【正文】 e requested interest rate even when the conditions imposed by the bank are too demanding relative to the true creditworthiness of the borrower. In this respect it is worthwhile observing that interest rates on bank loans are in general substantially higher for SMEs than for large Both the empirical findings of Dietsch and Wagenvoort suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified. It is true that on an individual basis smaller firms are riskier than larger firms because the expected default probability is negatively related to firm size. Banks in general use this argument to defend a higher risk premium on small business loans. But a portfolio of loans to small firms is not necessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large panies. Dietsch finds that default correlations are lower within the group of SMEs than within the group of 任毅敏：社會轉(zhuǎn)型期民企融資渠道探究 24 large firms. Lower default correlations can offset the higher individual default probabilities within a pool of credits. Indeed, firmspecific risk can be diversified as opposed to systematic risk. According to Dietsch, large firms are more sensitive to the systematic factor (the general state of the economy) than small firms. This may be surprising as small firms are usually less diversified than large firms. However, SMEs may show greater flexibility in the transformation of their business when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate or improve. Large firms are often locked in to existing organisational structures and technologies. In sum, the higher interest rates observed on SME loans seem difficult to justify on credit risk grounds only. It could be that SMEs pay high interest rates for wrong reasons. Banks may succeed in overcharging SMEs due to limited petition in (local) banking markets and the lockin effect mentioned above. Therefore, due to finance constraints, underinvestment by SMEs may happen on a large scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 does not widely occur. Wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may lead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. The empirical test of finance constraints here boils down to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firm’s investment and, thus, its growth. More precisely, Wagenvoort estimates the relationship between, on the one hand, firm growth and, on the other hand, cashflow and capital structure. A high growthcashflow sensitivity is an indication that finance is binding. The following findings are worth highlighting. Firstly, finance constraints tend to hinder the growth of small and very small firms (. firms with less than 50 employees)。安徽工程大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文） 21 附錄 C 引用的 外文文獻及 其 譯文 SME Financing in Europe: Introduction and Overview Introducing the topic of SME finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this edition of the EIB Papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of SME credit。 on average, the growth of these firms is onetoone related to retained profits. Secondly, while finance constraints seem to be less binding for mediumsized enterprises, their growth, in parison to the growth of large firms, nevertheless depends more on theavailability of internal funds. Thirdly, highly leveraged firms have greater difficulties in tapping external finance and, hence, exploiting their growth potential. How could one possibly improve the supply of finance to SMEs? It is useful to distinguish between public policy measures and fforts that lenders and borrowers can make to alleviate finance constraints. Wagenvoort briefly reviews the literature on the effectiveness of public lending programmes and guarantee main conclusion is that while direct lending and guarantee programmes usually benefit the recipients and help ease finance constraints, it has been questioned whether they improve the allocation of resources in an economy. Nevertheless a positive return on public intervention can be expected if intervention reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and thus helps solving information problems. For instance, public authorities may stimulate information sharing among lenders. A recent study (Jappelli and Pagano 2020) shows that information sharing among lenders increases bank lending and reduces credit risk. Borrowers and lenders themselves can also contribute to solve finance problems of SMEs by reducing information asymmetries directly. As argued above, the establishment of longterm relationships has the potential to achieve this. 安徽工程大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文） 25 4. Relationship banking and bank consolidation Is there empirical evidence to support the view that relationship banking can mitigate finance constraints? Ongena and Smith (2020) report substantial variation in the average number of bankfirm relationships across European countries. The three country studies reviewed here confirm this result and they show that firms make considerable use of multiple banking. Guiso’s analysis reveals that in Italy small firms keep on average more than four bank relationships whereas large Italian firms diversify their credit needs over more than 10 credit institutions. As shown b