【導(dǎo)讀】版（公開(kāi)版），昨晚通宵進(jìn)行了翻譯。因?yàn)楸救擞⒄Z(yǔ)水平有限，時(shí)間又緊迫，內(nèi)容較多，文。中的翻譯會(huì)出現(xiàn)大量錯(cuò)誤，請(qǐng)廣大軍迷諒解。未來(lái),包括中國(guó)擴(kuò)充軍力,權(quán)力如何使用.突或領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端，而在其它地區(qū)發(fā)生突發(fā)事件.國(guó)在繼續(xù)追求傳統(tǒng)的陸地,空中,海洋,以及空間和網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間的現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)場(chǎng).事務(wù)自然會(huì)遭到國(guó)際社會(huì)的不理解和迅速的反應(yīng).

　　

【正文】 d” conditions with an emphasis on integrated joint operations, joint logistics, and longrange mobility. In June 2020, the PLA released new guidance to increase realism in training and to expand the use of simulators and opposing forces in training evolutions. In December 2020, the leaders of the mand colleges for the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA ground forces signed a cooperative education agreement paving the way for joint professional military education. In December 2020, the National Defense Mobilization Committee issued the “Outline of National Defense Education for all Citizens,” to standardize defense education across China. The goals of such education include “arousing patriotism … and raising the citizens? awareness of their national defense duty.” 評(píng)估對(duì)臺(tái)灣的威懾 Assessment of Challenges to Taiwan?s Deterrent Forces 臺(tái)灣海峽附近 ,在 2020年無(wú)武裝事件 ,整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)繼續(xù)保持穩(wěn)定 . 北京對(duì)臺(tái)灣總統(tǒng)陳水扁 ,在 2020 年初暫停國(guó)統(tǒng)會(huì)和國(guó)統(tǒng)綱領(lǐng)的決定做出了反應(yīng) . 但是 ,中國(guó)的軍事現(xiàn)代化和部署先進(jìn)能力對(duì)臺(tái)灣局勢(shì)沒(méi)有緩解 , 隨著力量的平衡不斷變化 ,大陸的偏袒 ,可能造成在 2020年 3月的臺(tái)灣下屆總統(tǒng)大選計(jì)劃的緊張 . 臺(tái)灣的國(guó)防支出是扭轉(zhuǎn)下降趨勢(shì) . 2020 年 ,臺(tái)灣的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人宣布計(jì)劃在 2020 年增加國(guó)防開(kāi)支占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的 3 % . 2020年 ,這個(gè) 數(shù)字約為 %的比重 . 2020 年國(guó)防預(yù)算要求的資金在一個(gè)水平 ,國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的 % , 與 2020 年計(jì)劃的補(bǔ)充要求將提高為 % . 臺(tái)灣放棄的策略是運(yùn)用特別預(yù)算 ,在 2020 年采購(gòu)美國(guó)的主要防御系統(tǒng) .但是臺(tái)灣立法院尚未通過(guò)這些撥款法案 . 根據(jù)臺(tái)灣關(guān)系法 ,美國(guó)將繼續(xù)提供防御物品 ,服務(wù)培訓(xùn)和協(xié)助 ,讓臺(tái)灣維持足夠的自衛(wèi)能力 . 2020 年 9 月 ,臺(tái)灣接受交付了的最后兩艘基德級(jí)導(dǎo)彈驅(qū)逐艦 . There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in 2020 and the overall situation remained stable, as it was for most of 2020. Beijing reacted responsibly to Taiwan President Chen Shuibian?s decision to suspend the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines in early 2020. However, China?s military modernization and the deployment of advanced capabilities opposite the island have not eased, with the balance of forces continuing to shift in the mainland?s favor. Tension could also increase as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election planned for March 2020. Taiwan appears to be reversing the trend of declining defense expenditures. In 2020, Taiwan leaders announced plans to increase defense spending to three percent of GDP by 2020. In 2020, this figure was approximately percent of GDP. The 2020 defense budget requests funds at a level of percent of GDP, with a planned 2020 supplemental request expected to raise this figure to percent. Taiwan abandoned the strategy of using a Special Budget to procure major defense systems approved for sale by the United States in 2020. It will attempt instead to fund the programs in the regular defense budget and budget supplementals. Taiwan?s Legislative Yuan has yet to pass these funding bills, however. Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 968 (1979), the United States continues to make available defense articles, services, and training assistance to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient selfdefense capability. In September 2020, Taiwan accepted delivery of the last two of four KIDDclass DDGs. 第 2 章 了解中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略 概況 中國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人并不明確地提供一個(gè)包羅萬(wàn)象的 大戰(zhàn)略 ,概述了戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)和實(shí)現(xiàn)這些目標(biāo)的手段 . 