代變量時(shí)，盈余管理 和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的存在 具有 負(fù)相關(guān) 關(guān)系 。 Peasnell 等（ 2020）研究表明盈余管理與董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性是負(fù)相關(guān)的，而另一些研究發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)委員會(huì)與盈余管理之間存在顯著的關(guān)系（ 。我們也 研究董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性，研究首席執(zhí)行官和董事會(huì)主席的角色分離對(duì)盈余管理產(chǎn)生的影響、研究 董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理職務(wù)的分離與盈余管理相關(guān)。 這些結(jié)果具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，因?yàn)楦鲊?guó)政府、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和標(biāo)注制定者更加關(guān)心企業(yè)管制事宜。然而，我們主要關(guān)心的是某些公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)限制盈余管理，而不是具體的鼓勵(lì)盈余管理出現(xiàn)的措施。從監(jiān)督財(cái)務(wù)的角度，一個(gè)有效的董事會(huì)應(yīng)該確保管理層作出的會(huì)計(jì)選擇及其產(chǎn)生的影響的有效性。然而他們并沒有通過實(shí)證分析美國(guó)公司盈余管理與董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性 之間存在關(guān)系。此外，澳大利亞證券交易所（ ASX）在 2020 年修訂的上市規(guī)則中要求任何