【正文】 這將 猜測(cè)留給了 審判法庭和酒吧 .這也似乎在過度鼓勵(lì) 無效練習(xí) 將不會(huì)被第一時(shí)間處理 。 It might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. Yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in Hotchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the Constitution gets. Thus, even if the “constitutional fact” doctrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not stand out. 也許這樣做 是基于 非顯而易見性 要求的 起源。 然而 大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為， 這是因?yàn)殄e(cuò)誤的法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用 。一位評(píng)論家認(rèn)為，法院的自由裁量難以限制的第一修正案。一般見，例如， B. Schwartz 行政法， 16 卷 213 頁 （ 1984 年 第二版 ）。然而， 現(xiàn)在有充分證據(jù)說明 法院 將更嚴(yán)格地審查這些帶有明顯錯(cuò)誤或者充足證據(jù)這么一個(gè)層次的審判結(jié)果 。引述一則依法院決定將 Dennison 案發(fā)回重審的案例，法院對(duì) Graham v. John Deere ：“雖然專利的有效性問題最終都是法律問題， ... 第 103 項(xiàng)條件 ...隨后又詢問了幾個(gè)基本的事實(shí)。 without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事實(shí)上，這是陪審團(tuán)的固有權(quán)利；沒有這些區(qū) 別，陪審團(tuán)的這一權(quán)利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機(jī)會(huì)考慮有關(guān)的影響。以及有效性問題是一個(gè)法律問題。 The Bottom Line 例外情況 The CAFC has full control of issues of patent law, subject only to legislative and Supreme Court oversight. When reviewing infringement litigation, whether there is a jury or not, it has the capacity, for example, to correct for the application of erroneous legal standards, to expand the application of principles, or to carve out exceptions to rules. 根據(jù)最高人民法院的立法和監(jiān)督 ， 美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回法院 有專利法 的 完全控制權(quán) 。 Regardless of the oute, everyone should appreciate an honest attempt to grapple with an issue in limbo far too long. In Dennison, the CAFC has an opportunity to shape the very foundations of patent litigation. It is to be hoped that the court will rise to the occasion. 無論結(jié)果如何，每個(gè)人都應(yīng)該明白一個(gè)誠(chéng)實(shí)的嘗試拼一明朗的問題太長(zhǎng)。這將 猜想留給了 審判法庭和 法庭欄桿了 。 但是， 無論在憲法或其他任何學(xué)說應(yīng)當(dāng)用于這一目的，就轉(zhuǎn)變成了 另外一個(gè)問題。相反，盡管聲稱異議，法官納爾遜不承認(rèn)加入了新的要求 —— 更不用說一 個(gè)由憲法規(guī)定的。 The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings... based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the factfinding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要論點(diǎn)有利于推進(jìn) 搜索上訴審查 結(jié)果 ...純粹 證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由， 但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢委員會(huì)說： 這些考慮 公眾輿論的 和司法經(jīng)濟(jì) 會(huì)被審判法庭，而不是 上訴法庭 要允許上訴法院 …… 。 法律術(shù)語 “法律”和“事實(shí)” 被用于若干方面 ， 在目前的情況下，我們有必要去 給這個(gè)兩個(gè)術(shù)語下定義 。Law and Fact in Patent Litigation: Form versus Function* 法律和事實(shí)在專利訴訟中是形式還是功能 Thomas G. Field, Jr. Introduction Recently, the Supreme Court sent Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp. back to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It remanded with explicit directions that the lower court consider the extent to which Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations. 介紹： 最近，最高法院駁回了 丹尼森 （ CAFC）。 While much has been written on the law/fact dichotomy, a brief overview is in order. The terms, “l(fā)aw” and “fact” are used several ways, and it is nec