金融學(xué)專(zhuān)業(yè)外文翻譯-----股利政策，信號(hào)和現(xiàn)金流量：綜合辦法-金融財(cái)政(已修改)
2025-05-31 14:58 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 原文 ： Dividend policy, signaling and free cash flow: an integrated approach Richard Fairchild Purpose–Scholars have examined the importance of a firm39。s dividend policy through two peting paradigms: the signaling hypothesis and the free cashflow hypothesis. It has been argued that our understanding of dividend policy is hindered by the lack of a model that integrates the two hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to address this by developing a theoretical dividend model that bines the signaling and free cashflow motives. The objective of the analysis is to shed light on the plex relationship between dividend policy, managerial incentives and firm value. Design/methodology/approach–In order to consider the plex nature of dividend policy, a dividend signaling game is developed, in which managers possess more information than investors about the quality of the firm (asymmetric information), and may invest in valuereducing projects (moral hazard). Hence, the model bines signaling and free cashflow motives for dividends. Furthermore, managerial munication and reputation effects are incorporated into the model. Findings–Of particular interest is the case where a firm may need to cut dividends in order to invest in a new valuecreating project, but where the firm will be punished by the market, since investors are behaviourally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news. This may result in firms refusing to cut dividends, hence passing up good projects. This paper demonstrates that managerial munication to investors about the reasons for the dividend cut, supported by managerial reputation effects, may mitigate this problem. Real world examples are provided to illustrate the plexity of dividend policy. Originality/value – This work has been inspired by, and develops that of Fuller and Taker, and Fuller and Blab, which considers the signaling and free cashflow motives for dividends. Whereas those authors consider the case where firms only have new negative present value (NPV) projects available (so that dividend increases provide unambiguously positive signals to the market in both the signaling and free cashflow cases), in this paper39。s model, the signals may be ambiguous, since firms may need to cut dividends to take positive NPV projects. Hence, the model assists in understanding the plexity of dividend policy. Introduction Nearly 50 years after Miller and Modigliani39。s (1961) famous dividend irrelevance theorem, academics and practitioners still have little understanding of dividend policy and its effect on firm value. Indeed, Black (1976) observed, ―The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don39。t fit together‖. In this paper, we develop a dividend signaling model that attempts to analyses the various factors that affect dividend policy and firm value. According to Miller and Modigliani39。s (1961) theorem, the value of the firm is unaffected by its dividend policy in a world of perfect market conditions. Two major assumptions driving the MM irrelevance theorem were that: 1. A firm39。s management is purely interested in maximizing shareholder value (there are no agency problems). 2. Corporate insiders and outsiders share the same information about the firm39。s operations and prospects (the ―symmetric information‖ assumption). Subsequent theoretical research has analyzed the effects of incorporating asymmetric information and agency problems into the firm39。s dividend decision. This resulted in two peting approaches。 the dividend signaling hypothesis, and the excess cash hypothesis. Our dividend model incorporates both approaches. The signaling hypothesis states that under asymmetric information between managers and investors, dividend policy may provide signals regarding the firm39。s current performance and future prospects. The free cashflow hypothesis (also known as the excesscash hypothesis) states that dividend policies address agency problems between managers and outside investors (for example Easterbrook, 1984。 Jensen, 1986。 Fluck, 1995). In particular, the agency problem in Jensen39。s (1986) analysis arises from an empire building manager39。s incentives to invest in negative present value (NPV) projects. Dividends alleviate this problem by reducing the free cash flow available to the manager. As noted by Fuller and Thakor (2020), both of these hypotheses (signaling and free cash flow) support much (but not all) of the empirical evidence that dividend increases (decreases) are good (bad) news, causing stock price increases (decreases). Perhaps the reason why a solution to Black39。s (1976) dividend puzzle remains so elusive is that ―we lack an integrated theory that incorporates both the signaling and free cashflow motivations for dividends‖ (Fuller and Thakor 2020。 Fuller and Blau, 2020). Fuller and Thakor (2020) sketch the first su
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