【正文】 術(shù)先進(jìn)、管理規(guī)范，已經(jīng)成為美國消費(fèi)信貸蓬勃發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ)。本文的研究表明，隱含擔(dān)保的存在將弱化銀行防范系統(tǒng)性違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的激勵(lì)，使得消費(fèi)信貸市場(chǎng)上更有可能發(fā)生系統(tǒng)性的違約問題。文章第一部分的介紹了我國 個(gè)人消費(fèi)信貸業(yè)務(wù)的 現(xiàn)狀，說明研究 我國個(gè)人消費(fèi)信貸業(yè)務(wù)的 目的和意義；第二部分 提出我國個(gè)人消費(fèi)信貸業(yè)務(wù)中存在的問題 ；第三部分 針對(duì)上述存在問題，提出相關(guān)解決方案 。 Science of Jianghan University 畢業(yè)論文 外文翻譯 外文來源 日本一橋大學(xué) 中文譯文 商業(yè)銀行和中小企業(yè)信用管理策略的研究 部 （系） 商 學(xué) 部 專 業(yè) 金 融 學(xué) 姓 名 宋 健 學(xué) 號(hào) 2020 0 11 903 05 指導(dǎo)老師 陳 貽 漢 2020 年 3 月 15 日英文原文 1 The mercial banks and small and mediumsized enterprises credit risk management research The thesis sets out from the general theories of economic risks and banking credit risks management, to represent that economic risks are one of basic characters of modern market economy, and the banking credit risks are the focalization of the whole economic risks. The essence of risk is that the possibilities of proceeds and losses exist simultaneously, therefore encouraging meanwhile restricting the activities of main body of the market economy. The essence of mercial banks is to avoid and prevent risks under the balance of dual effects of the risk so that risks can decline to an acceptable degree while proceeds is to be taken in as much as possible. At present, western economic industry has reached a consensus on the reasons of the exposure of banking credit risks by virtue of the information nonsymmetry theory that risks stem from the adverse selection under the information nonsymmetry and moral risks and objective risks arising from information insufficiency. In addition, this thesis discusses the relations between credit risks management and equitydebt ratio management, capital abundance ratio management and internal control respectively. It also clarifies some misunderstanding on credit risks management. The abovementioned contents form Chapter One of this thesis. Chapter Two of this thesis first points out that the decisive factor of the efficiency of credit management is not the external anizational form but internal anization structure by paring the relations between various external anizational forms and the efficiency of risks management. The emphases on designing anizational structure of credit risks management should be laid on the forming of the mechanism of lateral control between different divisions and the mechanism of vertical control on different levels of subsidiaries and affiliates. After longterm development, the internal anizational structure of western mercial banks has been shaped into three functional sections: market section, operation section and administration section, which exercise the functions of marketing, business operation, and centralized administration respectively, and furthermore, control one another, cooperate one another. This kind of idea about anizational design is embodied by the 英文原文 2 plete anizational division of these three steps of credit examination, approval and investigation in the credit operation that means the departments of business operation, credit examination and risk management, which belong to three different functional sections, respectively perform the functions of research before loanproviding, examination of credit application, and supervision after loanproviding, thereby, the lateral control between different departments can be effected. The vertical control is exercised through both the allotment of credit decisionmaking power between higher levels and lower levels of business departments that means to choose centralization or decentralization of power, and allotment of credit decisionmaking power between individuals and collectivity in a department that represents individual or collective decisionmaking power. This thesis amply discusses the good and bad effect of these four kinds of decisionmaking systems under two groups by applying the fundamentals of anizational management, thereby indicating that solely using any one of four decisionmaking systems will bring on visible defects. Accordingly, modern mercial banks mostly intends to adopt the loan examining authorization system which joins the collective and individual decisionmaking as well as centralization and decentralization together, but giving priority to individual decision and decentralization of power. Chapter Three of this thesis puts emphases on credit risks management system and its executive efficiency. The anizational control theory deems that system is the necessary condition under which anizational functions can be optimized and exerted, meanwhile anizational institution being stabilized, A key issue of interest in the recent literature on financial intermediation has been the role of relationship lending. Relationship lending is particularly mon in the case of small business lending, because small businesses typically rely on bank loans for a substantial part of their financing needs but also tend to be informationally opaque. An important issue in this context is the use of collateral, which is a mon feature of loan contracts between small firms and banks around the world, and a number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined why it is so widespread and how it relates to the incentives for borrowers and lenders and the borrowerlender relationship. For instance, it has been argued that in the presence of information asymmetries between creditors and borrowers, collateral may mitigate the problem of adverse selection (Bester, 1985。 Longhofer and Santos, 2020) screening and monitoring efforts. Another aspect of collateral that studies have concentrated on is that its presence may depend on the length and intimacy of the relationship between creditors and borrowers (Boot, 2020。nez, Salas and Saurina (2020) directly test the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses by separating exante and expo