【正文】 ants) or by improving the ef?ciency of loans schemes through containing administration costs and particularly, in reducing repayment leakages due to default. We have noted that the main factor in accounting for the failure to recoup loans disbursements in most schemes is the level of builtin subsidies (hidden grants), rather than default or high administration costs We discuss ?rst the rationale for high level of builtin loans subsidization in most scheme and, in particular, raise questions about its justi?cation. Confronting builtin oversubsidization Repayment ratios are quite low in a number of loans schemes. While there is room for some element of subsidy in most schemes, heavy government builtin subsidies provided through large hidden grants— the major source of recovery losses— cannot always be justi?ed. Whether or not a loans scheme should be subsidized and, given that a subsidy is in place, whether or not the size of the government builtin subsidy is excessive, will depend on the main objectives that the loans scheme is intended to serve. In a recent paper, one of the authors identi?ed no less than eleven separate objectives that have underscored loans schemes around the world (Ziderman 2021). For purposes of the present discussion, however, we restrict our focus to the three more pervasive purposes of loans schemes. These are: cost sharing (ine generation)。 they should not be forced to rely upon parental ?nancial support which might not be forthing. In loans schemes where either cost recovery or student independence constitutes the central objective, the case for heavy builtin student loan subsidies is not strong. In both of these cases, the intended effect of student loans is to reduce the ?nancial burden on students during study and to delay fee payment (through borrowing) until after graduation, when payment is more readily made from the expected enhancement of earnings that the additional education makes possible. In these cases, the level of builtin subsidy is often excessive。 and careful and deliberate loans targeting so that loans do indeed reach the poor and other disadvantaged groups, otherwise the central objective of the scheme is promised. Loans scheme aimed at greater participation of the poor are often not effective because these ingredients for success are missing. The upshot of this discussion is that the levels of builtin subsidies, resulting in low repayment ratios, are often excessive. High subsidies may be either unnecessary (cost sharing and student independence models) or less than effective in practice in achieving objectives (social targeting). Since the level of builtin subsidy is ?xed by government, these subsidies may be reduced, as appropriate, by government decision. However, vested interests are likely to militate against these desirable changes. Reducing loans repayment default The problem of high repayment default may be less tractable. A wide range of measures to reduce repayment default are available for use in various loans schemes. These include the use of loans guarantors, moral suasion (publication of defaulter lists), baring access to further credit if in default and legal action against recalcitrant defaulters. However, it is frequently the case that these measures are not employed in practice. In a number of cases, notably in developing countries, a general atmosphere of nonpliance has been created in which non repayment has bee to be regarded as socially acceptable. A subject of recent controversy is whether the type of repayments collection mechanism in place can affect the level of repayment default. Speci?cally, it has been argued strongly that ine contingent repayments schemes are likely to ease the problem of repayment default, since an excessive repayment burden is avoided during periods of unemployment and low earnings. However, whatever the other relative merits of ine contingent repayment and traditional mortgage loans schemes, there is no evidence from the present study that default is lower under ine contingent schemes than mortgagetype sche