國外博弈論課件lecture(21)-資料下載頁
2024-10-19 13:59本頁面
【正文】 player 1 plays H, T if player 1 plays T Player 2’s strategies are denoted by HH, HT, TH and TT, respectively. June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 19 Sequentialmove matching pennies ? Their payoffs ? Normalform representation Player 2 HH HT TH TT Player 1 H 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 T 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 20 Nash equilibrium ? The set of Nash equilibria in a dynamic game of plete information is the set of Nash equilibria of its normalform. June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 21 Find Nash equilibrium ? How to find the Nash equilibria in a dynamic game of plete information ? Construct the normalform of the dynamic game of plete information ? Find the Nash equilibria in the normalform June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 22 Nash equilibria in entry game ? Two Nash equilibria ? ( In, Acmodate ) ? ( Out, Fight ) ? Does the second Nash equilibrium make sense? ? Noncreditable threats Incumbent Acmodate Fight Challenger In 2 , 1 0 , 0 Out 1 , 2 1 , 2 June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 23 Remove nonreasonable Nash equilibrium ? Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium ? It can rule out nonreasonable Nash equilibria or noncreditable threats June 4, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 12 24 Summary ? Dynamic games of plete and perfect information ? Extensiveform representation ? Game tree ? Next time ? Subgame ? Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ? Backward induction ? Reading lists ? Sec of Gibbons ? Sec of Gibbon
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