【正文】 組合上更加復(fù)雜性，包括高管補償，比起早期工作對單一激勵機制的研究。與傳統(tǒng)觀念相反，他們認為，高管補償程度的日益增加可以被解釋為監(jiān)管的實效，而隨著監(jiān)管強度的增強是由于獨立董事和股東人數(shù)的增加導致的。作者的結(jié)論是，監(jiān)測強度與他們的補償是正相關(guān)的。事實上，這些組合可能在不同的組織環(huán)境相反的效果。然而，風險投資公司的留存收益與激勵計劃呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。 高管補償與國家機構(gòu) 正如我們介紹的，大多數(shù)對于高管賠償?shù)膶嵶C文獻，特別是在分析高管薪酬不同組成的組織結(jié)果 時，主要都集中在英國和美國的企業(yè)部門，同時，公司治理的英美模式的許多共同要素在其他國家是沒有的。在日本， 71%的高管補償是與基本工資聯(lián)系，股權(quán)激勵僅占 17%。 計算各國之間存在顯著差異的高管補償。中國的 CEO薪酬總額是美國公司的 51%， 44%和 21。 越來越多的機構(gòu)認為， 公司治理因素的效率應(yīng)該考慮它們的國家機構(gòu)背景。近來，相當?shù)闹鲝娬{(diào)在國家經(jīng)濟體制組織內(nèi)的潛在組織多樣性，使機構(gòu)可以支持特定類型的組織形式以犧牲某些其他類型的組織為代價。近來，從組織的角度研究公司治理表明企業(yè)級管理特性可能在體制上嵌入。 制度理論為企業(yè)行為提供了另一種解釋，認為公司的行為在組織人員的共同利益和個人利益方面可以被理解。因此，研究這些決策的關(guān)鍵股東從社會的角度來看，做出合理的經(jīng)濟的戰(zhàn)略決策是無法被理解的。管理人才的競爭市場和對高的收入不等的寬容導致了高管補償。理性的管理者很難意識到非正式關(guān)于公平的準則的變化，從而引起媒體和新領(lǐng)導的批判。 了借制度環(huán)境的不同可以幫助對不同國家的高管補償影響進行分析，特別是可以解釋世界各地的薪酬敏感性的差異。另外，那些非正式的制度是由不成為本的，頗有影響的社會準則，公約和價值觀組成的。從代理角度看，它顯示出美國的投資者對于貨幣政策更有依賴性，把它作為首選的激勵機制。 在美國以外的體制背景下，管理人員認購權(quán)往往違背主流文化。 在英國，存在著相當大的認股權(quán)激勵性質(zhì)的公開辯論。普遍的共識是，英國的規(guī)定很少對高管薪酬問題進行詳細處理。通過比較英國和美國的高管補償問題可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，在美國高管補償增加股東價值的敏感性要高于英國，最大的不同之處要歸因于在美國有更大的股權(quán)獎勵。這種銀企關(guān)系的長期性能給其他利益相關(guān)者補償，像雇員，如企業(yè)持有的員工投資可以 受到 違反信托的保護。制度分析進一步夸大了這一框架，通過闡述國家機構(gòu)，特別是國家治理模式可以形成高管補償?shù)挠行浴Ｈ欢?，在具有強大平均主義傾向和強大利益相關(guān)者的社會里可以約束管理者的行為，高管補償?shù)男蕰诓活櫨唧w的組織環(huán)境下受到限制。我們的做法表明不同激勵制度的效果應(yīng)該在組織環(huán)境內(nèi)被考慮。此外，激勵制度的相似性和區(qū)別也能在行業(yè)內(nèi)或跨行業(yè)變得更加系統(tǒng)，最新的在財務(wù)機構(gòu)的正義就是行業(yè)環(huán)境應(yīng)該被考慮進去。只有少數(shù)的研究考慮到機會成本和聲譽成本的問題。 另外，前人的絕大多數(shù)研究都集中在高管激勵制度的經(jīng)濟效應(yīng)而沒有考慮到各種治理機制之間的潛在相互影響。未來的研究應(yīng)該關(guān)注公司治理的其他部分，比如所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，股票持有人的身份證明，股東的積極性以及與該公司接觸的控制權(quán)市場。 最后，我們的討論表明，國家體制環(huán)境可能影響公司層面的代理沖突的本質(zhì)，高管激勵制度的有效性需要根據(jù)具體的體制因素，如法律法規(guī)，文化方面和經(jīng)濟相關(guān)者的共同利 益。例如，今后的研究應(yīng)該比較 和探索高管薪酬在不同的國家治理模式中的治理作用，包括家族控制模型中的高管薪酬治理作用。 硬法律方法旨在加強監(jiān)管，通過在特定的司法管轄區(qū)的法律規(guī)則來使公司運作。在高管補償方面，硬法律提倡一套規(guī)則和股票分配的限制。 軟法律是基于符合或解釋原則的替代辦法。在英國，上市公司可以根據(jù)公司治理的聯(lián)合準則提供的業(yè)績相關(guān)補償原則設(shè)計的指導細則。也就是說，公司的靈活性可以適應(yīng)不同的公司治理，軟法律可以幫助他們適應(yīng)組織環(huán)境多樣性。雖然不是很全面，但它關(guān)注了公司治理的環(huán)境的相互依存關(guān)系以及關(guān)于各種知名企業(yè)的公司治理做法的 互補性替代性效應(yīng) ， 還有國家機構(gòu)的作用。 附錄 B Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework Executive Overview By integrating anizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different anizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principalagent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outes. We suggest a framework that examines executive pensation in terms of its anizational contexts and potential plementarities/ substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive pensation policy such as ―soft law‖ and ―hard law.