【正文】 d pensation arrangements that might encourage employees to manipulate earnings in order to receive financial rewards(Hala,2020).Clikeman (2020)argues that internal auditors should not only be actively involved in detecting earnings management,but that they should take a proactive approach to educating managers and directors about the dangers of the and Cashell(2020) regard the role of internal audit in detecting earnings management as being a plementary one to that of external believe that both should be actively involved in the detection of inappropriate earnings management,thereby providing two unrelated opinions to the audit mittee. These arguments suggest that the presence of an internal audit function should be associated with a lower level of earnings ,the following hypothesis is proposed. H3:Earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of an internal audit function. audit The choice of a firm’s auditor is another internal governance mechanism that is likely to be associated with earnings evidence suggests that the large audit firms are perceived to perform higher quality audits than smaller audit firms(DeAngelo,1981).While examples such as Enron in the USA and HIH in Australia might suggest otherwise,the large firms are considered to be more effective monitors of the financial reporting process pared to smaller (2020)argues that, not only do the large audit firms have more resources and expertise to detect earnings management,but they also have a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client studies demonstrate that clients of Big 5 auditors report lower levels of earnings management than clients of nonBig 5 auditors(Becker et al.,1998。Rezaee,2020。Goodwin and Yeo,2020。ASX,2020).This is supported by research that demonstrates a relationship between audit mittee independence and a higher degree of active oversight and a lower incidence of financial statement fraud (Jiambalvo,1996。ASX,2020。ASX,2020。Jiambalvo,1996), our approach is to examine a board crosssection of firms rather than identifying a specific subset with strong incentives to engage in earnings management. Such subsets of firms are often context specific(. recent managerial change,hostile takeover or new capital raising)and these contexts are likely to be endogenous to the internal governance mechanisms we examine. Internal governance structure The internal governance structure of a firm consists of the functions and processes established to oversee and influence the actions of the firm’s management. The role of these mechanisms in relation to financial reporting is to ensure pliance with mandated reporting requirements and to maintain the credibility of a firm’s financial statements(Dechow et al.,1995).The mechanisms that we examine in the present study are the board of directors,the audit mittee,the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Board of directors Fama and Jensen(1983a,b)recognize the board as the most important control mechanism available because it forms the apex of a firm’s internal governance terms of monitoring financial discretion,an effective board of directors should ascertain the validity of the accounting choices made by management and the financial implications of such decisions(NYSE,2020). From an agency perspective,the ability of the board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism is dependent upon its independence from management(Beasley,1996。s results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the research findings,highlighting potential limitations and considering future areas for research. 2 Theoretical background and hypotheses Management The preparation and disclosure of true and fair financial information is central to corporate governance,as it provides stakeholders with a foundation to exercise their rights,in order to protect their interests(OECD,1999). However,earnings management,defined as the practice of distorting the true financial performance of (a) pany39。Dechowetal.,1996。Corporate Governance。