【正文】 t board of directors(ShleiferandVishny,1997),an independent board chair person,an effective audit mittee(MenonandWilliams,1994),the use of internal audit(Clikeman,2020)and the choice of external auditor(Becker etal.,1998。namely,avoiding breaching debt covenants(DefondandJiambalvo,1991,1994) and avoiding political costs(WattsandZimmerman,1978。Bosch Committee,1995。Wright,1996). In contrast,however,Klein(2020a)reports a negative relation between earnings management and a majority of independent directors on the audit mittee,but finds no meaningful relationship between earnings management and an audit mittee prised solely of independent directors. To effectively monitor the financial discretion of management,the audit mittee is expected to review the financial reporting process,as well as to facilitate a flow of information among the board of directors,the internal and external auditors, and management(McMullen and Raghundan,1996).However,both Cohen et al.(2020)and Gibbins et al.(2020)report that external auditors are sceptical of the role that audit mittees play in reducing conflicts between auditors and management. Hence,to effectively discharge their responsibilities,audit mittees need to be active(Collier,1993。Hala,2020).Sherron Watkins,former Enron vice president,believes that internal auditors should look for warning signs such as undue pressure from senior management to meet earnings targets and pensation arrangements that might encourage employees to manipulate earnings in order to receive financial rewards(Hala,2020).Clikeman (2020)argues that internal auditors should not only be actively involved in detecting earnings management,but that they should take a proactive approach to educating managers and directors about the dangers of the and Cashell(2020) regard the role of internal audit in detecting earnings management as being a plementary one to that of external believe that both should be actively involved in the detection of inappropriate earnings management,thereby providing two unrelated opinions to the audit mittee. These arguments suggest that the presence of an internal audit function should be associated with a lower level of earnings ,the following hypothesis is proposed. H3:Earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of an internal audit function. audit The choice of a firm’s auditor is another internal governance mechanism that is likely to be associated with earnings evidence suggests that the large audit firms are perceived to perform higher quality audits than smaller audit firms(DeAngelo,1981).While examples such as Enron in the USA and HIH in Australia might suggest otherwise,the large firms are considered to be more effective monitors of the financial reporting process pared to smaller (2020)argues that, not only do the large audit firms have more resources and expertise to detect earnings management,but they also have a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client studies demonstrate that clients of Big 5 auditors report lower levels of earnings management than clients of nonBig 5 auditors(Becker et al.,1998。Goodwin and Yeo,2020。ASX,2020。Jiambalvo,1996), our approach is to examine a board crosssection of firms rather than identifying a specific subset with strong incentives to engage in earnings management. Such subsets of firms are often context specific(. recent managerial change,hostile takeover or new capital raising)and these contexts are likely to be endogenous to the internal governance mechanisms we examine. Internal governance structure The internal governance structure of a firm consists of the functions and processes established to oversee and influence the actions of the firm’s management. The role of these mechanisms in relation to financial reporting is to ensure pliance with mandated reporting requirements and to maintain the credibility of a firm’s financial statements(Dechow et al.,1995).The mechanisms that we examine in the present study are the board of directors,the audit mittee,the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Board of directors Fama and Jensen(1983a,b)recognize the board as the most important control mechanism available because it forms the apex of a firm’s internal governance terms of monitoring financial discretion,an effective board of directors should ascertain the validity of the accounting choices made by management and the financial implications of such decisions(NYSE,2020). From an agency perspective,the ability of the board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism is dependent upon its independence from management(Beasley,1996。Dechowetal.,1996。一個更精確的檢驗方法可以審查一個公司的內(nèi)部審計地位、職能及其在公司治理中發(fā)揮的作用。同時也暗示出應(yīng)基于會計信息披露質(zhì)量來優(yōu)化公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu) 的重要性 。 通過本文的研究可以發(fā)現(xiàn)， 盈余管理與董事會中獨立董事比例存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，證明了假設(shè) 1（ a）。但發(fā)現(xiàn)審計委員會中非行政人員的增多會導(dǎo)致盈余管理下降。加入此變量用于控制公司規(guī)模對盈余管理的影響。一些公司的信息披露不足，因此，我們只選擇其中一些資料和報告都齊全的公司進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行分析。研究的主要思路是根據(jù)估計期間的數(shù)據(jù) (假定不存在盈余管理 )利用數(shù)學(xué)模型來預(yù)測非可控性應(yīng)計項目，從而計算出可控性應(yīng)計項目的值，通過統(tǒng)計分析，作為判斷盈余管 理是否存在的依據(jù)。文章排除了產(chǎn)業(yè)分類和治理結(jié)構(gòu)或財務(wù)信息不完全的企業(yè)，行業(yè)分類從全球行業(yè)分類標(biāo)準(zhǔn) （ GICS）中獲得 , 最終獲得本文的需要的 434家上市公司樣本。因此，我們預(yù)計選擇 5 大審計師的公司不太可能進(jìn)行盈余管理。 內(nèi)部審計人員不僅要積極參與檢測盈余管理， 同時應(yīng)采取積極的態(tài)度參與管理董事及財務(wù)過程。一個有效的審計委員會為公司提供了對 盈余管理進(jìn)行約束的方法。 無論是公開發(fā)表的文獻(xiàn)還是公司治理的報告都顯示，審計委員會應(yīng)完全是由非執(zhí)行董事或獨立董事組成。 因此，我們提出了如下假設(shè)： H2,0:盈余管理與行政總裁和董事會主席“兩職合一”負(fù)相關(guān) 審計委員會 為了更有 效地履行其職責(zé)，董事會可以委派董事會委員會的職責(zé)。 目前出版的文獻(xiàn)支持澳大利亞和國際公司治理準(zhǔn)則，這些準(zhǔn)則承認(rèn)非執(zhí)行董事的監(jiān)督作用的重要性。這樣的公司往往是針對具體情況的子集（例如最近的經(jīng)營模式的轉(zhuǎn)變，敵意收購或新的資金籌集），而這些情況有可能是我們研究的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的內(nèi)生變量。第 4 節(jié) 研究報告的結(jié)果。 我們的實證研究使用可控性應(yīng)計項目來衡量盈余管理，證明盈余管理水平較低是與非執(zhí)行董事在董事會的 比例 有關(guān)。在澳大利亞，在本研究中（ 2020 年）的時間 點上 ，上市公司不要求有一個 具有 審計職能 的 內(nèi)部審計委員會 。 在此之前的研究已經(jīng)調(diào)查了治理機(jī)制可以 減少欺詐性財務(wù)報告 的產(chǎn)生 （比斯利， 1996。 LNTUAcc 附錄 A 內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余管理 瑞安戴維森，珍妮古德溫 斯圖爾特， 帕梅 拉肯特 本文探討了 公司的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對盈余管理的約束作用。我們研究 的 是獨立的董事局（ ShleiferandVishny， 1997），獨立委員會主席，一個有效的審計委員會（ MenonandWilliams， 1994 年），內(nèi)部審計（ Clikeman，2020 年）和外部審計師的選擇使用（貝克爾埃塔爾，