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Most of these deals were for stock, and the acquirers were typically in the same industry as the targets (Andrade et al., 2001). This wave of acquisitions was very different from the ‘‘hostile’’ takeover wave of the 1980s, when many acquirers were financiers, and the medium of payment was often cash rather than stock. These acquisitions also differed from the ‘‘conglomerate’’ wave in the 1960s, when mergers typically involved firms from different industries. At the same time, the waves of the 1960s and 1990s were similar in that the medium of payment was generally stock and both occurred during periods of very high stock market valuations. In the 1980s, in contrast, the valuations were lower.Neoclassical theory sees mergers as an efficiencyimproving response to various industry shocks, such as antitrust policy or deregulation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996。 Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). In the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s, wellmanaged bidders built up diversified groups by adding capital and knowhow to the targets (Gort, 1962。 Rumelt, 1974。 Meeks, 1977。 Steiner, 1975). In the bustup takeovers of the 1980s, raiders financed by bank debt and junk bonds acquired and split up the very same conglomerates assembled in the 1960s, because the conglomerate organization was no longer efficient (Jensen, 1986。 Blair, 1993。 Bhagat et al., 1990). The wave of related acquisitions in the 1990s, which still does not have a name, was part consolidation of major industries, and part response to deregulation (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001。 Andrade et al., 2001).The neoclassical theory of mergers has considerable explanatory power, but it is inplete. Because it focuses on industryspecific shocks, it does not explain aggregate merger waves unless, of course, several industries experience shocks at the same time. The neoclassical theory also does not explain whether cash or stock is used to pay target shareholders, even though there are distinct patterns in the data on means of payment in mergers. On the central prediction of the neoclassical theory that mergers increase profitability, the evidence is inconclusive. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), focusing on the period of conglomerate mergers, fail to find evidence of improvements in profitability, whereas Healy et al. (1992), focusing on the period of hostile takeovers, do find such evidence.Last but not least, the neoclassical theory is difficult to reconcile with somestock market evidence. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the market does not react correctly to the news of a merger, with acquirers making cash tender offers earning positive longrun abnormal returns, and those making stock acquisitions earning negative longrun abnormal returns. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that this pattern of returns remains even after the correction for size and booktomarket ratio remended by Fama and French (1993). Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Andrade et al. (2001), however, challenge this evidence on the grounds that merger observations are not statistically independent, and present longrun bidder returns that are lower in absolute value and statistically insignificant. We propose a theory of acquisitions related to the neoclassical theory, but also able to acmodate the additional evidence. In this theory, transactions are driven by stock market valuations of the merging firms. The fundamental assumption of the model is that financial markets are inefficient, so some firms are valued incorrectly. In contrast, ma