‖ Over the past two decades, panies around the world have increasingly moved from a fixed pay structure to remuneration schemes that are related to performance and include a substantial ponent of equitybased incentives. As a result, research on the economic effects of executive pensation has bee one of the hotly debated topics within corporate governance research. As Bruce, Buck, and Main (2021, p. 1493) indicated, ―In recent years, literature on executive remuneration has grown at a pace rivaled only by the growth of executive pay itself. Most of the empirical literature on executive pensation has focused predominantly on the ./. corporate sectors when analyzing anizational outes of different ponents of executive pay, such as cash pay (salary and bonus), longterm incentives (., executive stock options), and perquisites (., pension contributions and pany cars). In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, previous research has attempted to understand executive pensation in terms of agency theory and explored links between different forms of executive incentives and firm performance. This literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the principalagency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. Much of corporate governance research is based on a universal model outlined by principalagent theory (Fama amp。 Jensen, 1986), and the central premise of this framework is that shareholders and managers have different access to firmspecific information and broadly divergent interests and risk preferences. As a result, managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in selfserving behavior that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth maximization. A substantial body of literature is based on this straightforward premise and suggests that, to constrain managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including various equitybased managerial incentives that align the interests of agents and principals. As Jensen and Murphy (1990, pp. 242– 243) observed, ―Agency theory predicts that pensation policy will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s objective. The objective of shareholders is to maximize wealth。 Larcker, 2021。 Rajagopalan, 2021。 and Tosi, Werner, Katz, amp。 CuervoCazurra, 2021。 Jackson, 2021。Zajac, 2021). In this paper we discuss an anizational approach to executive pensation that will better account for the interdependencies of incentive alignment with diverse anizational contexts and institutional environments. Building on research by Aguilera et al. (2021) we suggest that corporate governance aspects of executive pensation outlined by the agency and stakeholder perspectives must capture the patterned variation in corporate governance caused by differences in anizational contexts and their environment. Along these lines, we build on recent studies of corporate governance that have attempted to explainthe dynamic dimensions of corporate governance over the pany life cycle (Filatotchev amp。 Jackson, 2021。 Fried, 2021). The CEO’s pay arrangements, therefore, have less to do with incentive alignment and more to do with the CEO’s selfenrichm