【正文】 y Hommel and Schneider, the Mittelstand in Germany relies on a smaller number of bank ties but even the small German firms on average borrow from more than one lender. Very small German firms borrow on average from two banks whereas large Why is it then that SMEs keep fewer and shorter bank relationships than large firms? As credit availability improves when relationships bee longer,one would expect information opaque SMEs to stay with the same creditor(s). To begin with the number of relationships, as Dietsch notes, an obvious reason is that SMEs have to spread out fixed costs of lending over a smaller loan amount. Adding more creditors to the list of the firm’s financial intermediaries will trigger additional costs. Therefore, smaller firms may be less willing to borrow from several banks at the same time. However, the disadvantage of relying only on one bank is that this bank may turn into a monopolist over time. Dietsch explains that, although it is expensive for the smaller firms to provoke petitive behaviour of their lenders by maintaining multiple relationships, smaller firms may still break monopolies by switching banks when time passes. This may explain the relatively short duration of bankfirm relationships of smaller firms. One remark is called for. Hommel and Schneider point out that the number of initial credit offers a firm enquires about before finalising a loan contract may be more informative than the number of its relationships. This is especially the case if firms seek offers from banks they had no prior relationship with. Another important element is whether firms seek offers from banks that are not located in the area where the firms have their headquarters. Overall, the authors conclude that Mittelstand firms seem to be more flexible than monly assumed. Companies approaching several banks obtain an average of approximately three loa n offers. What is more, a substantial amount of offers originates from banks that had no prior relationship with the firm and/or from banks situated outside the immediate geographical vicinity of the firm seeking finance. This is quite surprising beca use it is often argued that a local bank is best informed about firms in its region, essentially tying small firms to local banks. Having established that both relationship banking and multiple banking enhance credit availability for SMEs, Dietsch continues his analysis by investigating whether bank consolidation in France has altered those two important features of European banking. He emphasises that bank consolidation in France went hand in hand with a lower concentration level in the business loan market. The wave of mergers and acquisitions thus seems to have stimulated petition between credit shows that the number of 任毅敏：社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型期民企融資渠道探究 26 bankfirm relationships significantly increased during the consolidation period. The relative change in the number of relationships is most important for small and mediumsized panies. An increase in the number of creditors tends to improve credit availability and, indeed, the share of SMEs in the French business loan market has significantly increased during the 1990s. The mirror image of this is a relative decline in lending to large firms, which lost 8 percent of their initial market share of 65 percent in 1993. 5. Concluding remarks Bank consolidation and Basel II have widely raised the fear that banks may reduce their participation in the SME loan market segment. So far, these expectations cannot be borne by empirical findings. On the contrary, there are indications that recent and future developments in the European banking industry will actually foster SME lending. That said, especially for firms with less than 50 employees (or an annual turnover less than EUR 2 million) finance constraints still seem to hamper their development. It is worthwhile noting that a lack of financing does not necessarily imply a lack of debt. Indeed, credit rationing in the strict sense is rarely observed in France, Italy, and Germany. However, this does not rule out that banks overcharge SME loans and, as a consequence, that financial market imperfections have a negative impact on the growth of SMEs and thus the economy at large. Public policy in support of SMEs needs to be designed in such a way that relief is offered where finance constraints are most binding. In this respect, equity financing deserves more attention. According to a recent OECD report (OECD 2020), small businesses experience considerable difficulty in obtaining risk capital. In Europe, small firms are relatively unimportant on the equity market in parison to the United States. Therefore, the promotion of secondary capital markets and venture capital funds need to rank high on the political agenda. 安徽工程大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 27 中小企業(yè)融資在歐洲：介紹和概述 本文介紹了中小企業(yè)融資問(wèn)題以及 總結(jié)歐洲投資銀行 的 貢獻(xiàn)，本概述強(qiáng)調(diào) 民營(yíng)企業(yè)的信貸供給關(guān)系的重要性；指出了在 整個(gè)歐洲 的分歧和企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的異同；注意到，盡管有廣泛的民營(yíng)企業(yè)信貸配給的現(xiàn) 象，金融市場(chǎng) 的不完善仍在抑制民營(yíng)企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)和亮點(diǎn)。其次，部分原因是由于 信息技術(shù)的進(jìn)步，新的銀行管理辦法正在制定和實(shí)施。第四，歐盟第二銀行指令旨在促進(jìn) 銀行之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，從而提高銀行融資的條款及條件，包括提供給那些民營(yíng) 企業(yè)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)收集了 經(jīng)濟(jì)積蓄，但他們往往對(duì) 民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款比較少。 為什么民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資往往會(huì)比大型企業(yè)的融資困難。 Wagenvoort 區(qū)分五個(gè)不同的大小級(jí)：非常小，小，中型，大型和超大型企業(yè)。 然而， Wagenvoort 也表明，正在跨越歐盟國(guó)家的平均 民營(yíng)企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)顯著的差異。事實(shí)上，有條件的，有金融債務(wù) ，金融債務(wù)比率和金融債務(wù)的期限結(jié)構(gòu)任毅敏：社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型期民企融資渠道探究 28 之間存在廣泛的大小類相似。迪特希找到一個(gè)法國(guó)公司的同類資產(chǎn)的比例，不論其大小。 更具體而言 ，民營(yíng) 企業(yè)則似乎不那么靈活調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的結(jié)構(gòu)比大企業(yè)不斷變化的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)。圭索建立一個(gè)模型，可以解釋為什么有些小公司帶來(lái)金 融債務(wù)，而有的則沒(méi)有。不過(guò)，圭索認(rèn)為，當(dāng)信貸約束約束力，缺乏規(guī)模和股權(quán)似乎發(fā)揮