【正文】 (2020). In Brucato and Smith, a reputable dividend signal is one where an unexpected dividend increase is confirmed by a subsequent unexpected earnings increase. Similarly, in Gillet et al., the reputation mechanism is such that the market punishes a firm that chooses a high dividend (in order to ―fool‖ the market that it is a highine firm), but subsequently reports low profitability. In contrast, in our model, we consider the role of managerial reputation in allowing a firm to municate that it is cutting the dividend in order to invest in a new valueadding project. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section , we consider our free cashflow case. In section , we consider our adverse selection case, and consider the role of munication and reputation. In section 4, we discuss practical and managerial implications of our model. Furthermore, in the light of our model, we consider some anecdotal evidence demonstrating the plexities surrounding dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. Our dividend signaling model demonstrates that dividend policy is indeed plex. We have demonstrated that high dividends may have a positive effect on firm value, both by providing a positive signal of current performance (in terms of current ine), and in reducing the free cashflow problem (that is, the temptation for the manager to invest in negative NPV projects due to private benefits). However, when good positive NPV investment opportunities are available, a high dividend may indeed be value reducing if it prevents firms from being able to make these investments. However, management may refuse to cut dividends, thereby passing up these positive NPV opportunities, especially if the stock market has been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal a highquality firm. Our model thus emphasized managerial munication/education of investors, supported by managerial reputation considerations, as a means of eliminating this problem. We now consider some anecdotal evidence that provides a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the realworld confusion surrounding dividend policy. The ―traditional‖ positive relationship between dividends and firm value Lease et al. (2020) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the ―standard‖ way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases): Figgie International announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie39。t fit together‖. In this paper, we develop a dividend signaling model that attempts to analyses the various factors that affect dividend policy and firm value. According to Miller and Modigliani39。 Jensen, 1986。s strategic repositioning for growth and the resulting cash requirement‖. On the release of the dividendcut announcement, the firm39。 近 50 年后米勒和莫迪利亞尼（ 1961）著名的股利無關(guān)定理 ，學者和從業(yè)人員仍然缺乏了解的股利政策及其對公司價值的影響。所指出的富勒和 Thakor（ 2020 年），這些假說（信號 和現(xiàn)金流量）均支持多（但不是全部）的實證證據(jù)表明，股息的增加（或減少）的好（壞）消息，導致 股票價格上漲（減少）。例如，艾倫和Michaely（ 2020）認為，“不過，我們注意到，在不對稱信息 情況下 ，股息也可以看作是壞消息。在我們的第一種情況下，投資者的信念確實是正確的，高質(zhì)量的企業(yè)可以從低質(zhì)量的公司單獨支付高股息 演變而來 。 我們的股利信號傳遞模型表明，股利政策確實是復(fù)雜的。這表明，投資者可能了解，股息可能需要進行切割，再投資于公司的成長，但他們?nèi)匀灰蠹t利。在消息公布的當天，其股價上升。因此，我們認為后者的問題可能會被減輕投資者的溝通，通過加強管理的口碑效應(yīng)。與此相反，康柏電腦公司支付 1997 年第一次股息 ，導致其股價下跌（ 一開始是作為紅利“壞消息”的信號，該公司已抓住 了良好的投資機會）。沃爾瑪?shù)墓蓛r上升。在 節(jié)中，我們考慮我們的逆向選擇的情況下，并考慮溝通和聲譽的作用。 投資者的行為大大影響社會規(guī)范和態(tài)度。與此相反，我們認為該項目的可能性，可能有正面或負面的凈現(xiàn)值。詹森， 1986。 這可能會導致企業(yè)拒絕削減股息，因此放棄好的項目。s share price increased. However, Lease et al. (2020) demonstrate that management understands that high dividends may restrict corporate investment in valuecreation: Elisabeth Goth, a dissident member of the family that controls Dow Jones and Co., raises questions about its dividend policy, contending that Dow Jones has increased its dividends at the expense of reinvesting its earnings to fuel future growth. However, ―shareholders who enjoyed stock runups and rising dividends in the 1980s are unhappy that Bell CEOs want to curb dividend growth and use profits to improve their works and diversify at home and abroad‖. This suggests that investors may understand that dividends may need to be cut to invest in pany growth, but they still demand dividends. Dividend cuts are not always bad news! Our analysis revealed that dividend cuts are not always bad news, especially when a firm has significant growth opportunities available. However, we demonstrated that managers may refuse to cut dividends for fear of negative market reaction (which may be driven by investors being behaviorally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news). Our model suggested that the problem may be mitigated if managers can municate the reasons for dividend cuts (to invest in new valueadding projects), supported by managerial reputation effects. Indeed, Cohen and Yagil39。s operations and prospects (the ―symmetric information‖ assumption). Subsequent theoreti