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closelyheld and widelyheld firms (Research Question 3), this study develops thefollowing hypotheses: Hypothesis 3a. The impact of board independence on firm performance is stronger in closelyheld than widelyheld firms. Hypothesis 3b. The impact of audit mittee independence on firm performance is stronger in closelyheld than widelyheld firms. Source: Lukas Y. Setia Atmaja. 2020, “Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, ,. 譯文: 治理機(jī)制與企業(yè)價(jià)值:股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響 在過去的三十年中,獨(dú)立董事的概念已成為重要的,特別是與股市監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和許多公司治理倡導(dǎo)者( Farrar, 2020)。 Shleifer amp。 Fama amp。 Faccio, Lang, amp。 Bebchuk amp。 Vishny, 1997). The presence of blockholders may also enhance corporate governance. Since blockholders hold a significant percentage of firm equity, they have an incentive to collect information and monitor management (Shleifer amp。 Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, amp。P/ASX All Ordinaries Index must ply with this remendation. The empirical evidence on the relationship between audit mittee position and firm value, however, is also inconclusive. A number of studies (., Hsu, 2020。Weisbach, 1988). The most widely discussed question regarding board position is therefore whether having more independent directors on the board enhances firm performance. A number of studies have been conducted in the US on this issue. For example, a study by Baysinger and Butler(1985) found that the proportion of independent directors was positively correlated with accounting measures of performance. In contrast, Bhagat and Black(2020), Hermalin and Weisbach(1991), and Klein(1998) have found that a higher percentage of independent directors on the board does not have a significant impact on accounting measures of firm performance. A study by Agrawal and Knoeber(1996) show that the proportion of independent directors has a negative relationship to market measures of performance. Conflicting evidence on a direct relationship between board position and firm performance has also been reported from Australia. Lawrence and Stapledon(1999) found that independent directors do not appear to have added value to firms in the period 19851995. A similar result is reported by Cotter and Silvester(2020), who examine the largest 200 panies in 1997. In contrast, Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan(2020) reported that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to stronger firm performance. Why are the findings on the relationship between board position and firm performance inconclusive? One possible explanation is that most of the corporate governance is both a result of the decisions made by previous directors and, itself a factor that potentially affects the choice of subsequent directors. Studies of boards often neglect this issue and therefore produce confusing results (Hermalin amp。外 文 翻 譯 原文: Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends Over the last three decades, the idea of independent directors has bee important, particularly with stock market regulators and many corporate governance advocates (Farrar, 2020). Indeed, financial economists generally suggest that the representation of independent directors on boards increases the effectiveness of boards in monitoring managers and exercising control on behalf of shareholders (., Fama amp。 Jensen, 1983。 Weisbach, 2020). An important role of boards is to establish submittees to deal with specific matters. One such mittee is the audit mittee. The audit process, and internal accounting controls. This helps mit