【正文】 irements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and panion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify it’s approach. 無論 聯(lián)邦巡回法院 決定為 非顯而易見性決定 適當?shù)膶彶闃藴?，它應該也能解釋為何該標準應有所區(qū)別 于 應用到其他的有效性要求。以及有效性問題是一個法律問題。 The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century later. Moreover, it arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against reexamining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court nevertheless found the patent invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied. 第一最高法院針對憲法的利益被 參與到 專利標準 的事實 似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到 1950年 幾乎整整一個世紀之后。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機會考慮有關的影響。 “Constitutional Facts” “憲法事實” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give aboveaverage scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at , the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union . While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 盡管如此，也不管是否事實發(fā)生在審判 前， 在危急時刻憲法關注的一項爭議可以使 法院 給予 高于平 均水平的審查。 without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事實上，這是陪審團的固有權利；沒有這些區(qū) 別，陪審團的這一權利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣?？傊聦崋栴}的裁決 歷來是陪審團認為比較合適的裁判種類之一 。引述一則依法院決定將 Dennison 案發(fā)回重審的案例，法院對 Graham v. John Deere ：“雖然專利的有效性問題最終都是法律問題， ... 第 103 項條件 ...隨后又詢問了幾個基本的事實。 On remand, the CAFC should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for other issues that arise in patent appeals. Neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the attention it deserves — particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy. 在發(fā)回重審時 ， 聯(lián)邦巡回法院應該嘗試在專利上訴時聯(lián)系它的 復審 范圍 。然而， 現(xiàn)在有充分證據(jù)說明 法院 將更嚴格地審查這些帶有明顯錯誤或者充足證據(jù)這么一個層次的審判結果 。如下所示，沒有對這些事項的分析，它是很難確定專利是否有效的問題比專利的非顯而易見性的問題更應被視為“法律”或在任何情況下應該提供的什么樣的待遇。一般見，例如， B. Schwartz 行政法， 16 卷 213 頁 （ 1984 年 第二版 ）。 For somewhat different reasons, deference to fact finding is also extended, as in Dennison, to bench trials. There “clearly erroneous” review applies. That standard is less deferential, but the Supreme Court demonstrated in Dennison, and more so in Inwood Laboratories more than token deference is required. 該標準是不那么恭敬，但最高法院在 Dennison 案件表現(xiàn)出來的，以及在 Inwood 實驗室案件中說明超過象征 性的尊重是必需的。一位評論家認為，法院的自由裁量難以限制的第一修正案。專利代理人喜歡專利制度的憲法基礎 這一理論 。 然而 大多數(shù)人認為， 這是因為錯誤的法律標準的應用 。 Had Graham cited Justice Douglas’ opinion in Aamp。 It might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. Yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in Hotchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the Constitution gets. Thus, even if the “constitutional fact” doctrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not stand out. 也許這樣做 是基于 非顯而易見性 要求的 起源。如果沒有陪審團參與 ， 它 就有更大的權利 。這將 猜測留給了 審判法庭和酒吧 .這也似乎在過度鼓勵 無效練習 將不會被第一時間處理 。