一個(gè)更精確的檢驗(yàn)方法可以審查一個(gè)公司的內(nèi)部審計(jì)地位、職能及其在公司治理中發(fā)揮的作用。 文中對(duì) 就業(yè)的措施的限制是為了強(qiáng)化內(nèi)部控制的機(jī)制， 對(duì)于 獨(dú)立董事更精 細(xì)的分類能更好的提供董事會(huì)職能的信息。同時(shí)也暗示出應(yīng)基于會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量來(lái)優(yōu)化公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu) 的重要性 。然而模型 2 發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立董事比例與盈余管理之間存在相關(guān)關(guān)系。 通過(guò)本文的研究可以發(fā)現(xiàn)， 盈余管理與董事會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事比例存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，證明了假設(shè) 1（ a）。 ，有 四 個(gè) 與盈余管理有 顯著 相關(guān)關(guān)系 。但發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)委員會(huì)中非行政人員的增多會(huì)導(dǎo)致盈余管理下降。 回歸模型 以下模型是用來(lái)檢驗(yàn)前文所提出的假設(shè)： DA=α+β1BDIND+β2INDCHAIR+β3AC+β4ACIND+β5ACMEET +β6 ACSIZE+β7 IAF+IG5 4 研究結(jié)果 通過(guò)多因素分析，可以得出一下結(jié)論： 1（ a）成立，董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與盈余管理負(fù)相關(guān)。加入此變量用于控制公司規(guī)模對(duì)盈余管理的影響。同樣的，當(dāng)公司使用 5 大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所進(jìn) 行審計(jì)時(shí)虛擬變量取 1，否則取 0。一些公司的信息披露不足，因此，我們只選擇其中一些資料和報(bào)告都齊全的公司進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行分析。董事會(huì)大多數(shù)由非執(zhí)行董事組成則取 1，否則為 0。研究的主要思路是根據(jù)估計(jì)期間的數(shù)據(jù) (假定不存在盈余管理 )利用數(shù)學(xué)模型來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)非可控性應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目，從而計(jì)算出可控性應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目的值，通過(guò)統(tǒng)計(jì)分析，作為判斷盈余管 理是否存在的依據(jù)。由于現(xiàn)金流量是企業(yè)實(shí)實(shí)在在發(fā)生的，企業(yè)難以對(duì)其進(jìn)行操縱，因此假定盈余管理只能通過(guò)應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行，但并不是全部的總體應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)都能進(jìn)行操縱。文章排除了產(chǎn)業(yè)分類和治理結(jié)構(gòu)或財(cái)務(wù)信息不完全的企業(yè)，行業(yè)分類從全球行業(yè)分類標(biāo)準(zhǔn) （ GICS）中獲得 , 最終獲得本文的需要的 434家上市公司樣本。我們還進(jìn)行額外的測(cè)試，使用替代變量代替因變量和自變量的數(shù)目。因此，我們預(yù)計(jì)選擇 5 大審計(jì)師的公司不太可能進(jìn)行盈余管理。研究數(shù)據(jù)表明，大型會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所被認(rèn)為比小型會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所執(zhí)行高品質(zhì)稽核。 內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員不僅要積極參與檢測(cè)盈余管理， 同時(shí)應(yīng)采取積極的態(tài)度參與管理董事及財(cái)務(wù)過(guò)程。審計(jì)工作的目標(biāo)是與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的審計(jì)委員會(huì)的監(jiān)督職責(zé)對(duì)齊，內(nèi)部審計(jì)將有利于審計(jì)委員會(huì)的有效運(yùn)作。一個(gè)有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)為公司提供了對(duì) 盈余管理進(jìn)行約束的方法。然而，科恩等人發(fā)現(xiàn)內(nèi)部審計(jì)師的存在可以減少外部審計(jì)師與管理層的沖突。 無(wú)論是公開(kāi)發(fā)表的文獻(xiàn)還是公司治理的報(bào)告都顯示，審計(jì)委員會(huì)應(yīng)完全是由非執(zhí)行董事或獨(dú)立董事組成。此外，澳大利亞證券交易所（ ASX）在 2020 年修訂的上市規(guī)則中要求任何公司包括 涉及 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾 指標(biāo) 的上市公司，在其財(cái)政年度開(kāi)始時(shí)具有審計(jì)委員會(huì)。 因此，我們提出了如下假設(shè)： H2,0:盈余管理與行政總裁和董事會(huì)主席“兩職合一”負(fù)相關(guān) 審計(jì)委員會(huì) 為了更有 效地履行其職責(zé)，董事會(huì)可以委派董事會(huì)委員會(huì)的職責(zé)。然而他們并沒(méi)有通過(guò)實(shí)證分析美國(guó)公司盈余管理與董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性 之間存在關(guān)系。 目前出版的文獻(xiàn)支持澳大利亞和國(guó)際公司治理準(zhǔn)則，這些準(zhǔn)則承認(rèn)非執(zhí)行董事的監(jiān)督作用的重要性。從監(jiān)督財(cái)務(wù)的角度，一個(gè)有效的董事會(huì)應(yīng)該確保管理層作出的會(huì)計(jì)選擇及其產(chǎn)生的影響的有效性。這樣的公司往往是針對(duì)具體情況的子集（例如最近的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的轉(zhuǎn)變，敵意收購(gòu)或新的資金籌集），而這些情況有可能是我們研究的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的內(nèi)生變量。然而，我們主要關(guān)心的是某些公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)限制盈余管理，而不是具體的鼓勵(lì)盈余管理出現(xiàn)的措施。第 4 節(jié) 研究報(bào)告的結(jié)果。 這些結(jié)果具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，因?yàn)楦鲊?guó)政府、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和標(biāo)注制定者更加關(guān)心企業(yè)管制事宜。 我們的實(shí)證研究使用可控性應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目來(lái)衡量盈余管理，證明盈余管理水平較低是與非執(zhí)行董事在董事會(huì)的 比例 有關(guān)。我們也 研究董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性，研究首席執(zhí)行官和董事會(huì)主席的角色分離對(duì)盈余管理產(chǎn)生的影響、研究 董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理職務(wù)的分離與盈余管理相關(guān)。在澳大利亞，在本研究中（ 2020 年）的時(shí)間 點(diǎn)上 ，上市公司不要求有一個(gè) 具有 審計(jì)職能 的 內(nèi)