個(gè)人消費(fèi)信貸違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響因素分析論文(參考版)
2025-06-30 12:05本頁(yè)面
【正文】 Sharpe, 1990). Existing empirical research has yet to reach decisive conclusions about the nature of these relationships. This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on collateral using a unique firmlevel data set of the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) loan market in Japan. Explicitly differentiating physical collateral (such as real estate) and personal guarantees by business representatives, we investigate how the use of collateral and personal guarantees affects the incentives of borrowers, lenders, and the relationship between them. More specifically, we examine the following three issues. First, we examine whether riskier borrowers are more likely to be required to provide collateral or personal guarantees. Second, we investigate how collateral and personal guarantees affect banks’ monitoring of borrowers. Third, we examine the correlation between the use of collateral and personal guarantees on the one hand and the closeness of borrowerlender relationships on the other. The data set we employ is based mainly on the “Survey of the Financial Environment” (SFE) conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan in October 2002. In order to focus on firms that mostly depend on bank loans for their financing, we limit the sample to firms satisfying the legal definition of an SME in Japan. We then bine the SFE data for each SME with information on their main bank obtained from the bank’s financial statements in order to control for lender characteristics as well. Furthermore, to control for the effect of government credit guarantees on collateral and personal guarantees, in the main analysis of this paper we exclude from the sample all firms that enjoyed any form of government credit guarantee. As a result of this screening process, we end up with a sample of 1,702 firms. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that firms’ riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. Thus, we cannot find firm evidence that the use of collateral mitigates moral hazard. We find, however, that banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively, and that borrowers who have a longterm relationship with their main bank are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings suggest that collateral is plementary to relationship lending. In contrast, the plementarity between relationship lending and personal guarantees is weaker.As far as we know, this is the first empirical study that systematically examines the role of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan’s SME loan market. The two main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, given that Japan is generally considered to have a relationshipbased financial system in which the relationshiplender, the main bank, plays a central role in corporate financing (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), the study helps to improve our understanding of the role of collateral in relationship lending and plements existing studies that focus on the United States and Europe. Second, and more importantly, by distinguishing collateral and personal guarantees, the study detects an important role of collateral in relationship lending that has not been remarked on much before. As we argue below, although a typical SME in Japan has a longterm relationship with its main bank, it actually engages in transactions with several banks, which is not mon in other countries. A possible corollary of this is that because of the informational freerider problem it creates, this practice may reduce the main bank’s incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. Since collateral defi。 Longhofer and Santos, 2000) screening and monitoring efforts. Another aspect of collateral that studies have concentrated on is that its presence may depend on the length and intimacy of the relationship between creditors and borrowers (Boot, 2000。 Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). Collateral also affects the incentives of creditors, who will use it either as a substitute for (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001) or plement to (Rajan and Winton, 1995。 Science of Jianghan University 畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文來(lái)源 日本一橋大學(xué) 中文譯文商業(yè)銀行和中小企業(yè)信用管理策略的研究部 （系） 商 學(xué) 部 專 業(yè) 金 融 學(xué)
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