最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)及其它價(jià)值的作用外文翻譯(已修改)
2025-06-01 00:41 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外 文 翻 譯 原文： Optimal Capital Structure Reflections on Economic and Other Values Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stake holders’ interests on capital structure. Wellknown examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the pany. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control 1 and, related, the issue of corporate governance , receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather ,the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the ?rm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly de?ned situations. The ?rst is the traditional case of the ?rm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the ?rm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating ?nance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why ?rms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。 According to the neoclassical view on the role of the ?rm, the ?rm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the ?rm and are thus entitled to decide what the ?rm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind wealth maximization the goal of the ?rm is maximization of the ?rm’s contribution to the ?nancial wealth of its shareholders. The ?rm can acplish this by investing in projects with a positive present value. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate ?nancing decision. Two theories about the capital structure of the ?rm the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate ?nancing decision in this essentially neoclassical view. The original proposition I of Modigliani and Miller tates that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a ?rm is independent of its capital structure, . the debtequity ratio. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued ?rm and sell shares of the overvalued ?rm in such a way that identical ine streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal. When corporate taxes are introduced , proposition I changes dramatically. Modigliani and Miller show that in a world with corporate tax the value of ?rms is among others a function of leverage. When interest payments bee tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes ?rm value involves a hundred percent debt ?nancing. By increasin
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