【正文】 Given Eisenhower’s July 1955 statement that the United States would include a satellite as part of its IGY effort, Cooper argued that the US had precipitated the need to resolve the issue of sovereignty by announcing its intention to launch a satellite into outer space. Cooper felt that if the US was prepared to launch such a satellite, it ought also to be prepared to state its position on the sovereignty issue. In a second letter, Cooper reiterated his earlier position. He reasoned that the United States, by announcing its intention to launch a satellite, had accepted the proposition that it did not retain sovereignty of the outer space above its territory and thereby waived any legitimate grounds on which to object to foreign satellites passing over its territory. Cooper’s argument was clearly in accord with President Eisenhower’s position of espousing a freedom of passage in outer space, but the president’s position and its implications had apparently not yet been municated outside a small circle of advisors. Given Professor Cooper’s efforts, ACC Chairman Rothschild quickly responded to Secretary Sharp’s request. Rothschild reiterated the positions taken by Kinsey and the Legal Division and weled Air Force and other DOD input when the studies Sharp had initiated were pleted.[22]Cooper was not about to let the issue die based on the ACC’s actions. In an address to the annual convention of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), he discussed the issues associated with outer space sovereignty and urged that outer space law issues be resolved through an international convention. Also at the ASIL convention, Professor Cooper proposed, among other things, a convention providing that all space above “contiguous space,” that is, three hundred miles above the earth’s surface, be free for the passage of all devices. Perhaps because of its premature nature, but for reasons unknown, Cooper’s proposal did not pass.In the meantime, by memorandum dated 9 May 1956, Col Paul W. Norton, director of civil law, Office of the Judge Advocate General, responded to the request by Sharp and General Twining for an Air Force position. Colonel Norton informed Maj Gen Richard C. Lindsay, acting assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, that any international convention was “premature and contrary to the best interests of the Air Force.” Noting that the United States had “assumed the lead in the research and development of longrange guided missiles, rockets, and satellite programs,” Norton advised that “any codification of formal, intergovernmental rules at this time would operate to fetter the unbounded use of outer space for military research and development.” He based this conclusion on the fact that current US programs were military sponsored and that past international conventions regarding airspace allowed military over flights only with special authorization of the subjacent nation. Norton concluded that a like provision would be included in any convention dealing with outer space.Colonel Norton argued that, given that the United States was more advanced than any other nation, the effect of such a convention would have a more profound effect on the US than on anyone else, including the USSR. He cited case law stating that any nation can take any reasonable and necessary measures to protect its national security even outside its territory and airspace. Based on these legal precedents, he concluded that should foreign use of outer space jeopardize its security then the United States, for its selfdefense, could undertake reasonable and necessary unilateral restrictions on the use of space by other nations. Norton argued that other nations would accept such moves and that the US should be prepared to accept similar restrictions if imposed by other nations. He contended that so long as other nations did not raise objection to。responded to Cooper’s proposal by writing ACC Chairman Rothschild. Noting that the proposal entered an “uncharted area of thinking [and] cut across certain highlevel policies…such as the President’s mutual inspection proposal, the recent Air Force weather balloon problem, earth satellite projects, and guided missile testing projects,” Sharp remended that the ACC postpone consideration of the proposal. He argued that until higherlevel policies had been developed, the Air Coordinating Committee consider only “appropriate means whereby such higherlevel policy considerations can be isolated and promptly considered.” Finally, Sharp proposed that the United States adopt a position at the ICAO seeking to have the matter postponed as being premature. Sharp argued that Cooper’s proposition posed a “number of problems which should properly be disposed of at the National Security Council or Presidential level” before being considered by the ACC. Once such national security issues were resolved, Sharp indicated he felt fortable with the ACC dealing with the issue and allowing legal experts to “attack the problem of drafting a United States position on any proposed international convention.”[19]Air Force officials perceived that Cooper was “agitating” for an international convention on outer space.[16]had proposed the above questions given that Cooper and others had placed the general subject of outer space sovereignty on the agenda for the Tenth Session of the World Assembly of the ICAO to be held in Caracas, Venezuela, in June 1956.[13] Eisenhower and the Air Force preferred that the law be derived by custom and practice. Eisenhower’s goal had apparently not been shared with or been digested by many military officials in the Air Force. Thus, certain Air Force officers periodically made statements contrary to the freedom of passage principle.During the spring of 1956, Cooper met with ACC chairman Louis S. Rothschild.[10]By 1955 Professor Cooper had concluded that an international convention similar to the Chicago Convention for airspace