注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照-資料下載頁(yè)
2024-11-01 00:17本頁(yè)面
【導(dǎo)讀】月的專欄里的研究表明，“會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性”的概念，在過(guò)去的150多年中，從一般意義上說(shuō)，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性與當(dāng)前的商業(yè)環(huán)境是存在。著密切的關(guān)聯(lián)的。通常情況下，許多審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的不同概念的提出，都是圍繞著專業(yè)。的會(huì)計(jì)師、審計(jì)師、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和一般公眾之間的獨(dú)立性，所展開(kāi)討論的。和現(xiàn)有的殖民資本承擔(dān)監(jiān)督的責(zé)任。在此期間，數(shù)量上相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)較少的會(huì)計(jì)師事。務(wù)所，卻要對(duì)相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)大數(shù)量的群體執(zhí)行審計(jì)的任務(wù)。的審計(jì)實(shí)體;英國(guó)投資者明確禁止審計(jì)者在其審計(jì)的企業(yè)工作或參與投資。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性這一初步的概念在19世紀(jì)末到20世紀(jì)初發(fā)生了改變。對(duì)于公司的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)益的重要性。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，轉(zhuǎn)向?yàn)樵谪?cái)務(wù)狀況和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的報(bào)告中保。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的客觀和中立的概念，一直趨于上風(fēng)，成為主流。對(duì)其不稱職或不盡職調(diào)查的說(shuō)法上的，而不是缺乏獨(dú)立性。業(yè)本身的尊重、對(duì)問(wèn)題的客觀性的處理、可靠性和誠(chéng)實(shí)，而不是獨(dú)立性本身。
【正文】 some auditors are not sufficiently able to determine which areas of a pany’s operations are subject to the greatest risks. In addition, auditors using a riskbased approach might not detect fraudulent activities. While this new concept of auditor independence may be appropriate for an auditor in certain circumstances, too often an auditor’s efforts to aid management resulted in misleading accounting numbers that concealed true economic performance. During the 1990s, it appeared that some auditors neglected their most immediate responsibility to act on behalf of thirdparty investors or, at a minimum, to be an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards. Pre–SarbanesOxley Proposals to Enhance Auditor Independence A legal prohibition against an auditor possessing a financial interest in a client has been the cornerstone of auditor independence rules in the United States since the 1930s. Until the 1990s, this was not necessarily true in the United Kingdom and some other countries, even though prohibitions against holding financial interests were generally observed in practice because of the standards of the accounting institutes and mon law. Currently, a prohibition against auditors possessing financial interests in clients is virtually a universal principle. Both the SEC and the public accounting profession have focused most of their attention regarding auditor independence on defining and enforcing prohibitions against financial interests. Elaborate rules and reporting structures have been formulated for the purpose of revealing any type of financial interest on the part of professional employees of accounting firms, their spouses, their parents, or their children. The PCAOB has adopted most of these rules, with a degree of relaxation in areas where the rules seemed unreasonable. Rotation of audit appointments. In several countries (., Italy) auditors are permitted to audit a client for only a specified number of years. This type of regulation has never been seriously considered in the . or the ., although SarbanesOxley requires that individual auditors rotate off a client on a periodic basis. In France, the concept of auditor rotation is reversed: Auditors are appointed for a fixed period of time, during which time they cannot be replaced. This rule was intended to increase auditor independence, because the auditor has less fear of being fired by the client. With regard to independence standards, the PCAOB has adopted interim rule 3600T as part of its bylaws and rules. Rule 3600T reads as follows: In connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report, a registered public accounting firm, and its associated persons, shall ply with independence standards: (a) as described in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct Rule 101, and interpretations and rulings thereunder, as in existence on April 16, 2020 [AICPA Professional Standards, ET sections 101 and 191 (AICPA 2020)], to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board。 (b) Standards Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and Interpretations 991, 001, and 002, of the Independence Standards Board, to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board. Essentially, the PCAOB has recognized the independence standards previously developed by the AICPA and the SEC through the Independence Standards Board. Reconsidering Auditor Independence What is needed now is a plete reconsideration of the concept of auditor independence. Such reconsideration might lead to a new concept in which auditor independence would be based on reasserting the accounting profession’s former ethic of being an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards, rather than an advocate for client positions. Given the recent and ongoing accounting and auditing scandals, it seems obvious that independent auditors should not be advocates for client positions. A new concept of auditor independence is required that specifically incorporates the propositions that: 1) auditors should not be advocates for their clients, and 2) management should not be able to influence the audit fee and the scope of the audit. Without a transition to this concept, auditor independence standards will most likely be primarily cosmetic and will not provide sufficient assurance that auditors are in fact independent from client management.
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