【正文】 現(xiàn)實(shí)的企業(yè)組織是企業(yè)正式組織和企業(yè)非正式組織的統(tǒng)一，兩者互為基礎(chǔ)，互為條件。從霍桑實(shí)驗(yàn)中非正式組織被發(fā)現(xiàn)，到現(xiàn)在對(duì)非正式組織的成因、類型、影響、管理等各個(gè)方面的深入研究，人們對(duì)非正式組織的認(rèn)識(shí)越來越全面和系統(tǒng)。舉一個(gè)小例子，在粥全粥到的企業(yè)文化中有一句話是“寧肯讓員工吃虧不能讓公司吃虧，寧肯讓公司吃虧不能讓顧客吃虧”，但是這句話在事實(shí)上卻是一個(gè)笑話，首現(xiàn)，雖然讓員工總是先付出，但是在實(shí)際的操作中往往是員工執(zhí)行，在缺乏監(jiān)督的條件下員工是不會(huì)讓自己吃虧的，而管理者總是利用自己的職位有是逃避自己的過錯(cuò)，即使公司吃了虧，管理者也拒絕承擔(dān)責(zé)任，那么員工就會(huì)上行下效，組織文化中的這一句話也就不被人們認(rèn)同了。同時(shí)，也要培養(yǎng)新加入的組織成員接受、認(rèn)同并適應(yīng)這種組織文化。培育團(tuán)隊(duì)協(xié)作型企業(yè)文化, 是構(gòu)建基于高度信任的企業(yè)人際關(guān)系的關(guān)鍵, 企業(yè)應(yīng)在員工中培育共同的理想和價(jià)值觀念, 從而使員工對(duì)企業(yè)有認(rèn)同感、歸屬感, 增強(qiáng)企業(yè)的凝聚力 企業(yè)應(yīng)通過采取各種激勵(lì)措施, 滿足員工的物質(zhì)和精神心理需要, 使員工與企業(yè)之間結(jié)成命運(yùn)共同體。要尊重并肯定他在非正式組織成員中的地位和威信, 這是取得其信任并與之進(jìn)行合作的前提。社會(huì)關(guān)系影響員工潛在行為的思想對(duì)于中國(guó)勞工政治的研究來說并不新鮮。，說明獲取信息，可以幫助工人導(dǎo)航復(fù)雜的正式法律制度，促進(jìn)集體行動(dòng)，取得新的爭(zhēng)端的備選方案和戰(zhàn)略，甚至識(shí)別和定位新的支持來源。這直接導(dǎo)致了移民加入非正式組織來建立與外界的抵抗?！?瑪格麗特在中國(guó)的移民往往面臨一個(gè)反應(yīng)遲鈍，甚至掠奪性的國(guó)家，并且選擇受到正式組織的限制。附錄： The Knowledge to Act: Political Process, Informal Organization and the Emerging Migrant Labor Movement in ChinaBy Jeffrey Douglas BeckerYet while the types of protest specific information described above can greatly increase the likelihood of action, obtaining such information is often exceedingly difficult. Migrants in China often face an unresponsive, even predatory state, and have limited options for formal organization. This environment impedes their ability to obtain credible information, creating incentives to discount new or unverifiable sources such as newspapers and television, and rely instead on trusted sources such as family members or hometown associates, in order to avoid exploitation. Migrants newly arrived in urban areas for example are often deceived and defrauded, both by societal elements as well as street level government In large cities such as Shenzhen or Beijing, it is not unmon to find panies offering nonexistent positions to workers who must first pay “application fees,” while whole “talent markets” may simply be elaborate scams. Other examples of deception include criminal elements, or even corrupt street level government agents, charging newly arrived migrants illegal fees, or robbing them of their possessions before they ever leave the bus depot. According to a survey conducted by academics from Sun Yatsen University, almost 40% of migrant workers interviewed in the Pearl and Yangtze River Delta regions (n=1024) had been victims of crime, while local government handbooks caution migrant workers that “a few lawless persons often use migrant worker’s anxiousness to find a job to defraud, abduct, or extort them.”As Margaret Levi and others have argued, institutional credibility is influenced by past experience and reputational Institutions that maintain credibility can lower certain transaction costs for citizens, providing information and services without those citizens engaging in costly In China however, the mix of sincere and fraudulent actors makes it difficult to differentiate the two, and to avoid exploitation, information that cannot be directly verified is often discounted. This has significant consequences for migrants attempting to obtain the information necessary to opening up additional channels for protest. Acquiring legal information can still be costly for migrant workers who have limited time and resources to devote to information searches.In short, while information may be crucial to facilitating labor dispute activity among low ine migrant labor, gaining access to such information may be exceedingly difficult. The next section describes how workers overe these obstacles, and obtain information that facilitates dispute activity by relying on informal ties, primarily the nonnative place ties that develop between migrants while working in the cities.Section sought to explain why information is so important to dispute activity among Chinese migrant labor, by illustrating how access to information can help workers navigate the plex formal legal system, promote collective action, obtain new dispute options and strategies, and even identify and locate new sources of support. Yet if access to information is vital for migrant labor dispute activity, obtaining such information can be difficult, as limited resources and a hostile environment that encourages workers to discount potentially useful sources limits access to information. Given these constraints, how exactly do workers obtain such information?Section below seeks to answer this question by looking at the unique role that informal social networks play in providing resources in nondemocracies。這個(gè)措施對(duì)于非正式組織的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者尤其適用，當(dāng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的觀念與組織相背離時(shí)，他往往會(huì)通過影響其他成員使整個(gè)非正式組織對(duì)正式組織的決定產(chǎn)生抵觸，這對(duì)于管理者來說是一件非常棘手的事，管理者要么說服領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，要么“解決”領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，對(duì)于極具破壞力的人，管理者只能是堅(jiān)決清除，就像是在四方店，一樓的領(lǐng)班總是仗著自己的老員工身份要么與管理者頂嘴，要么對(duì)公司的決策指指點(diǎn)點(diǎn)，要么