【正文】 o the FB7 fighter program will enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime maritime strike operations and use improved weapons such as the Kh31P (AS17) antiradiation missile and KAB500 laserguided munitions. 防空 Air Defense. 在未來幾年 ,中國將接收其俄制 S 300PMU2 型防空導彈系統(tǒng) . 有效射程達 200 公里 , S 300PMU2 提供了增加殺傷力的反戰(zhàn)術(shù)彈道導彈及更有效的電子對抗 . 中國也正在發(fā)展國產(chǎn)HQ9防空導彈系統(tǒng) ,以相控陣雷達為基礎(chǔ) ,射程為 150公里 . 如上所述 , 海軍 HHQ9將部署于旅洋 2 型驅(qū)逐艦 ,垂直發(fā)射的 SAM (HHQ16)將部署于江凱 2 型護衛(wèi)艦 . In the next few years, China will receive its first battalion of Russianmade S 300PMU2 surfacetoair missile systems. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S 300PMU2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic countermeasures. China also is developing the indigenous HQ9 air defense missile system, a phased array radarbased SAM with a 150 km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ9) will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical launch naval SAM (HHQ16) will deploy on the JIANGKAI II FFG. 地面部隊 Ground Forces 中國有大約 140 萬人的陸軍部隊 ,其中約有 40 萬人部署在臺灣對面的三個軍區(qū) . 中國一直在升級這些部隊的坦克 ,裝甲運兵車 ,以及更多的火炮 . 2020 年 4 月 ,中國第一次裝備了新的第三代主戰(zhàn)坦克 , ZTZ99,將裝備在北京軍區(qū)和沈陽軍區(qū) . China has about million ground forces personnel with approximately 400,000 deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and additional artillery pieces. In April 2020, China made its fi rst delivery of the new third generation main battle tank, the ZTZ99, to units in the Beijing and Shenyang military regions. 兩棲力量 Amphibious Forces 解放軍裝備了新的兩棲攻擊車 (AAV) ,并將升級現(xiàn)有的車輛 ,包括兩棲坦克和突擊車輛 . 其新型水陸兩棲車有更穩(wěn)定的性能 . 同時增加兩棲訓練 ,包括一年中的多種演習訓練 ,這是一支正在建設(shè)中的兩棲力量 . The PLA has deployed a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed a range of modifications for existing vehicles including flotation tanks and mounted outboard engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have greater stability and performance in open water. Increased amphibious training, including multiple training evolutions in a single year, is building proficiency among China?s amphibious forces. 中國軍事學說的發(fā)展 Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine 中國將繼續(xù)把重點放在 信息化 的條件 ,提高綜合性的聯(lián)合行動 , 聯(lián)勤和遠程機動能力 . 2020 年 6 月 解放軍推出了新的指導 ,在演習中使用模擬器和假想敵 ,以提高實戰(zhàn)訓練能力 . 2020年 12月 ,中國人民解放軍第二炮兵 ,海軍 ,空軍和陸軍的軍事學院的領(lǐng)導 ,簽訂了合作辦學協(xié)議 ,為聯(lián)合專業(yè)軍事教育鋪平了道路 . 2020 年 12 月 ,中國國防動員委員會 發(fā)出 國防教育活動 的綱要 ,規(guī)范國防教育 ,包括 喚起愛國主義 ...和提高公民的環(huán)保意識 ,自己的國防職責 . China continues to focus on capabilities to operate under “informatized” conditions with an emphasis on integrated joint operations, joint logistics, and longrange mobility. In June 2020, the PLA released new guidance to increase realism in training and to expand the use of simulators and opposing forces in training evolutions. In December 2020, the leaders of the mand colleges for the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA ground forces signed a cooperative education agreement paving the way for joint professional military education. In December 2020, the National Defense Mobilization Committee issued the “Outline of National Defense Education for all Citizens,” to standardize defense education across China. The goals of such education include “arousing patriotism … and raising the citizens? awareness of their national defense duty.” 評估對臺灣的威懾 Assessment of Challenges to Taiwan?s Deterrent Forces 臺灣海峽附近 ,在 2020年無武裝事件 ,整個經(jīng)濟形勢繼續(xù)保持穩(wěn)定 . 北京對臺灣總統(tǒng)陳水扁 ,在 2020 年初暫停國統(tǒng)會和國統(tǒng)綱領(lǐng)的決定做出了反應(yīng) . 但是 ,中國的軍事現(xiàn)代化和部署先進能力對臺灣局勢沒有緩解 , 隨著力量的平衡不斷變化 ,大陸的偏袒 ,可能造成在 2020年 3月的臺灣下屆總統(tǒng)大選計劃的緊張 . 臺灣的國防支出是扭轉(zhuǎn)下降趨勢 . 2020 年 ,臺灣的領(lǐng)導人宣布計劃在 2020 年增加國防開支占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的 3 % . 2020年 ,這個 數(shù)字約為 %的比重 . 2020 年國防預(yù)算要求的資金在一個水平 ,國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的 % , 與 2020 年計劃的補充要求將提高為 % . 臺灣放棄的策略是運用特別預(yù)算 ,在 2020 年采購美國的主要防御系統(tǒng) .但是臺灣立法院尚未通過這些撥款法案 . 根據(jù)臺灣關(guān)系法 ,美國將繼續(xù)提供防御物品 ,服務(wù)培訓和協(xié)助 ,讓臺灣維持足夠的自衛(wèi)能力 . 2020 年 9 月 ,臺灣接受交付了的最后兩艘基德級導彈驅(qū)逐艦 . There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in 2020 and the overall situation remained stable, as it was for most of 2020. Beijing reacted responsibly to Taiwan President Chen Shuibian?s decision to suspend the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines in early 2020. However, China?s military modernization and the deployment of advanced capabilities opposite the island have not eased, with the balance of forces continuing to shift in the mainland?s favor. Tension could also increase as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election planned for March 2020. Taiwan appears to be reversing the trend of declining defense expenditures. In 2020, Taiwan leaders announced plans to increase defense spending to three percent of GDP by 2020. In 2020, this figure was approximately percent of GDP. The 2020 defense budget requests funds at a level of percent of GDP, with a planned 2020 supplemental request expected to raise this figure to percent. Taiwan abandoned the strategy of using a Special Budget to procure major defense systems approved for sale by the United States in 2020. It will attempt instead to fund the programs in the regular defense budget and budget supplementals. Taiwan?s Legislative Yuan has yet to pass these funding bills, however. Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 968 (1979), the United States continues to make available defense articles, services, and training assistance to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient selfdefense capability. In September 2020, Taiwan accepted delivery of the last two of four KIDDclass DDGs. 第 2 章 了解中國的戰(zhàn)略 概況 中國的領(lǐng)導人并不明確地提供一個包羅萬象的 大戰(zhàn)略 ,概述了戰(zhàn)略目標和實現(xiàn)這些目標的手段