這種模糊性可能反映了刻意隱瞞的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃 ,中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人自己也對(duì)他們自己的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)目標(biāo)和戰(zhàn)略的不確定性 . 但這仍然是有可能作出一些基于 戰(zhàn)略傳統(tǒng)歷史格局 ,聲明 ,正式文件 ,某些軍事能力 ,以及近期的外交努力的中國(guó) 大戰(zhàn)略 . China?s leaders do not explicitly provide an overarching “grand strategy” that outlines strategic goals and the means to achieve them. Such vagueness may reflect a deliberate effort to conceal strategic planning, as well as uncertainties, disagreements, and debates that China?s leaders themselves have about their own longterm goals and strategies. Still, it is possible to make some generalizations about Chinese “grand strategy” based on strategic tradition, historical patterns, statements and official papers, an emphasis on certain military capabilities, and recent diplomatic efforts. 戰(zhàn)略與中國(guó)特色 Strategy with Chinese Characteristics 中國(guó)的總體戰(zhàn)略 ,在于希望保持中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨為核心的連續(xù)統(tǒng)治 . 一個(gè)根深蒂固的害怕失去政權(quán)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)階層的戰(zhàn)略觀 ,驅(qū)使他們很多的選擇 . 作為替代失敗的共產(chǎn)主義意識(shí)形態(tài) ,中共已根據(jù)其合法性的兩大支柱的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)和民族主義 . 作為一種后果 , 國(guó)內(nèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)困難 ,可能導(dǎo)致中國(guó)試圖加強(qiáng)支持激發(fā)民族主義情緒 ,可能導(dǎo)致比我們本來(lái)期望的外交及安全事務(wù)更具侵略性的行為 . 中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和戰(zhàn)略家 們很少使用西方國(guó)家的方法手段建構(gòu)商討策略 . 相反 ,他們討論戰(zhàn)略的兩個(gè)核心理念 : “綜合國(guó)力 ”( CNP )和 “戰(zhàn)略的配置權(quán)力 ”.這些觀念形成怎樣的中國(guó)戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃 ,評(píng)估安全環(huán)境 ,了解中國(guó)的相對(duì)位置 ,在世界上作出調(diào)整 ,流行的地緣政治趨勢(shì) . CNP 分?jǐn)?shù)評(píng)價(jià)中國(guó)相對(duì)于其他國(guó)家的地位 . 這些成績(jī)是基于定性與定量措施內(nèi) ,天然資源 ,經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮 ,我們的外交影響 ,國(guó)際聲望 , 國(guó)內(nèi)凝聚力 ,提高戰(zhàn)斗力 ,和文化的影響力 . 中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的文職和軍事智庫(kù)申請(qǐng)有不同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 年中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué) 院的一份報(bào)告 ,在經(jīng)濟(jì) ,軍事 , 外交上 ,中國(guó)排名第六 ,在世界強(qiáng)國(guó)之林 . 自八十年代初以來(lái) ,中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人曾形容自己的國(guó)家發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略 ,以謀求提高中國(guó) CNP. 他們強(qiáng)調(diào)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和科技創(chuàng)新為中心 ,加強(qiáng) CNP. 一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的假設(shè) ,這一戰(zhàn)略 ,是經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮和穩(wěn)定將給予中國(guó)更大的國(guó)際影響力和外交杠桿以及強(qiáng)大的現(xiàn)代化軍事力量 . 2020年 4月官方的解放軍日?qǐng)?bào)的評(píng)論 CNP之間的關(guān)系 , 軍隊(duì)現(xiàn)代化建設(shè) ,中國(guó)的國(guó)際地位 : 隨著中國(guó)綜合國(guó)力的逐步展開(kāi) ,它的地位不斷上升 ,在國(guó)際事務(wù)中 , 這是一件重大的事情 ,要努力建設(shè)一支軍事力量 ,是同中國(guó)的國(guó)際地位 ,勝任這項(xiàng)工作的利益出發(fā)來(lái)維護(hù)中國(guó)的發(fā)展 ,以鞏固我國(guó)的國(guó)際地位 . 戰(zhàn)略格局的力量 ,大概理解為 聯(lián)盟的力量 ,盡管并無(wú)直接相當(dāng)于西方的名詞 . 中國(guó)戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃者不斷為了潛在威脅評(píng)估 戰(zhàn)略格局的力量 (例如 ,臺(tái)灣的潛在的沖突 )以及機(jī)會(huì) (例如 , 在蘇聯(lián)崩潰 )可能迅速調(diào)整國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略 . 中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人形容 21 世紀(jì)最初的幾十年中 ,是一個(gè) 20 年機(jī)遇期 ,也就是區(qū)域和國(guó)際形勢(shì)總體是和平和有利于經(jīng)濟(jì) ,外交和軍事發(fā)展的 ,從而使中國(guó)崛起成為一個(gè)大國(guó) . 與此密切相關(guān)的概念是 和平發(fā)展 運(yùn)動(dòng) ,以平息外國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的軍事現(xiàn)代化及其全球化的評(píng)議 ,宣告中國(guó)的崛起將是和平的 . At the core of China?s overall strategy rests the desire to maintain the continuous rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A deeprooted fear of losing political power shapes the leadership?s strategic outlook and drives many of its choices. As a substitute for the failure of munist ideology, the CCP has based its legitimacy on the twin pillars of economic performance and nationalism. As a consequence, domestic economic and social difficulties may lead China to attempt to bolster support by stimulating nationalist sentiment which could result in more aggressive behavior in foreign and security affairs than we might otherwise expect. Chinese leaders and strategists rarely use a Western “endswaysmeans” construct