【正文】 Organization, 81, –8 資本市場實驗（行為金融） ? Vernon L. Smith, G. Suchanek, amp。 J. A. List (Eds), Field Experiments in Economics. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Research in Experimental Economics,Vol. 10: 1750. ? Benz, Matthias, and Stephan Meier, 2021, ―Do People Behave in Experiments as in Real Life? Evidence from Donations,‖ Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper 248. ? List, John A, 2021, Field Experiments: A Bridge between Lab and Naturally Occurring Data, The . Journal of Economic Analysis amp。chter, ―Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments‖, American Economic Review, 2021a, 90(4), 980–994. ? Fehr, E. and G228。 Laibson, David I.。 and its applications European Economic Review, 42, 757769. ? Kagel, J. and Levin, D. (1999), “ Common Value Auctions with Insider Information,” Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 5. pp. 12191238. ? Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2021), ―Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in PrivateValue Auctions,‖ Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 247272 ? Abbink K et al (2021), An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS Auction, European Economic Review, 49, 505530. ? Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2021), ―Levelk Auctions: Can a NonEquilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner39。此時委托人收益為 S y+x ，而代理人收益為 S +3 y x 沒有法律合同的買賣行為 委托人選擇投資 y= 0 ；代理人選擇返還 x=0. 平均上來看實驗者會選擇 y= 投資給代理人，而代理人會選擇返還一個略小于0. 5S 的值給委托人，而且 x 與 y 成正比 互惠偏好，利他偏好 禮物交換實驗 雇主提供給一個工資 w 給雇員，雇員選擇一個工作努力程度 e （ 1 ≤e≤10 ），并付出成本 c （ e ），此時雇員工作產(chǎn)出效益為 10e ，雇主收益為 10e w ，雇員收益為 w c （ e ） 雇主和雇員的上下關(guān)系 雇員選擇最小努力程度即e=0 ，而雇主提供最小工資 雇員的努力程度和雇主的工資水平成正比。另 3 個市場（ 36 位參與者）利用作實驗。 W i l l i a m s ( 1987) 利用實驗設(shè)計所得到的觀察資料，來檢驗價格是否可經(jīng)由理性預(yù)期來形成。 買賣雙方公開喊價，當(dāng)只有一位買方喊價，和一位賣方接受，即達成交易，成交價公開寫在黑板上，每一回合結(jié)束之后，重新交換底牌。 將學(xué)生分為買方和賣方 2 團體，買賣雙方公開喊價，一次性交易一個單位，一期的交易回合結(jié)束之后，買方拿的底牌仍是同一張，賣方可在相同的最低價格下獲得新的生產(chǎn)數(shù)量。有 39 次小于均衡價格。 and Guillaume R. Fr233。chter (2021) The science of experimental economics 其他如 Simth (2021) G228。chter (2021) 等等 實驗經(jīng)濟學(xué)方法論的爭議舉例1 實驗經(jīng)濟學(xué)方法論的爭議舉例2 作為一門成熟學(xué)科的標(biāo)志 1：實驗經(jīng)濟學(xué)經(jīng)典文獻的被引次數(shù) ? Fehr and Schmidt（ 1999） Quarterly journal of Economics A theory of fairness, petition, and cooperation 4160 ? Rabin (1993) American Economic Review Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics 2759 ? Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Econometrica Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 19423 ? Holt and Laury (2021) American Economic Review Risk aversion and incentive effects 1369 ? G252。chette Vol. 101, No. 2, April 2021 ? Reference Points and Effort Provision (pp. 47092) Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Goette and David Huffman ? Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence (pp. 493525) Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder ? The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition (pp. 52655) Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter ? Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender (pp. 55690) Thomas Dohmen and Armin Falk 作為一門成熟學(xué)科的標(biāo)志 3：實驗研究在頂級期刊的發(fā)表數(shù)（ 以 AER2021年 5期期刊為例）續(xù) 2 Vol. 101, No. 2, April 2021 ? Heterogeneity in Risky Choice Behavior in a Broad Population (pp. 66494) HansMartin von Gaudecker, Arthur van Soest and Erik Wengstrom ? The Rich Domain of Uncertainty: Source Functions and Their Experimental Implementation (pp. 695723) Mohammed Abdellaoui, Aur233。得到價格波動 使得銷售量普遍大于均衡數(shù)量的結(jié)論。 在信息公開時即使人數(shù)少，但只要能禁止買賣雙方彼此勾結(jié)，就能達到競爭時的均衡價格。從每一回合的交易中，買賣雙方產(chǎn)生學(xué)習(xí)效果，使交易的均衡價格產(chǎn)生波動。 若市場價格可經(jīng)由理性預(yù)期模型來預(yù)測，則市場無效率，有套利空間。 結(jié)果顯示，實驗觀察資料和有理性預(yù)期假設(shè)是一致的。 互惠偏好，利他偏好 社會偏好理論 ? Rabin, M., ―Incooperating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics‖, American Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), 1281–1302. ? Levine, D., ―Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments‖, Review of Economic Dynamics, 1998, 1(3), 593–622. ? Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt, ―A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation‖, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3), 817–868. ? Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels, ―ERC—A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition‖, American Economic Review, 2021, 90(1), 166–193. ? Andreoni, J., and J. Miller, ―Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism‖, Econometrica, 2021, 70(2), 737–753. ? Charness, G. and M. Rabin, ―Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests‖, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2021, 117(3), 817–869. ? Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger, ―A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity‖, Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 47(2), 268–298. ? Sobel, J., ―Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity‖, Journal of Economic Literature, 2021, 43(2), 392–436. ? Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher, ―A Theory of Reciprocity‖, Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 54(2), 293–315. ? Fehr, E and K. Schmidt, ―Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications‖, in: M. Dewatripont, . Hansen, S. Turnovski, Advances in Economic Theory, Eigth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 208–257. ? Fowler, J., ―Altruism and Turnout‖, Journal of Politics, 2021, 68(3), 674–683. 社會福利 模型 Andreoni/ Miller (2021) 互利模型 Rabin（ 1993) Dufwenberg/ Kirchsteiger (2021) Kohler (2021) Falk / Fischbacher (2021) Charness /Rabin (2021) 不平等厭惡模型 Fehr/Schmidt (1999) Bolton/Ockenfels （ 2021) 社會偏好理論各模型關(guān)系圖 拍賣實驗 ? Kagel JH and Levin D (1986), The Winner39。s Curse and Overbidding in Private