【正文】 CAFC）。 It is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: First, whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitutional fact” doctrine. 這絕不是說專利的非顯而易見性 裁定應(yīng)作為法律問題 來 對待。 The Law/Fact Dichotomy 法律 /事實二分理論 The most directly relevant precedent governing appellate review of patent litigation is cryptic. Quoted in the per curiam decision that remands Dennison, It consists of one sentence from the Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.: “While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, ... the 167。 Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “l(fā)aw” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “l(fā)aw” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is hoped that, following the remand of Dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不過，這句話的意思是什么不清楚， Graham 表示命名這些專利權(quán)的有效性問題既沒有原因也沒有權(quán)威，在一般情況下，非顯而易性具體而言是作為“法律”（作為對比的“事實”）的。 法律術(shù)語 “法律”和“事實” 被用于若干方面 ， 在目前的情況下，我們有必要去 給這個兩個術(shù)語下定義 。 The closest one can e to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the oute of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, ., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 21316 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以 用 來避免循環(huán) 是看 事實是否 只對具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去 建立 階級中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利和義務(wù) 。因此，在 對 “法律 ”和 “事實 ”問題 進行分類時 ，法官和陪審團的角色是至關(guān)重要的。由于某些不同的原因，事實的裁決范圍要被擴大，就像在 Dennison 案件中法官的審判，有“明顯錯誤”的審查適用。 The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings... based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the factfinding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要論點有利于推進 搜索上訴審查 結(jié)果 ...純粹 證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由， 但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢委員會說： 這些考慮 公眾輿論的 和司法經(jīng)濟 會被審判法庭，而不是 上訴法庭 要允許上訴法院 …… 。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One mentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is pelling when they