【正文】 因此，我們認(rèn)為后者的問題可能會被減輕投資者的溝通，通過加強(qiáng)管理的口碑效應(yīng)。但是，股息的增加可能被視為負(fù)面的信號（該公司缺乏成長的機(jī)會），而 股息的削減可能被視為一個(gè)積極的信號（該公司具有顯著的增長機(jī)會提供）看到。我們表明，與管理創(chuàng)新，股利政策與公司價(jià)值關(guān)系確實(shí)是復(fù)雜的。在消息公布的當(dāng)天，其股價(jià)上升。與此相反，康柏電腦公司支付 1997 年第一次股息 ，導(dǎo)致其股價(jià)下跌（ 一開始是作為紅利“壞消息”的信號，該公司已抓住 了良好的投資機(jī)會）。 看看 兩種改變其股利政策的公司的例子 。事實(shí)上，科恩和 Yagil 的（ 2020 年）在美國，英國，德國，加拿大和日本的主要 公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官國際機(jī)構(gòu)的調(diào)查顯示，這個(gè)問題的存在。這表明，投資者可能了解，股息可能需要進(jìn)行切割，再投資于公司的成長，但他們?nèi)匀灰蠹t利。沃爾瑪?shù)墓蓛r(jià)上升。關(guān)于公布 Figgie 的股票價(jià)格下跌。因此，我們強(qiáng)調(diào)管理溝通模式的投資者 /教育，提高 管理聲譽(yù)因素作為消除這一問題的方法。 我們的股利信號傳遞模型表明，股利政策確實(shí)是復(fù)雜的。在 節(jié)中，我們考慮我們的逆向選擇的情況下，并考慮溝通和聲譽(yù)的作用。與此相反，在我們的模型，我們認(rèn)為，允許一個(gè)公司溝通，這是削減股息，以投資于新的增值項(xiàng)目中的管理聲譽(yù)的作用。然而，伍爾德里奇和 Ghosh 認(rèn)為，管理的聲譽(yù)也可以提供一個(gè)信譽(yù)為企業(yè)提供融資決策的重要機(jī)制。在我們的第一種情況下，投資者的信念確實(shí)是正確的，高質(zhì)量的企業(yè)可以從低質(zhì)量的公司單獨(dú)支付高股息 演變而來 。 投資者的行為大大影響社會規(guī)范和態(tài)度。其次，我們考慮一個(gè)逆向選擇的問題，使管理人員可以拒絕削減股息，因此傳遞了一個(gè) 正的凈現(xiàn)值項(xiàng)目 [4]。但是，股息的增加可能被視為負(fù)面的信號（該公司缺乏成長的機(jī)會），而股息的削減可能被視為一 個(gè)積極的信號（該公司具有顯著的增長機(jī)會提供）看到。例如，艾倫和Michaely（ 2020）認(rèn)為，“不過，我們注意到，在不對稱信息 情況下 ，股息也可以看作是壞消息。與此相反，我們認(rèn)為該項(xiàng)目的可能性，可能有正面或負(fù)面的凈現(xiàn)值。 我們的模型有助于富勒和 Thakor 的（金融時(shí)報(bào) 2020 年）在以下幾個(gè)方面的分析。股息收入提供了投資者（管理者的動(dòng)機(jī)，因此選擇高股息，以提供一個(gè)積極的信號） 電流信號 。所指出的富勒和 Thakor（ 2020 年），這些假說（信號 和現(xiàn)金流量）均支持多（但不是全部）的實(shí)證證據(jù)表明，股息的增加（或減少）的好（壞）消息，導(dǎo)致 股票價(jià)格上漲（減少）。詹森， 1986。股利信號假說，過?，F(xiàn)金假說。兩個(gè)驅(qū)動(dòng)的 MM 無關(guān)定理的主要假設(shè)是： 1． 一個(gè)公司的管理純粹是興趣最大化股權(quán)持有人的價(jià)值（沒有代理問題）。 近 50 年后米勒和莫迪利亞尼（ 1961）著名的股利無關(guān)定理 ，學(xué)者和從業(yè)人員仍然缺乏了解的股利政策及其對公司價(jià)值的影響。 這可能會導(dǎo)致企業(yè)拒絕削減股息，因此放棄好的項(xiàng)目。 為了考慮股利政策的復(fù)雜性 ，其中管理人員擁有超過有關(guān)企業(yè) 優(yōu)質(zhì)投資者 的信息，可投資于價(jià)值減少項(xiàng)目。s (1976) dividend puzzle. We demonstrated that the relationship between managerial incentives, dividend policy and firm value is indeed plex. In our model, dividends served a dual purpose. They signaled current ine, and they affected the firm39。s strategic repositioning for growth and the resulting cash requirement‖. On the release of the dividendcut announcement, the firm39。s share price increased. However, Lease et al. (2020) demonstrate that management understands that high dividends may restrict corporate investment in valuecreation: Elisabeth Goth, a dissident member of the family that controls Dow Jones and Co., raises questions about its dividend policy, contending that Dow Jones has increased its dividends at the expense of reinvesting its earnings to fuel future growth. However, ―shareholders who enjoyed stock runups and rising dividends in the 1980s are unhappy that Bell CEOs want to curb dividend growth and use profits to improve their works and diversify at home and abroad‖. This suggests that investors may understand that dividends may need to be cut to invest in pany growth, but they still demand dividends. Dividend cuts are not always bad news! Our analysis revealed that dividend cuts are not always bad news, especially when a firm has significant growth opportunities available. However, we demonstrated that managers may refuse to cut dividends for fear of negative market reaction (which may be driven by investors being behaviorally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news). Our model suggested that the problem may be mitigated if managers can municate the reasons for dividend cuts (to invest in new valueadding projects), supported by managerial reputation effects. Indeed, Cohen and Yagil39。s (1986) free cashflow problem. In contrast, we consider the possibility that the project may have a negative or positive NPV. This enables us to consider the following underresearched area. Although the majority of theoretical and empirical work suggests that the relationship between dividends and share price is positive (dividend increases are ―good news‖), Wooldridge and Ghosh (1998) have suggested that, when a firm has strong growth opportunities available, dividend cuts may not always be bad news. Conversely, dividend increases may be bad news. For example, Allen and Michaely (2020) argue, ―However, we note that with asymmetric information, dividends can also be viewed as bad news. Firms that pay dividends are the ones that have no positive NPV projects in which to invest‖, and according to Black (1976), ―Perhaps a corporation that pays no dividends is demonstrating confidence that it has attractive investment opportunities that might be missed if it paid dividends‖. Hence, the relationship between dividends and firm value is plex. The market may view an increase in dividends favorably, either as a positive signal of current ine (that is dividends reduce asymmetric information problems), or as a means of mitigating free cashflow problems (that is dividends reduce agency problems). However, a dividend increase may be seen as a negative signal (the firm lacks growth opportunities), while a dividend cut may be seen as a positive signal (the firm has significant growth opportunities available). Our integrated signaling/excess cashflow model of dividends attempts to analyses all of these affects. Our third contribution is to consider two types of inefficiency (or agency problem) relating to managerial incentives regarding dividend policy. Firstly, we analyses a moral hazard problem in which empirebuilding managers may c