【正文】
ss, however, a prehensive review of the franchising in the economy reports fails to show any figures providing parable failure or success rates for franchises or franchisees. On the contrary, the reports note specifically that 39。(franchising in the economy, 1988), .My own review of applicable . Department of Commerce publications reveals no studies or statistics capable of supporting parative survival rates for new franchise versus independent business startups. Claims that franchise startups have vastly higher survival rates than independent business startups cannot be supported by published . Department of Commerce studies of small business. Thus, claims about franchise rates of survival have often tended to extremes. The purpose of this study is to raise the debate to a higher plain. The presence Of the CBO data base makes it possible for issues of franchisee survival to be analyzed in objective, prehensive ways. The CBO oversamples minority and women business owners, and it oversamples the larger scale small businesses that utilize paid employees. Of the roughly 90,000 small businesses surveyed to create the CBO data base, over 70 percent responded. All of the reported statistics in this study are weighted to adjust for both survey nonresponsive, and the Census Bureau39。 Bates and Gucci, 1989). Among very young firms, owner traits associated with greater likelihood of survival include owners working fulltime in the firm, highly educated owners, and large owner financial capital investment in the firm at startup (Bates, 1990a). Table one indicates that franchisees are generally better endowed with traits linked to survival than no franchise young firms. In terms of mean 1987 sales revenues, the young franchisees report $513,961, over five times larger than the corresponding figure of $102,410 reported by the independent businesses (table one). Capitalization at startup is similarly much greater mean value $86,493 for the franchise firms, almost three times greater than the no franchise firm capitalization of $29,822. Only in the area of owner educational background do the franchise firms appear to be weaker than the independents: percent of the former and percent of the latter had pursued graduate studies beyond the bachelor39。 these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. Aspiring entrepreneurs choosing to bee franchisees certainly expect to improve their odds of survival over the early turbulent years of business startup. Beyond low risk of failure, what specifically does the potential owner seek to gain by purchasing a franchise rather than operating an independent business? Rubin (1978) lists hypothesized advantages accruing to franchisees. First the trademark and the product sold appear to be valuable, which facilitates access to customers for the young franchisee. Second, the franchisor often makes capital available to the franchisee, either by extending credit directly or cosigning for a bank loan. Third, franchisees lacking appropriate human capital can receive managerial advice and assistance from franchisors. Table one summary statistics provide evidence that is consistent with these hypothesized advantages of the franchise relationship. Franchisees are generating greater sales per unit of capital and labor input than independent firms: Regarding access to debt capital, percent of the table one franchise firms report that they used borrowed capital to help finance business entry, versus percent of the independent firms. Yet, the franchise operations are only moderately more leveraged than the independents, on average: debt accounted for percent of firm capitalization at startup for franc