【正文】 998) argue that firms may be able to avoid a negative market reaction by municating to investors that the reason for dividend cuts is to invest in future growth opportunities. It may be argued that this may be cheaptalk. However, Wooldridge and Ghosh argue that managerial reputation may provide an important mechanism for providing credibility to corporate finance decisions. The role of reputation in dividend policy has been explored by Brucato and Smith (1997) and Gillet et al. (2020). In Brucato and Smith, a reputable dividend signal is one where an unexpected dividend increase is confirmed by a subsequent unexpected earnings increase. Similarly, in Gillet et al., the reputation mechanism is such that the market punishes a firm that chooses a high dividend (in order to ―fool‖ the market that it is a highine firm), but subsequently reports low profitability. In contrast, in our model, we consider the role of managerial reputation in allowing a firm to municate that it is cutting the dividend in order to invest in a new valueadding project. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section , we consider our free cashflow case. In section , we consider our adverse selection case, and consider the role of munication and reputation. In section 4, we discuss practical and managerial implications of our model. Furthermore, in the light of our model, we consider some anecdotal evidence demonstrating the plexities surrounding dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. Our dividend signaling model demonstrates that dividend policy is indeed plex. We have demonstrated that high dividends may have a positive effect on firm value, both by providing a positive signal of current performance (in terms of current ine), and in reducing the free cashflow problem (that is, the temptation for the manager to invest in negative NPV projects due to private benefits). However, when good positive NPV investment opportunities are available, a high dividend may indeed be value reducing if it prevents firms from being able to make these investments. However, management may refuse to cut dividends, thereby passing up these positive NPV opportunities, especially if the stock market has been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal a highquality firm. Our model thus emphasized managerial munication/education of investors, supported by managerial reputation considerations, as a means of eliminating this problem. We now consider some anecdotal evidence that provides a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the realworld confusion surrounding dividend policy. The ―traditional‖ positive relationship between dividends and firm value Lease et al. (2020) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the ―standard‖ way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases): Figgie International announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie39。s share price increased from $ to $ (hence, the dividend cut, supported by positive munication to the market, was seen as good news). In contrast, Compaq Computer Corporation paid a dividend for the first time in 1997, causing its share price to fall (a dividend initiation was seen as a ―bad news‖ signal that the pany had run out of good investment opportunities). Wooldridge and Ghosh (1998) emphasize the importance of corporate munication and managerial reputation when cutting dividends to invest in growth. They pare the cases of Gould Inc. and ITT. In 1983, Gould Inc. announced that it was cutting its quarterly dividend in order to ―conserve cash that can be used to finance the growth of its electronic businesses the board set the new dividend in the light of the pany39。因此，該模型結合了信號和自由現(xiàn)金流 的 因素 。事實上，黑色（ 1976）指出，“我們期待在更困難的 支付 股息 局面中，更好像一個謎與片段，而不是適合在一起。我們的股息模型結合這兩種方法 。 也許，之所認 為黑色的（ 1976）股利之謎的解決方案仍然如此難以捉摸的是，是因為我們缺乏一個綜合的理論，“結合對股息信號 和自由現(xiàn)金流動機”（ Fuller和 Thakor 2020 年富勒和布勞， 2020， 富勒和 Thakor（ 2020）得 出第一個這樣的綜合模式。首先，我們 從對 開發(fā)的分析 中， 獲得了正式的和嚴格的方式對股息博弈均衡。公司的分紅是那些沒有積極的凈現(xiàn)值項目，其中投資“，并根據(jù)布萊克（ 1976 年），”“如果錯過機會支付股息 ， 或許沒有一家公司 具備已支付股息的 自信心， 但 它已經(jīng)有吸引力的投資可能，”。事實上，科恩和 Yagil（ 2020 年）確定“一個新的機構股息成本類 型：正 凈現(xiàn)值是放棄以支付股息的項目數(shù) 為前提的 ”。在第二種情況下，這些信 念驅動的逆向選擇問題（高品質的公司 是不愿意減少低于低質量的公司的 股息 作為我們的第二個案例，由于市場當時誤值低質量的這家公司的延伸，我們考慮是否逆向選擇問題可以通過溝通 方式 ，以緩解投資者，通過加強管理的口碑效應。 本文的其余部分組織如下。我們已經(jīng)表明，高分紅可能 性 有，都是由目前的表現(xiàn)提供了積極的信號 （在當前的收入而言）對公司價值的積極作用，減少現(xiàn)金流動問題（即 經(jīng)理 在 私人利益誘惑 下投入 負凈現(xiàn)值投資項目 ）。 伯利恒鋼鐵公司宣布，它忽略其季度股息。 股息削減并不總是壞消息！ 我們的分析顯示，股息削減并不總是壞消息，尤其是當公司有顯著 的增長機會。溫耐用控股公司和康柏計算機公司。 與此相反， ITT 公司宣布削減百分之 64 在其股息，并解釋說，它的股息水平已經(jīng)“成為競爭激烈的高科技環(huán)境不一致”。 我們的模型確定了兩個潛在的機構與股息政策相關的問題。其次，基金經(jīng)理可能不愿意減少分紅采取積極的凈現(xiàn)值項目，因為他是與目前的收入消極的信號表示關注。 結論 我們已經(jīng)制定了股利信號模型，開始解決費舍爾布萊克（ 1976）股利之謎。 論股息削減公布后，該公司的股票價格從十八點二五美元至 （因此，削減股息，以積極的溝通，以市場的支持，被視為好消息看到）。我們的模型表明， 由 管理的口碑效應的支持 ， 如果管理者能夠溝通股息削減的原因（投資于新的增值項目） ，問題可能 將得到緩解， 。沃爾瑪宣布將其季度股息增加。 然而，管理層可能會拒絕削減股息，從而放棄了這