【正文】 on of rents. ?The political desire to grandfather may also lead to an administratively cumbersome downstream system with exemptions for some sectors and inefficient mand and control type regulation for others. ?The potential cost of this inefficient system is tremendous. If auctioned permits were accepted, much of the rationale for choosing these inefficient options would disappear. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?CO2 is a uniformly mixed, accumulative pollutant. Neither the source of emissions nor their timing is important from an environmental standpoint. Thus, permits are ideally defined in a homogeneous way over space and time. Ideally permits would be fully tradeable internationally. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. ?The government would conduct quarterly auctions. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?who, on efficiency grounds, should get the permits and at what prices? The best answer to these questions depends on the government’s goals. ? A secondary goal is revenue maximization. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) ?To minimize regulatory transaction costs, permits are required by oil refineries, natural gas pipelines, naturalgas liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. Such an ―upstream‖ system is prehensive and minimizes the number of parties that need permits. ?In addition, permits can and should be auctioned not only for the current years but also for future issue years. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) ?Market power should not be a concern in an auction for carbon permits. Even in an upstream program, there would still be more than 1,700 permit buyers. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——方式 ?Ways to auction many identical items ?A standard ascendingclock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——方式 ?The ascendingclock auction offers a simpler approach. The clock indicates the current price. In each round, the bidders submit the quantity they are willing to buy at that price. If the total quantity bid exceeds the quantity available the clock is increased. The bidding continues until the quantity bid is less than the quantity available. The permits are then allocated at the prior price, and are rationed for those that reduced their quantity in the last round. ?It is easier to implement for both seller and buyers, since a buyer only bids a single quantity in each round, rather than a schedule. ?There is no possibility of undesirable bid signaling, since only the total quantity bid is reported. ?Rapid convergence is guaranteed, since the price increases by one bid increment with each round of bidding. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——優(yōu)點(diǎn) ?近來網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)的飛速發(fā)展，出現(xiàn)了越來越多的網(wǎng)上拍賣。這為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家提供了不同拍賣機(jī)制設(shè)計的機(jī)會。 ?eBay的拍賣規(guī)則是有一個固定的最后期限來結(jié)束拍賣。 ?Amazon拍賣規(guī)則，不僅要求達(dá)到最后期限，且要求 10分鐘后沒有新的報價出現(xiàn)才算拍賣結(jié)束。 拍賣實(shí)踐 4：信息時代下的拍賣 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計在相當(dāng)普遍的意義下存在，且相當(dāng)有效。 ?政府職能應(yīng)向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)方向轉(zhuǎn)變。政府官員素質(zhì)提高十分必要。 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計及市場設(shè)計需要博弈論。 ?企業(yè)適應(yīng)未來，需要博弈論。 ?目前我國很多現(xiàn)象不合理（費(fèi)稅現(xiàn)象）。 拍賣理論與實(shí)踐：對中國的啟示 ?在我國傳統(tǒng)思維中，機(jī)制是給定不變的，經(jīng)濟(jì)活動是在給定不變的機(jī)制下進(jìn)行的。 ?現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展表明，機(jī)制是可以改變，甚至可以設(shè)計的。 ?激勵相容問題 ?效率性問題 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計來源于拍賣理論，創(chuàng)始人是Vickrey. 機(jī)制設(shè)計理論簡介 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計實(shí)質(zhì)上是一種特殊的不完全信息博弈分析 ?當(dāng)賣者在選擇出售商品的方式時，他事實(shí)上是在選擇或設(shè)計一個博弈規(guī)則。 ?除了拍賣外，政府對企業(yè)的規(guī)制(Regulation)、公共產(chǎn)品的供給、雇主對壟斷企業(yè)的職位安排、保險公司的收費(fèi)和賠償政策，都是機(jī)制設(shè)計例子。 機(jī)制設(shè)計理論簡介 ?著名的委托 代理機(jī)制模型 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計可用委托 (Principal)——代理(Agents)機(jī)制模型描述 ?委托人的支付函數(shù)是共同知識 ?代理人的支付函數(shù)只有自己知道，委托人和其他代理人均不知道。如 … ?委托人選擇機(jī)制，而不是使用一個給定的機(jī)制，這是機(jī)制設(shè)計的一個基本特征。 機(jī)制設(shè)計理論簡介 ?委托人設(shè)計機(jī)制的目的是最大化其期望效用 機(jī)制設(shè)計理論簡介 ?在實(shí)現(xiàn)效用期望最大化同時，面臨兩個約束 ?參與約束或個人理性約束：一個有理性的代理人有興趣參與這個約束。數(shù)學(xué)的語言為：（如果參與該約束）代理人在該機(jī)制下得到的期望效用必須不小于他在不接受該機(jī)制時得到的最大期望效用。 ?激勵相容約束 (incentivepatibility constraints)：給定委托人不知道代理人的類型的情況下，代理人在所設(shè)計的機(jī)制下必須有積極性選擇委托人希望他選擇的行動。 機(jī)制設(shè)計理論簡介