【導(dǎo)讀】師的指導(dǎo)下進(jìn)行的研究工作及取得的成果。盡我所知，除文中特別加。而使用過(guò)的材料。均已在文中作了明確的說(shuō)明并表示了謝意。除了文中特別加以標(biāo)注引用的內(nèi)容外，本論文。不包含任何其他個(gè)人或集體已經(jīng)發(fā)表或撰寫(xiě)的成果作品。究做出重要貢獻(xiàn)的個(gè)人和集體，均已在文中以明確方式標(biāo)明。全意識(shí)到本聲明的法律后果由本人承擔(dān)。同意學(xué)校保留并向國(guó)家有關(guān)部門(mén)或機(jī)構(gòu)送交論文的復(fù)印件和電子版，允許論文被查閱和借閱。本人授權(quán)大學(xué)可以將本學(xué)位。印或掃描等復(fù)制手段保存和匯編本學(xué)位論文。涉密論文按學(xué)校規(guī)定處理。程序清單等），文科類(lèi)論文正文字?jǐn)?shù)不少于萬(wàn)字。有圖紙應(yīng)符合國(guó)家技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)范。萬(wàn)億美元的巨額外匯儲(chǔ)備，引起了各界的廣泛關(guān)注。巨額的外匯儲(chǔ)備，雖然體現(xiàn)我國(guó)綜合國(guó)力的。提升，同時(shí)也給我國(guó)各領(lǐng)域帶來(lái)很多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文首先從我國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備的發(fā)展及現(xiàn)。了加強(qiáng)外匯儲(chǔ)備的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制和管理的建設(shè)性措施。實(shí)行積極管理，提高儲(chǔ)備資產(chǎn)投資收益……………………

　　

【正文】 f . Treasury bonds. This has served to finance the . deficit, help keep . interest rates low, and given . consumers greater power to buy exports. Treasury bonds are generally regarded as relatively stable and safe investments, and in the aftermath of the subprime meltdown, they are generally considered even safer than tripleA bonds. However, this safety es at a price: Treasury bonds usually offer low returns, which are often insufficient to offset the exchange rate and inflation risks posed to the currency reserves. Therefore, partly in response to the low returns on Treasury bonds, China has, in recent years, sought to build and expand its sovereign wealth funds. Two: What are sovereign wealth funds? A sovereign wealth fund, according to the . Treasury Department, is a government investment vehicle funded by foreign exchange assets and managed separately from the official reserves of the moary authorities. In principle, sovereign wealth funds look abroad for higher returns and asset diversification, which would in turn improve the efficiency of global asset allocation. In this sense, investing reserves in sovereign wealth funds can be broadly construed as an investment alternative to buying Treasury bonds. Globally, sovereign wealth funds have grown in size and significance over the past 10 years, and are projected to grow even more (Martin, 20xx). This development has bee a concern in both economic and political circles in the . (McCormick, 21 20xx). In 20xx, Forbes magazine listed Ho Ching, CEO of a Singaporean sovereign wealth fund, as the 3rd most powerful woman in the world, ahead of prominent political figures such as Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinto n, and Queen Elizabeth II. Today, total sovereign wealth fund assets are currently estimated at about $3 trillion, and Man Stanley economist Stephen Jen writes that sovereign wealth funds are “projected to hold nearly $12 trillion in assets by 20xx” and are likely to “surpass the size of the world’s total official reserves within five years.” As a result, sovereign wealth funds have emerged as important investors of global equity and are attracting increasing world attention (Kimmitt, 20xx). Yet, although sovereign wealth funds have existed since the early 1950s, China has only recently established sovereign wealth funds on a large scale. In 20xx, the Central Huijin Investment Company Limited (CHI) was established by the Department of Finance with a paidincapital of $45 billion. In 20xx, China launched the China Investment Corporation (CIC), a sovereign wealth fund with $200 billion in capital, to make longterm investments in search of higher returns. Despite the size of China’s sovereign wealth fund holdings, few economists have analyzed these closely due to their generally low transparency and the fact that they have traditionally restricted themselves to investing in only several dozen panies, which limits the range of quantitative studies that can be made. In addition, sovereign wealth funds may enjoy fewer investment opportunities due to their size. A sovereign wealth fund with many billions to invest, but with limited personnel to oversee investments, may be unable to effectively invest small amounts, such as a few millions dollars, in small, but potentially profitable lowcapitalization panies. Instead, the sovereign wealth fund may have to invest larger amounts (., billions of dollars) in highcapitalization panies, and these investments may not always be superior to low capitalization alternatives. Moreover, because sovereign wealth fund investments are typically largesized and their purchases often bee public information relatively quickly, it is not so easy for them to time the market. Potentially profitable shortterm sales are unavailable to sovereign wealth funds, forcing them to restrict themselves to longterm holdings. In this sense, the China Investment Corporation, with $200 billion to spend, does face some drawbacks due to its size. In many senses, the China Investment Corporation’s situation can be seen as a variant of diseconomies of scale. Three: China’s dual dilemma China’s management of its foreign exchange reserves can be understood as making tradeoffs between two peting objectives. On one hand, China faces the continual shortterm challenge of making steady, sustainable payouts from the reserves for economic purposes (., the goal of consumption). On the other hand, China also faces the longterm challenge of maximizing the returns and total size of its reserves (., the goal of return maximization). China uses foreign exchange reserves for a variety of consumption purposes. This 22 money is sometimes used to pay off debt and other foreign liabilities. It is used for government expenditure overseas. It may be used as a tool for China’s moary or exchange rate policy. It can also be used in emergencies and times of disaster, such as during the 20xx Sichuan earthquake. Moreover, the reserves serve as a formal backing for China’s currency. For these reasons and many more, China occasionally makes payouts from its reserves. China’s foreign exchange reserves also represent funds for potential investment, and one of China’s priorities to keep the reserves growing while avoiding unnecessary risks that might lead to major losses. Naturally, this goal of return maximization conflicts with the goal of consumption. Four: Context The problem with analyzing China’s dual dilemma is that it is part of a bigger puzzle. Just as a Russian stacking doll consists of dolls of increasing sizes placed one inside the other, so the Chinese sovereign wealth funds are only one small segment of a larger entity, the foreign exchange reserves, whic hare in turn only a small part of an even lar