【正文】 legislature and any higher levels of administration. In short, questions would need to be posed concerning the transparency and accountability of a government and whether these meet minimum international standards. Quite often the consequences of subnational spending can be shifted to higher levels of government, or across generations, if there is no hardbudget constraint at a junior level of government (Rodmen, Laidback, and Eskelund, 2021). This generally translates into weak or nonexistent control over borrowing. The borrowing might be explicit, for example, through issuance of debt or contracting of loans, or indirect, such as though the buildup of arrears or accounts payable. Under different constitutional arrangements, policy responses vary from enforced controls over subnational borrowing (generally in unitary states) to voluntary agreements or rules (in federations, as well as in supranational conglomerations of states, such as the EU),to sole reliance on the strictures of the market. The case for munitybased governance depends on the possibilities of local information generation together with the works of intermunity interactions or social capital. The bination of these factors could, in principle, generate spending tailored to local needs, with substantive local interactions in order to ensure that funds are not diverted from expressed objectives. And as stated above, international and donor agencies have raised these possibilities in the design of assistance programs. But, in practice, there are two substantives in difficulties. The first relates to whether or not there might be elite capture, and the second, that would serve to reinforce the first, relates to the type of information that is generated. In the final analysis, the case turns on the effectiveness of local service delivery and whether or not powerful local interest groups are able to garner a significant proportion of funds allocated to the localities. Bradman and Mothered (2021) discuss theoretical tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized delivery of infrastructure services. Under conditions of considerable inequality, poorer and vulnerable sections of society might be disadvantaged by munity based development, as existing social and economic relations might be used by more influential groups to the disadvantage of the usual target groups (Plateau, 2021). Plateau also emphasizes the risks of the outright embezzlement of funds, in addition to wasteful or misdirected spending. These tendencies are likely to be reinforced when as described above the PFM infrastructure, especially information flows and independent audit, are weak. The evidence on munitybased development is mixed, at best (see the survey by Mansur and Rae, 2021).An assessment of Social Investment Funds suggests that these have been less than successful in generation ownership” the local munities (Tender, 2021), it a mismatch between the preferences of the donors and recipients, a “facade” of consultation between munities and donors through the PPA process (Francis and James, 2021). A strong conclusion by Plateau (2021) is that electorates may not be willing or able to discipline corrupt local leaders, specially if there is some trickledown and improvement regardless of the magnitude of funds diverted. And petition among donors may make matters worse. Is proposals include a sequential disbursement of assistance, and on accurate information on the spending, together with an improved technology of fraud detection. Equally important are the effective mechanisms put in place to prevent and punish misuse of public funds. Translate into the infrastructure of budgeting and public spending, concluding adequate and effective control and audit mechanisms. In order to meet the requirement of providing accurate and timely information to policy makers, the legislature and the broader public, there is increasing emphasis in anic budget laws arou