【正文】 總?cè)藬?shù)12220各營業(yè)所平均銷售員人數(shù)性別人數(shù)男9918女232婚姻狀況未婚846已婚3814平均年資平均底薪個(gè)人平均業(yè)績獎(jiǎng)金個(gè)人平均售車數(shù)量(三)同儕壓力與論件計(jì)酬差異分析根據(jù)模型設(shè)定錯(cuò)誤檢定與異質(zhì)變異檢定得知，在模型Ⅰ、Ⅱ中最佳之模型分別為模型與，因此將此二模型進(jìn)行比較。從《表15》中可以發(fā)現(xiàn)到在模型Ⅱ中，以模型為佳此模型以不估計(jì)變數(shù)EX為佳，表示在進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商所設(shè)立之模型不討論年資為佳，而模型則全部估計(jì)為佳。從表中可看到不論是模型或是模型其同儕壓力與論件計(jì)酬變數(shù)在迴歸模型的變數(shù)推估中均有顯著之效果。在同儕壓力部分以國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商為佳，以其他人多賺10,000元為例，國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商之銷售人員感受到之同儕壓力較進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商高，以致於比進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商銷售人員多賺550元；若換算成彈性值。在論件計(jì)酬部分則以進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商表現(xiàn)為佳，進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商銷售人員每多賣一臺(tái)車可以比國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商之銷售人員多賺3,553元；換算成平均彈性。其原因可能為進(jìn)口車之單價(jià)較高，所以可以得到之業(yè)績獎(jiǎng)金相對(duì)於國產(chǎn)車較高。此外，模型中女性對(duì)於個(gè)人平均獎(jiǎng)金具有顯著之正向關(guān)係，女性平均比男性多賺8,425元而在模型卻沒發(fā)生，可能原因在於其員工結(jié)構(gòu)上，進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商之女性員工所佔(zhàn)之比率非常少而造成此項(xiàng)變數(shù)不顯著，另外亦間接顯示女性相對(duì)適合進(jìn)入國產(chǎn)車行銷體系?！侗?5》模型比較分析表國產(chǎn)車模型進(jìn)口車模型常數(shù)()()PP(*)(*)SQ(*)(*)EX.()BS()()SEX(*)()MAR()()註：括弧數(shù)字代表P值，*為10％判定水準(zhǔn)顯著；為調(diào)整後判定係數(shù)。伍、結(jié)論與建議本研究主要運(yùn)用自行搜集臺(tái)灣中部地區(qū)國產(chǎn)車與進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商之所轄營業(yè)所之銷售人員營業(yè)資料，探討在工作團(tuán)隊(duì)中，同儕壓力與論件計(jì)酬對(duì)個(gè)人績效之影響。本文設(shè)定模型、(國產(chǎn)車)及模型、(進(jìn)口車)等六條迴歸方程式，經(jīng)過共線性檢定、模型設(shè)定錯(cuò)誤檢定及異質(zhì)變異檢定，最後選擇模型及為實(shí)證分析準(zhǔn)據(jù)。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示：(1)國產(chǎn)車與進(jìn)口車銷售人員皆存在顯著同儕壓力，當(dāng)他人多賺10,000元時(shí)，會(huì)激發(fā)國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商銷售人員個(gè)人績效表現(xiàn)多賺近3,988元，而進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商銷售人員個(gè)人績效表現(xiàn)多賺3,438元；換言之，同儕壓力之績效彈性。(2)兩種汽車銷售體系亦存在顯著論件計(jì)酬效果，國產(chǎn)車銷售員每額外多賣一部車之邊際報(bào)酬約8,408元而進(jìn)口車約11,961元；換算成平均彈性值，二者論件計(jì)酬之績效彈性。(3)在性別方面，國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商與進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商各營業(yè)所內(nèi)，女性銷售人員各佔(zhàn)23%與10%，且發(fā)現(xiàn)國產(chǎn)車女性銷售人員平均收入比男性顯著高出8,426元，而此一現(xiàn)象在進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商則不明顯，顯示國產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商制度相對(duì)進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商制度更適合女性發(fā)展。(4)在年資多寡與底薪高低方面，兩種汽車經(jīng)銷體系皆發(fā)現(xiàn)並沒有顯著影響個(gè)人績效獎(jiǎng)金。(5)在婚姻狀態(tài)方面，結(jié)婚與否並沒有顯著影響國產(chǎn)車與進(jìn)口車銷售人員個(gè)人績效。(6)整合本文之實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)在工作團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)，可以藉由其他團(tuán)隊(duì)成員的表現(xiàn)來樹立規(guī)範(fàn)，形成同儕壓力並搭配論件計(jì)酬之誘因設(shè)計(jì)，可有效提昇個(gè)別成員的績效表現(xiàn)。就本文之研究課題，未來或可朝向幾個(gè)方向延伸：首先，在資料來源方面，本文的資料來自公司內(nèi)部所取得的資料，而這類實(shí)際資料所得到的業(yè)績等變數(shù)有一定之代表性，但是由於實(shí)證公司家數(shù)太少可能有不足以代表整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)之虞，因此未來可朝向增加受測(cè)對(duì)象發(fā)展。另外，除了汽車經(jīng)銷商之外，其他企業(yè)或以銷售為主的組織，如保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)或房仲業(yè)之銷售團(tuán)隊(duì)，亦有工作團(tuán)隊(duì)的問題；在這一些企業(yè)或組織內(nèi)，團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)成員互動(dòng)關(guān)係的決定，以及薪資獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)制度對(duì)其互動(dòng)關(guān)係的影響，亦是值得關(guān)注的問題。此外自政府施行勞工退休金新制以來，每一企業(yè)皆需為勞動(dòng)者提撥月薪所得額6%，企業(yè)為使給薪制度少受勞工退休金制度框住，正積極尋求將薪資待遇績效化，獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制益趨風(fēng)行，這些獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制變遷對(duì)個(gè)人績效及團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)成員互動(dòng)關(guān)係的影響效果，亦是一項(xiàng)值得研究的課題。參考文獻(xiàn)Baland, J. 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