財(cái)務(wù)管理---責(zé)任管理模式-閱讀頁
2025-01-24 06:25本頁面
【正文】 contract, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand? Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent at all time, what are the amount and condition of payment? And, what is the expected payoff for the principal? 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 16 Now, let’s assume that you cannot monitor and observe the agent directly. What would you, as the agent, do? Now, can you see the agency problems here? Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 18,496189。 52 = 111 E3=4 18,496189。+40,000189。+40,000189。+40,000189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ55(e2) + R40189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ55(e3) + R40189。() + R40189。() + R40189。() + R40189。() + R40189。() + R40189。)+(11,449189。 = 95 E2=5 (18,769189。)189。)+(11,449189。 = 100 Now, the principal is telling the agent NOT to work hard! The $33,159 is actually better than the $33,020 under “incentive patible” contract! Effort level Expected utility of the principal E1=6 Not a feasible solution, agent’s utility 100 n/a E2=5 (55,00018,769)+(40,00011,449) = 33,159 E3=4 (55,00018,769)+(40,00011,449) = 30,855 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 25 A Few Cautionary Remarks ? This model presented here is a singleperiod model. Multipleperiod (repeated games) can give very different answers. ? There can be multiple principals as well as multiple agents in the model. Such models, however, bee extremely plex. ? Information systems are not considered here. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 26 Concluding Remarks ? The Principalagent model is theoretical elegant but mathematically tedious to use. ? Empirical (reallife) evidence seems to support the model well. ? The challenges, in my opinion, include: ? to e up with useful, testable hypotheses。 ? to encourage researchers to teach newers the basic skill in understanding the model rather than simply to publish in “ivorytower” type of journals.
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