【導讀】析與解決實際問題的能力，使學生得到從事科學研究工作的基本訓練和初步能力。得到全面的提高。能夠采用對比分析研究的方法，對所研究的問題進行充分論證和系統(tǒng)的分析。論文結構合理，層次清楚，重點突出，文字簡練，語句通順，邏輯性強，格式完備。出相關的應對措施。[5]袁亮.個人消費信貸信息不對稱的分析及對策[J].當代經濟,2020:158-159.上制約了我國個人消費信貸市場健康發(fā)展。深化消費信貸體制改革，加強管理個人消費信貸的違約風險。業(yè)務的創(chuàng)新，有利于促進消費的加大和經濟的增長。要進一步擴大個人消費信貸市場的規(guī)模就必須加強個人消費。者的信用管理，提高消費者整體的信用水平，進而提高整個社會的信用等級。近幾年，隨著政府以擴大內需為目標的宏觀經濟政策的制定，個人消費信貸業(yè)務。房貸款和汽車消費貸款占了相當比重。

　　

【正文】 several banks, which is not mon in other countries. A possible corollary of this is that because of the informational freerider problem it creates, this practice may reduce the main bank’s incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. Since collateral defines the order of seniority among creditors, using collateral may mitigate the freerider problem and enhance the main bank’s screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the main bank bees tenuous for personal guarantees, because personal guarantees do not define the seniority among creditors. Thus, our work provides empirical evidence on how collateral affects relationship lenders’ incentives, and plements previous studies that focus on the problem of borrower incentives (moral hazard and adverse selection). The remainder of the paper is anized as follows. Develops our empirical hypotheses which are based on previous theoretical models and empirical research. Section 3 describes the data and variables that are used in the paper, and explains our empirical model. Much of the empirical literature in this field examines theoretical predictions of asymmetric information models on the relationship between risk and collateral. If the bank cannot discern borrowers’ riskiness (hidden information), then collateral may serve as a screening device to distinguish between borrowers and to mitigate the adverse selection 英文原文 5 problem (Bester, 1985). This follows from the observation that a lowerrisk borrower has a greater incentive to pledge collateral than a risky borrower, because of his lower probability of failure and loss of collateral. Hence, the lowerrisk borrower will choose the contract with collateral. On the other hand, if the lender can observe the exante risk, but there are information asymmetries with regard to actions taken by the borrower after the loan is extended, collateral potentially provides an incentive to mitigate moral hazard. Thus, opposite to models focusing on hidden information, those concentrating on hidden action suggest that it is observably riskier borrowers that will pledge collateral, because collateral induces more effort by the borrower (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991), or reduces the incentives of strategic default (Bester, 1994).Because our data base only contains measures of firms’ observed riskiness (namely, credit scores), we couch our first empirical hypothesis as follows: Hypothesis 1 (H1): The use of collateral is higher among observably higherrisk (low credit score) borrowers if the lender requires collateral in order to mitigate the extent of moral hazard. Alternatively, if borrowers pledge collateral as a signal of their unobserved high credit quality, then there is negative or no relationship between the use of collateral and the credit score. Consistent with the theory of moral hazard, most existing empirical studies, including Berger and Udell (1990。 1995), have found a positive relationship between collateral and borrowers’ exante risk. Jim233。nez, Salas and Saurina (2020) directly test the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses by separating exante and expost measures of borrower riskiness, namely defaults prior to and after the loan origination. Their results suggest that although observed riskiness increases the likelihood that collateral is used, there is also a negative association between collateral and default after the loan has been granted, which is consistent with the adverse selection argument. It should be noted that theories of collateral as a solution to moral hazard and/or adverse selection problems assume collateral is external to the firm. Unfortunately, our measure of the incidence of collateral does not distinguish between firm (inside) collateral and personal (outside) collateral. Hence, throughout our analysis, we will assume that collateral is mostly inside, but allow for the fact that there may also be some 英文原文 6 outside collateral. As for personal guarantees, they clearly represent outside collateral. Recent research on collateral also discusses how collateral affects lenders’ incentives with regard to information production, that is, the screening of borrowers’ quality and the monitoring of their performance. These theories of the effect of collateral on lenders’ incentives apply to both inside and outside collateral. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2020), for instance, argue that, from banks’ point of view, collateral can be considered as a substitute for the evaluation of the actual risk of a borrower. Thus, banks that are highly protected by collateral may perform less screening of the projects they finance than is socially optimal. However, several theoretical studies argue that collateral may plement lenders’ screening and monitoring activities. In the presence of other claimants, lenders’ incentive to monitor borrowers is reduced due to the informational freerider problem. In order to enhance lenders’ incentive to monitor, loan contracts must be structured in a way that makes lenders’ payoff sensitive to borrowers’ financial health. Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that collateral may serve as a contractual device to increase lenders’ monitoring incentive, because collateral is likely to be effective only if its value can be monitored. Moreover, the use of collateral as an incentive will be more extensive when the value of such collateral (as in the case of accounts receivable and inventories, for example) depreciates rapidly if business conditions deteriorate, than when the value of collateral is relatively stable (as in the case of, ., real estate). Longhofer and Santos (2020) argue that collateral serves as an incentive for information production by the principal lender in the presence of several creditors, because taking collateral is effective in making its loan senior to other creditors’ cl