【正文】 下午 7時 44分 7秒 下午 7時 44分 19:44: MOMODA POWERPOINT Lorem ipsum dolor sit, eleifend nulla ac, fringilla purus. Nulla iaculis tempor felis amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Fusce id urna blanditut cursus. 感謝您的下載觀看 專家告訴 。 2023年 1月 下午 7時 44分 :44January 23, 2023 1業(yè)余生活要有意義，不要越軌。 :44:0719:44:07January 23, 2023 1意志堅強(qiáng)的人能把世界放在手中像泥塊一樣任意揉捏。 19:44:0719:44:0719:44Monday, January 23, 2023 1知人者智，自知者明。 19:44:0719:44:0719:441/23/2023 7:44:07 PM 1越是沒有本領(lǐng)的就越加自命不凡。 下午 7時 44分 7秒 下午 7時 44分 19:44: 楊柳散和風(fēng)，青山澹吾慮。 2023年 1月 下午 7時 44分 :44January 23, 2023 1少年十五二十時，步行奪得胡馬騎。 :44:0719:44:07January 23, 2023 1意志堅強(qiáng)的人能把世界放在手中像泥塊一樣任意揉捏。 :44:0719:44Jan2323Jan23 1世間成事，不求其絕對圓滿，留一份不足，可得無限完美。 , January 23, 2023 很多事情努力了未必有結(jié)果，但是不努力卻什么改變也沒有。 2023年 1月 23日星期一 7時 44分 7秒 19:44:0723 January 2023 1做前，能夠環(huán)視四周；做時，你只能或者最好沿著以腳為起點的射線向前。 2023年 1月 23日星期一 下午 7時 44分 7秒 19:44: 1比不了得就不比，得不到的就不要。 19:44:0719:44:0719:44Monday, January 23, 2023 1乍見翻疑夢，相悲各問年。 19:44:0719:44:0719:441/23/2023 7:44:07 PM 1以我獨沈久，愧君相見頻。 otherwise it is noncooperative. ? A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that all players are doing their best, given the strategies of the other players. 102 Summary ? Some games have no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but have one or more equilibria in mixed strategies. ? Strategies that are not optimal for a oneshot game may be optimal for a repeated game. ? In a sequential game, the players move in turn. 103 Summary ? An empty threat is a threat that one would have no incentive to carry out. ? To deter entry, an incumbent firm must convince any potential petitor that entry will be unprofitable. ? Bargaining situations are examples of cooperative games. 104 靜夜四無鄰，荒居舊業(yè)貧。Managerial Economics Chapter 10 Game Theory and Competitive Strategy Guan Xizhan School of Management, Fudan University EMail: Topics to be Discussed ? Gaming and Strategic Decisions（策略決策） ? Dominant Strategies（上策，占優(yōu)策略） ? The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Repeated Games（重復(fù)博弈） 1 Topics to be Discussed ? Sequential Games（序貫博弈） ? Threats, Commitments, and Credibility（威懾、承諾與可信性） ? Entry Deterrence（進(jìn)入阻止，進(jìn)入威懾） ? Bargaining Strategy（討價還價策略） 2 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ? “ If I believe that my petitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits, how should I take their behavior into account when making my own profitmaximizing decisions?” 3 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ? Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ? Cooperative Game（合作博弈） ? Players negotiate binding contracts（有約束力的契約） that allow them to plan joint strategies ? Example: Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (. Microsoft and Apple) ? Binding contracts are possible 4 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ? Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ? Noncooperative Game ? Negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possible ? Example: Two peting firms assuming the others behavior determine, independently, pricing and advertising strategy to gain market share ? Binding contracts are not possible 5 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ? Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ? “ The strategy design is based on understanding your opponent’ s point of view, and (assuming you opponent is rational) deducing how he or she is likely to respond to your actions” 6 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ? An Example: How to buy a dollar bill 1) Auction a dollar bill 2) Highest bidder receives the dollar in return for the amount bid 3) Second highest bidder must pay the amount he or she bid ? Question: How much would you bid for a dollar? 7 Acquiring a Company ? Scenario ? Company A: The Acquirer ? Company T: The Target ? A will offer cash for all of T’ s shares ? What price to offer? 8 Acquiring a Company ? Scenario ? The value of T depends on the oute of a current oil exploration project. ? Failure: T’ s value = $0 ? Success: T’ s value = $100/share ? All outes are equally likely 9 Acquiring a Company ? Scenario ? T’ s value will be 50% greater with A’ s management. ? A, must submit the proposal before the exploration oute is known. ? T will not choose to accept or reject until after the oute is known only to T. ? How much should A offer? 10 Dominant Strategies ? Dominant Strategy ? One that