【正文】 for possible sample selection bias, we find that large firms show less improvement than small firms. We note, however, that these regressions have low adjusted R2s. Possibly, this result suggests that larger firms face greater monitoring costs, which make it more difficult to implement programs in larger firms. In our multivariate analysis, we also find that (i) firms that perform better prior to adoption are more likely to tie pensation to VBM and (ii) the post adoption adjusted performance in the first two years after adoption negatively relates to the use of VBM to determine pensation. This effect is not statistically significant after two years. It is possible that firms that already focus on value creation are more likely to tie VBM to pensation and that these firms simply have less potential for improvement. Alternatively, firms might cap bonus payouts too low when they implement plans, which reduces initial efficacy. We also find that firms reduce capital expenditures following VBM adoption. These reductions in spending do not differ based on the firms’ growth opportunities. Thus, the improvement in performance does not appear to e at the expense of longterm value. Overall, our results provide support that valuebased management systems are effective mechanisms for improving corporate performance. The literature on property rights (., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and agency theory (., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) maintains that different incentives lead to conflicts between shareholders and managers of the public firm that result in a loss in firm value. Ultimately, the shareholders bear this loss. Valuebased management provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system designed to mitigate these agency conflicts and increase shareholder value. VBM systems attempt to acplish this goal by providing managers with a set of decisionmaking tools that, at least in theory, identify which alternatives create or destroy value, and often by linking pensation and promotions to shareholder value. Firms can use these metrics to monitor and reward management performance. They provide a mechanism for linking managers’ decisions to firm performance outes that create shareholder value and provide a means to further align shareholder and managerial interests. Valuebased management has captured the interest of the corporate and investment munities. Ryan and Trahan (1999) report that 87 percent of 86 CFOs surveyed indicate that they are familiar with valuebased management. Most of these CFOs also indicate that their firm uses one or more VBM systems. This interest has also been demonstrated in the business press. Articles in Fortune (., Stires, 2020。 Colvin, 2020。 Co. popularized RI under the market name of EVA. See Wallace (1997) for a more detailed discussion of RI. Despite the attention afforded valuebased management techniques and their widespread application, we have scant evidence on their ability to improve firm performance. Much of the existing empirical research, often conducted by the consulting firms who market valuebased management systems, focuses on the relations between the metrics (or valuedrivers) and shareholder value. These studies by consultants (., Stewart, 1994) document positive relations between performance metrics (., Economic Value Added (EVA)) and historical stockprice performance. In contrast, an academic study by Biddle, et al., (1997) concludes that EVA explains shareholder returns no better than earnings. Copeland (2020) argues that contemporaneous measures of mon valuebased mana