戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟ppt課件-資料下載頁
2025-04-29 01:35本頁面
【正文】 trant – The incumbent makes an offer to form an alliance with the entrant and to make available to the entrant y units of its capacity at a price of ra per unit The entrant either accepts or rejects the offer. If it rejects the offer, it enters by constructing its own terminal – The incumbent and entrant choose their output simultaneously. (In the case of an alliance, the entrant’s output cannot exceed y). The entrant either accepts or rejects the offer. If it rejects the offer, it enters by constructing its own terminal – The incumbent and entrant choose their output simultaneously. (In the case of an alliance, the entrant’s output cannot exceed y). 導(dǎo)出模型中的子博弈完美均衡 ? At the last stage of the game – If they do not form an alliance, they produce the Cournot duopoly output, – If they form an alliance, their output is such that – This implies that consumer price in the alliance equilibrium is higher than in entry equilibrium ? At the second stage, the entrant would accept the incumbent’s offer if the profit from the alliance is at least as large as that from full scale entry ? At the first stage, under what conditions will the incumbent offer to form a strategic alliance with entrant? ? It depends on the size of the fixed cost F ? The welfare effects of strategic alliance also depend on the size of F. ? 固定成本大小的不同，形成的均衡不同 ? II 和 III對(duì)社會(huì)福利影響不同 ? II：建立自己的設(shè)施比戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟經(jīng)濟(jì)效率更高，但均衡是形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟。 ? III區(qū)域，形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟更有效，均衡也是形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟 ? 戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟帶來的福利權(quán)衡 – 節(jié)省固定成本 F – 生產(chǎn)的邊際成本提高 (可能造成擁擠 congestion) – 企業(yè)間競(jìng)爭減少 ? 戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟可能帶來潛在效率的提高 ? 同時(shí)，戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟會(huì)削弱企業(yè)間競(jìng)爭，導(dǎo)致價(jià)格提高 ? 從企業(yè)的角度來看，上述兩方面都使企業(yè)獲得益處。 ? 但從社會(huì)福利的角度來看，這兩個(gè)因素符號(hào)相反。 ? 與壟斷協(xié)議有質(zhì)的不同，戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟從總的來講是提高效率，但結(jié)果可能削弱競(jìng)爭。 （谷歌與雅虎聯(lián)盟 利小于弊，所以失敗） 四、結(jié)論
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