【正文】 essary to define them in the present context. Approached that way, the term, “fact,” is more precisely called “adjudicative fact,” and the most accurate definition is operational. In short, a question of adjudicative fact is one of the kind traditionally regarded as appropriate for juries. Conversely, a question of “l(fā)aw” is anything that remains — including questions of “l(fā)egislative” fact, the latter being used, even by courts, in conjunction with values, to evolve general rules. 盡管 很多案例已經(jīng)被寫進(jìn)了法律 /事實(shí) 二分法，下面就來一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的介紹。后者有時(shí)不被給予尊重。 Even an 1850 case often regarded as the genesis of the nonobviousness requirement was not based on the Constitution. On the contrary, notwithstanding a dissent claiming otherwise, Justice Nelson did not admit to adding a new requirement — much less one mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, he insisted that mere novelty, even coupled with market success, had long been inadequate to support patent validity. 即使是 1850 年的情況通常 認(rèn)為非顯而易見性的 要求 不是以憲法為依據(jù) 的 。然而， 憲法明確了專利制度的起源，也許 事實(shí)有效性可能涉及抵押品的行政行為的審查，可以作為一個(gè)從頭對(duì)事實(shí)問題審查的基礎(chǔ)上加上。如果一個(gè)案件 轉(zhuǎn)向可靠 ， 這就 難以 解釋逆轉(zhuǎn) 。 在 Dennison， 美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院 是有機(jī)會(huì)塑造這個(gè) 專利訴訟的基礎(chǔ)。 在審查侵權(quán)訴訟 時(shí) ，無論有沒有 陪審團(tuán)，它有能力改正錯(cuò)誤法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用，擴(kuò)大原則 的應(yīng)用 ，或 開拓 出規(guī)則的例外。 ”對(duì)于權(quán)威，他引用 Mahn 在 1884年 審判的一個(gè) 案件中，法院審查了 專利專員 的決定 。然而， 在考慮 Dennison 案件是 很可能有 Bose公司 （也許不自覺地） 在潛意識(shí)里 。雖然上訴法院可能是法律問題的最終仲裁者，但是為了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常會(huì)在有大量充足的證據(jù)情況下的將事實(shí)案件妥善地交給陪審團(tuán)。” However, what that sentence means is unclear。 It is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: First, whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitutional fact” doctrine. 這絕不是說專利的非顯而易見性 裁定應(yīng)作為法律問題 來 對(duì)待。 The closest one can e to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the oute of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, ., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 21316 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以 用 來避免循環(huán) 是看 事實(shí)是否 只對(duì)具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去 建立 階級(jí)中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利和義務(wù) 。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One mentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is pelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在 Bose案件中，有人認(rèn)為，上訴法院有責(zé)任決定當(dāng) 一方應(yīng)該對(duì)另外乙方的非事實(shí)描述信任的時(shí)候獨(dú)立裁判 （ 在此種情況下 ，與“意見” 相反的東西 ） 。 雖然它必須有兩個(gè)下級(jí)法院進(jìn)行結(jié)果檢查規(guī)定 ， 但法院從來沒有判定專利無效 。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院 選擇 對(duì)非顯而易見性進(jìn)行 特殊待遇 ， 應(yīng)該證明它的做法。 最壞的情況也將無法處理這個(gè)問題 。 Should review more intensive than permitted under Rule 52(a) be somehow justified for fact disputes underlying one or more validity requirements, calling them issues of “l(fā)aw” changes nothing and merely confuses matters. Hence, the “constitutional fact” doctrine deserves close attention. It would highlight the need for intense appellate review without concealing the essential nature of the