【正文】 nce that provides a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the realworld confusion surrounding dividend policy. The ―traditional‖ positive relationship between dividends and firm value Lease et al. (2020) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the ―standard‖ way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases): Figgie International announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie39。s (FT 2020) analysis in the following ways. First, we develop the analysis, and derive the equilibrium of the dividend game, in a formal and rigorous manner. Second, FT only considers the possibility that a negative NPV project exists. Hence, they focus on Jensen39。 Fuller and Blau, 2020). Fuller and Thakor (2020) sketch the first such integrated model. We build on their work by developing a dividend model that incorporates both asymmetric information and free cashflow problems. Particularly, we consider a dual role for dividends. Dividends may provide a signal of current ine to investors (hence the manager is motivated to choose a high dividend to provide a positive signal). However, in our analysis, a new project is available to the firm. If the firm wishes to invest in this project, it must get the funds from current ine. Hence, in addition to the current inesignaling role, the level of dividends may also affect the manager39。s incentives to invest in negative present value (NPV) projects. Dividends alleviate this problem by reducing the free cash flow available to the manager. As noted by Fuller and Thakor (2020), both of these hypotheses (signaling and free cash flow) support much (but not all) of the empirical evidence that dividend increases (decreases) are good (bad) news, causing stock price increases (decreases). Perhaps the reason why a solution to Black39。 Fluck, 1995). In particular, the agency problem in Jensen39。s current performance and future prospects. The free cashflow hypothesis (also known as the excesscash hypothesis) states that dividend policies address agency problems between managers and outside investors (for example Easterbrook, 1984。s dividend decision. This resulted in two peting approaches。s management is purely interested in maximizing shareholder value (there are no agency problems). 2. Corporate insiders and outsiders share the same information about the firm39。t fit together‖. In this paper, we develop a dividend signaling model that attempts to analyses the various factors that affect dividend policy and firm value. According to Miller and Modigliani39。s model, the signals may be ambiguous, since firms may need to cut dividends to take positive NPV projects. Hence, the model assists in understanding the plexity of dividend policy. Introduction Nearly 50 years after Miller and Modigliani39。原文 ： Dividend policy, signaling and free cash flow: an integrated approach Richard Fairchild Purpose–Scholars have examined the importance of a firm39。s dividend policy through two peting paradigms: the signaling hypothesis and the free cashflow hypothesis. It has been argued that our understanding of dividend policy is hindered by the lack of a model that integrates the two hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to address this by developing a theoretical dividend model that bines the signaling and free cashflow motives. The objective of the analysis is to shed light on the plex relationship between dividend policy, managerial incentives and firm value. Design/methodology/approach–In order to consider the plex nature of dividend policy, a dividend signaling game is developed, in which managers possess more information than investors about the quality of the firm (asymmetric information), and may invest in valuereducing projects (moral hazard). Hence, the model bines signaling and free cashflow motives for dividends. Furthermore, managerial munication and reputation effects are incorporated into the model. Findings–Of particular interest is the case where a firm may need to cut dividends in order to invest in a new valuecreating project, but where the firm will be punished by the market, since investors are behaviourally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news. This may result in firms refusing to cut dividends, hence passing up good projects. This paper demonstrates that managerial munication to investors about the reasons for the dividend cut, supported by managerial reputation effects, may mitigate this problem. Real world examples are provided to illustrate the plexity of dividend policy. Originality/value – This work has been inspired by, and develops that of Fuller and Taker, and Fuller and Blab, which considers the signaling and free cashflow motives for dividends. Whereas those authors consider the case where firms only have new negative present value (NPV) projects available (so that dividend increases provide u