法律專業(yè)畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯3-法律法學(xué)-全文預(yù)覽
【正文】 AFC decides about the appropriate standard of review for nonobviousness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and panion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify it’s approach. 無論 聯(lián)邦巡回法院 決定為 非顯而易見性決定 適當(dāng)?shù)膶彶闃?biāo)準(zhǔn)，它應(yīng)該也能解釋為何該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)有所區(qū)別 于 應(yīng)用到其他的有效性要求。P, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. Nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact that validity may involve collateral review of administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. Whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end, however, is another question. Before attending to it, a closer examination of nonobviousness may be useful. 如果 Graham引述司法部 Douglas在 A＆ P公司 的觀點(diǎn) ，這將 對(duì)理解 什么是調(diào)用 法律效力問題 是有幫助的 。以及有效性問題是一個(gè)法律問題。 The most noteworthy aspect of that case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. There, it was argued that the majority would have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the twocourt rule. He reasoned that validity is a question of law because “The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard。 The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century later. Moreover, it arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against reexamining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court nevertheless found the patent invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied. 第一最高法院針對(duì)憲法的利益被 參與到 專利標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 的事實(shí) 似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到 1950年 幾乎整整一個(gè)世紀(jì)之后。然而，很少 有案 件會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)移到這方面來 ， 任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁決 都是 值得懷疑的 。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機(jī)會(huì)考慮有關(guān)的影響。他還對(duì)當(dāng)一項(xiàng)憲法事實(shí)被行政機(jī)關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)時(shí)它的審查深度時(shí)候可信度表示懷疑。 “Constitutional Facts” “憲法事實(shí)” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give aboveaverage scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at , the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union . While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 盡管如此，也不管是否事實(shí)發(fā)生在審判 前， 在危急時(shí)刻憲法關(guān)注的一項(xiàng)爭(zhēng)議可以使 法院 給予 高于平 均水平的審查。 Until 1985, the depth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. The latter had sometimes been accorded less 1985年，審查的深度有時(shí)視乎案件的行為或書面證據(jù)而不等。 without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事實(shí)上，這是陪審團(tuán)的固有權(quán)利；沒有這些區(qū) 別，陪審團(tuán)的這一權(quán)利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣。 Unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“ matter of law.” Yet, even then, the operational definition stands: If a matter is sufficiently well established in the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it is within the ultimate control of judges, not
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