managerialandindividualdecisionproblemsasymmetric管理和個人的決策問題的非對稱-資料下載頁
2025-01-17 04:00本頁面
【正文】 s neither state of the world nor the effort/care ? Can only calculate expected output based on probability of different states of the world – for given level of effort Game theoretic model of moral hazard A P contract State of world Good or bad? Good or bad? More effort (less utility) Less effort (more utility) Output? Agent/worker prefers less effort Principle/employer prefers more effort – output generally, but not always higher Principle never knows what the state of the world was/is or the agent’s effort as there is no 121 relationship between action/effort and output. Uncertainty for the principle Output? Moral hazard A P 50 40 40 20 contract State of world Good Bad Good Bad More effort (less utility) Less effort (more utility) Output With wage constant what effort level do you think the agent/worker will choose? What would you do? Agent/worker prefers less effort Principle/employer prefers more effort: Uncertainty for the principle Expected output = pgood50 + pBad40 Expected output = pgood40 + pBad20 Game theoretic model of moral hazard A P 50 40 40 20 contract State of world Good Bad Good Bad More effort Less effort Output Effort doesn’t map cleanly to output so agent has an incentive to make less effort/ be careless but lie: say made an effort but the state of the world was ‘bad’ . agent was unlucky that accident/mistake happened – especially if pBad is low Uncertainty for the principle Possible solutions to moral hazard ? Motivation/incentives for the agent to perform the action that benefits the principle . – Material incentives such as promotion, higher pay, a better job, payment by result, piecework – Social norms – Reputation so that the transaction is repeated – Cost sharing and exclusions in insurance ? But it may not be possible to contract for pliance . so that a person who takes out health insurance takes care of their health, or a mechanic works hard all day etc. because of : 1. measurement, monitoring issues and。 2. uncertainty means that even if the desired actions are taken oute is not certain ? Maybe the agent won’t take the job? Summary ? 2 main problems associated with asymmetric information – Adverse selection ? Detailed examples: second hand car markets, hiring in labour markets, markets for health care – Moral hazard ? Detailed examples: management employment contracts, wage contracts, markets for health care
教學(xué)課件相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1