【正文】 a) be somehow justified for fact disputes underlying one or more validity requirements, calling them issues of “l(fā)aw” changes nothing and merely confuses matters. Hence, the “constitutional fact” doctrine deserves close attention. It would highlight the need for intense appellate review without concealing the essential nature of the issue。 人們希望法院會振作起來。 最壞的情況也將無法處理這個問題 。 It can also correct clear errors of fact. Its power is even greater where no jury is involved. Yet, regardless of the standard of review, it cannot secondguess the resolution of disputes that turn on the relative credibility of witnesses. If a case turns on credibility, it is difficult to justify reversal. That would leave trial courts and the bar guessing. 它也可以糾正事實 的 清楚 錯誤 。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院 選擇 對非顯而易見性進行 特殊待遇 ， 應(yīng)該證明它的做法。然而， Mahn 只指出，雖然可能 專利 專員 過度 尊重事實問題， 但是 法院不必 在這個法律問題上 推遲 —— 因為這 根本就不是什么驚天動地的 問題。 雖然它必須有兩個下級法院進行結(jié)果檢查規(guī)定 ， 但法院從來沒有判定專利無效 。如果 美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院 ，或者 最高法院認為，在專利案件事實的 特殊 審查是非常必要的， 應(yīng)考 慮 “憲制上的事實 ”學(xué)說 是否 可能是有益的延長。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One mentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is pelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在 Bose案件中，有人認為，上訴法院有責(zé)任決定當 一方應(yīng)該對另外乙方的非事實描述信任的時候獨立裁判 （ 在此種情況下 ，與“意見” 相反的東西 ） 。由于某些不同的原因，事實的裁決范圍要被擴大，就像在 Dennison 案件中法官的審判，有“明顯錯誤”的審查適用。 The closest one can e to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the oute of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, ., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 21316 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以 用 來避免循環(huán) 是看 事實是否 只對具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去 建立 階級中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利和義務(wù) 。 Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “l(fā)aw” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “l(fā)aw” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is hoped that, following the remand of Dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不過，這句話的意思是什么不清楚， Graham 表示命名這些專利權(quán)的有效性問題既沒有原因也沒有權(quán)威，在一般情況下，非顯而易性具體而言是作為“法律”（作為對比的“事實”）的。 It is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: First, whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitutional fact” doctrine. 這絕不是說專利的非顯而易見性 裁定應(yīng)作為法律問題 來 對待。 但是 無論是狹義還是廣義的問題 都沒有得到它應(yīng)有的重視 —— 特別是基本的法律 / 事實二分法上的觀點?！? However, what that sentence means is unclear。相反， “法律”問題 則是被遺留的問題 —— 包括“立法”事實問題，它甚至被法院使用并與 價值相結(jié)合后，演變成 一般規(guī)則。雖然上訴法院可能是法律問題的最終仲裁者，但是為了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常