【正文】
eholders of the “tunneling” behavior. So did the reputation of the independent directors. In addition, if the chairman and general manager are the same person would increase the major shareholders’”tunneling” behavior. (3) In accordance with the above analysis, we did some further research on power balance with shareholder structure, independence of the board and tunneling behavior. The results showed that in the lack of power balance with shareholder structure regress analysis, there is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling” behavior. But in the case of power balance with shareholder structure, there is significantly negative related between the equity proportion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling” behavior. It is indicated that the environment of power balance with shareholder structure is benefit for the independence of independent directors to play. However, the reputation of the independent directors of the lack of power balances with shareholder structure even more significant than the power balances with shareholder structure, it has negative correlation with the “tunneling” behavior. It is indicated that controlling shareholders in order to cover up their own “tunneling” motivation, tend to choose good reputable independent directors under the lack of power balances with shareholder structure. Meanwhile we can also get an idea that reputable independent directors can protect the benefits of other s