【正文】 這些問題將帶來的最大的困境和挑戰(zhàn)捐贈(zèng)者和政府在農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。 企業(yè)的制度設(shè)計(jì) (所有權(quán)、控制、統(tǒng)治 )限制個(gè)人行為和創(chuàng)造結(jié)構(gòu)刺激計(jì)劃 ,指導(dǎo)決策決定性能。經(jīng)過很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間的學(xué)習(xí) ,微型金融組織才成功 ,它往往伴隨著密切的相互作用的國(guó)際供應(yīng)商的技術(shù)支持。一個(gè)清晰的認(rèn)識(shí) ,一般原則和最佳實(shí)踐 ,教訓(xùn) ,都是一個(gè)重要的起點(diǎn) ,但這還是不夠的。如果是不合適的 ,例如 ,只支持組織 ,工作與集團(tuán)提供信用卡或只有那些個(gè)人貸款。事實(shí)上 ,它被已他們大量的靈活的尋求另類的解決問題的金融交易使得小額金融借貸組織和信貸協(xié)會(huì)開發(fā)值得注意的創(chuàng)新。 然而，國(guó)家干預(yù)金融創(chuàng)新是有問題的。 典型地 ,刺激私人投資不足 ,從而向外延伸。 四 ．金融創(chuàng)新 從根本上又取決于農(nóng)村金融深化金融技術(shù)創(chuàng)新 ,就有可能擁有更多的客戶。 財(cái)政政策已經(jīng)在農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的供給上有很大的影響力。他們有更敏銳的問題出現(xiàn)在農(nóng)村地區(qū) ,從而提高相關(guān) 費(fèi)用 ,經(jīng)常禁止的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平。 (十三 ) 高協(xié)方差的收入和生產(chǎn)性努力取得的成果 ,從而降低借款人的投資組合多樣化的機(jī)會(huì)作為一種工具來管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的抵押貸款。 (九 ) 削弱的產(chǎn)權(quán)和低效率治理結(jié)構(gòu)的許多農(nóng)村金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)、不產(chǎn)生足夠的內(nèi)部控制和采用的商業(yè)計(jì)劃專注于外展和可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力。 (四 ) 信譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)損失 , 在違約時(shí)它威脅著貸款拖欠的情況下的收入的股份資產(chǎn)。 三、促進(jìn)擴(kuò)大農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的供給 政府干預(yù)還需要增加供應(yīng)農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)。農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)的缺點(diǎn)是由于非正式放債者或私人銀行家過渡開發(fā)。許多過去的干預(yù)的失敗歸咎于違反這個(gè)匹配規(guī)則。該制度的建立 ,獲取所需要 的資源需要建立深思熟慮的制度的努力 ,這可能是政府和慈善援助的幫助。 最后 ,裝配所有這些成分 ,在一個(gè)連貫系統(tǒng)需要結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)機(jī)制的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理的組織設(shè)計(jì)符合其外展和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的目標(biāo)。在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的農(nóng)村地區(qū)，這些組織供應(yīng)不足。盡管國(guó)家干預(yù)能促進(jìn)技術(shù)改變 ,選擇如何做到這一點(diǎn)很重要。如果沒有新的最符合成本效益的貸款和接受存款的技術(shù)開發(fā)和實(shí)施 , 這一目標(biāo)不會(huì)達(dá)到。非財(cái)務(wù)政策的改革約束客戶業(yè)務(wù)盈利能力和公共投資，降低市場(chǎng)參與者交易成本，有助于擴(kuò)大農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的市場(chǎng)需求和供給。 政策是指公共行動(dòng) —— 政府干預(yù) —— 需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)造一種有利于農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的環(huán)境 。 (o) the high covariance of ines and of the outes of the productive efforts of borrowers, which reduces opportunities for portfolio diversification as a tool to manage risk by lenders。 (k) the attenuated property rights and inefficient governance structures of many rural financial intermediaries, which do not generate sufficient internal control or the adoption of business plans focused on outreach and sustainability。 (g) inability to raise interest rates as a rationing device, due to adverse selection problems, which leads to nonprice credit rationing。 (c) additional costs of mobilizing deposits that emerge from the need to meet the regulatory requirements for deposit mobilization (., reserve requirements, minimum safety requirements, internal control)。本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯原 文 外文題目： Theme: Macro Economic Policy and Reality—— Deepening Rural Financial Markets: Macroeconomic, Policy and Political Dimensions 出 處： Rural Finance Program 作 者： Claudio GonzalezVega 原 文 ： Policies for rural financial deepening A contemporary perspective acknowledges the urgency to adopt new policies, develop the necessary physical and institutional infrastructure, improve and disseminate new financial technologies, and design and build new anizations, which would allow a more efficient, sustainable, and broadlybased provision of rural financial services in the developing world and economies in transition. Policies refer to public actions –government and donor interventions– needed to create an environment conducive to rural financial market development. Key policy interventions may require revisions of legal systems (., property rights, borrower and lender rights, contract design, judicial enforcement), new financial policies (., interest rates, exchange rates, reserve requirements), and new regulatory frameworks (., entry and exit of financial anizations, degrees of market petition, prudential regulation and supervision). These policies, legal systems, and regulatory frameworks are part of the institutional infrastructure needed for the efficient and stable operation of rural financial markets . At best, the development of this infrastructure has been neglected。 (d) high credit risks for lenders, which threaten with losses of ine in case of arrears and losses of equity capital in case of default。 (h) absence of patibility of the incentives that guide the behavior of potential borrowers and lenders, creating spaces for moral hazard (opportunistic borrower behavior), and thereby raising the operating costs and risks of lenders。 (l) the destruction of social capital (., a culture of repayment) that acpanies the politicized pardoning and rescheduling of loans, weakening the credibility of contract threats and obligations。 (p) the small size and low density of the clientele in local mar kets, which reduces the opportunities to dilute the fixed costs of any financial infrastructure。重要政策干預(yù)可能需要修改法律制度 (例如 ,產(chǎn)權(quán) ,借款人和貸款人的權(quán)利 ,合同設(shè)計(jì)、司法執(zhí)行 )，新金融政策 (例如 ,利率、匯率、存款準(zhǔn)備金 ), 和新的監(jiān)管框架 (例如 ,出入境的金融機(jī)構(gòu)、程度的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中 ,審慎監(jiān)管 )。 支持發(fā)展的制度機(jī)制 (例如 ,財(cái) 產(chǎn)注冊(cè)處組成 ,征信機(jī)構(gòu) ,評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu) ) 也是農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)張的關(guān)鍵。對(duì)于客戶和組織在適當(dāng)?shù)娘L(fēng)險(xiǎn)和成本下 ,擴(kuò)大