【正文】 ects. We believe that our integrated model has provided a springboard for future theoretical and empirical research into the plex nature of corporate dividend policy. 資料來源： Emerald Journal of Managerial Finance 2020(05):P394—413 譯文 ： 股利政策，信號(hào)和現(xiàn)金流量：綜合辦法 Richard Fairchild 信號(hào)假說和自由現(xiàn)金流假說認(rèn)為，股息政策 是由一個(gè)模型，集成了兩個(gè)假說缺乏阻礙。s (2020) international survey of CFOs of major panies in USA, UK, Germany, Canada and Japan reveals that this agency problem exists. The authors argue that managers should consider two factors when deciding whether to cut dividends: 1. How sensitive is the stock price to dividend changes (the adverse selection problem)? 2. To what extent can managers transfer information (that is municate) about the profitable investment opportunity so that investors will understand the reason for the dividend increase? Indeed, they state: If the managers believe that the reason for the dividend cut can be effectively municated to investors in such a manner that it would not result in a dramatic stock price decrease, then they should prefer investing over paying the full amount of the dividend. On the other hand, if they believe that a drastic decline in the stock price may occur, then they should continue with the normal dividend plan and postpone the investment opportunity. The ―flow of information‖ factor should be derived from the structural investors39。 Fuller and Blau, 2020). Fuller and Thakor (2020) sketch the first such integrated model. We build on their work by developing a dividend model that incorporates both asymmetric information and free cashflow problems. Particularly, we consider a dual role for dividends. Dividends may provide a signal of current ine to investors (hence the manager is motivated to choose a high dividend to provide a positive signal). However, in our analysis, a new project is available to the firm. If the firm wishes to invest in this project, it must get the funds from current ine. Hence, in addition to the current inesignaling role, the level of dividends may also affect the manager39。s dividend decision. This resulted in two peting approaches。原文 ： Dividend policy, signaling and free cash flow: an integrated approach Richard Fairchild Purpose–Scholars have examined the importance of a firm39。s operations and prospects (the ―symmetric information‖ assumption). Subsequent theoretical research has analyzed the effects of incorporating asymmetric information and agency problems into the firm39。s (1976) dividend puzzle remains so elusive is that ―we lack an integrated theory that incorporates both the signaling and free cashflow motivations for dividends‖ (Fuller and Thakor 2020。s share price increased. However, Lease et al. (2020) demonstrate that management understands that high dividends may restrict corporate investment in valuecreation: Elisabeth Goth, a dissident member of the family that controls Dow Jones and Co., raises questions about its dividend policy, contending that Dow Jones has increased its dividends at the expense of reinvesting its earnings to fuel future growth. However, ―shareholders who enjoyed stock runups and rising dividends in the 1980s are unhappy that Bell CEOs want to curb dividend growth and use profits to improve their works and diversify at home and abroad‖. This suggests that investors may understand that dividends may need to be cut to invest in pany growth, but they still demand dividends. Dividend cuts are not always bad news! Our analysis revealed that dividend cuts are not always bad news, especially when a firm has significant growth opportunities available. However, we demonstrated that managers may refuse to cut dividends for fear of negative market reaction (which may be driven by investors being behaviorally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news). Our model suggested that the problem may be mitigated if managers can municate the reasons for dividend cuts (to invest in new valueadding projects), supported by managerial reputation effects. Indeed, Cohen and Yagil39。s (1976) dividend puzzle. We demonstrated that the relationship between managerial incentives, dividend policy and firm value is indeed plex. In our model, dividends served a dual purpose. They signaled current ine, and they affected the firm39。 這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)拒絕削減股息，因此放棄好的項(xiàng)目。兩個(gè)驅(qū)動(dòng)的 MM 無關(guān)定理的主要假設(shè)是： 1． 一個(gè)公司的管理純粹是興趣最大化股權(quán)持有人的價(jià)值（沒有代理問題）。詹森， 1986。股息收入提供了投資者（管理者的動(dòng)機(jī)，因此選擇高股息，以提供一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)） 電流信號(hào) 。與此相反，我們認(rèn)為該項(xiàng)目的可能性，可能有正面或負(fù)面的凈現(xiàn)值。但是，股息的增加可能被視為負(fù)面的信號(hào)（該公司缺乏成長的機(jī)會(huì)），而股息的削減可能被視為一 個(gè)積極的信號(hào)（該公司具有顯著的增長機(jī)會(huì)提供）看到。 投資者的行為大大影響社會(huì)規(guī)范和態(tài)度。然而，伍爾德里奇和 Ghosh 認(rèn)為，管理的聲譽(yù)也可以提供一個(gè)信譽(yù)為企業(yè)提供融資決策的重要機(jī)制。在 節(jié)中，我們考慮我們的逆向選擇的情況下，并考慮溝通和聲譽(yù)的作用。因此，我們強(qiáng)調(diào)管理溝通模式的投資者 /教育，提高 管理聲譽(yù)因素作為消除這一問題的方法。沃爾瑪?shù)墓蓛r(jià)上升。事實(shí)上，科恩和 Yagil 的（ 2020 年）在美國，英國，德國，加拿大和日本的主要 公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官國際機(jī)構(gòu)的調(diào)查顯示，這個(gè)問題的存在。與此相反，康柏電腦公司支付 1997 年第一次股息 ，導(dǎo)致其股價(jià)下跌（ 一開始是作為紅利“壞消息”的信號(hào)，該公司已抓住 了良好的投資機(jī)會(huì)）。我們表明，與管理創(chuàng)新，股利政策與公司價(jià)值關(guān)系確實(shí)是復(fù)雜的。因此，我們認(rèn)為后者的問題可能會(huì)被減輕投資者的溝通，通過加強(qiáng)管理的口碑效應(yīng)。但是，股息的增加可能